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Introduction
The Dodo says that the Hatter tells lies. The Hatter
says that the March Hare tells lies. The March Hare
says that both the Dodo and the Hatter tell lies. Who
is telling the truth?
A puzzle from Lewis Carrol’s diary.1
Information integrity is of common concern. In every situation in which commu-
nication matters, preserving the quality of information is an imperative need as
well as a continuous challenge. Understanding how information flows, identi-
fying patterns, assessing sources, cross-checking information becomes more and
more demanding as data become more prevalent in society. Unfortunately, infor-
mation is more manipulated than ever before. While manipulations of all sorts
have always existed, new technologies and social media make lying, deceiving
or more subtle forms of disinformation as prevalent in daily life as they were,
during the Cold War, in the hidden realm of intelligence warfare. Whether these
strategies rely on simple mechanisms or on more convoluted scenarios, they are
just as difficult to define as to detect. This thesis proposes to help meet these
challenges.
Unsurprisingly, information quality has also been a field of common interest.
Information being a multidimensional concept, evaluating and protecting data
quality calls for the combination of different methods and tools at the interface
1 This riddle and other Carrollian puzzles have been compiled and edited by Edward Wakeling
[see Wakeling 1992].
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between computer science, analytic philosophy and psychology. Broadly speak-
ing, two schools of thought have contributed to define the field of information
quality since the 1990s.
The first one, the MIT school, combines complementary approaches, the one
empirical, the other theoretical. The empirical approach consists in using empirical
surveys to isolate dimensions that are considered crucial by academics, information
practioners and consumers with respect to information quality [Wang 1998, Lee
et al. 2002]. In addition to accuracy (or truth) of message contents, dimensions of
relevance, timeliness and completeness are perceived as being as important as accuracy
for evaluating the quality of data sets. But this approach based on empirical
investigation has been later opposed to a more “ontological” approach [Wand &
Wang 1996], also named “theoretical” [Batini & Scannapieco 2006]. Contrary to
the first, the ontological approach looks for theoretical and a prioristic definitions
of the dimensions involved in information quality. Crucially, they aim at better
understanding how information quality can be defective, and even deceptive, when
one of those dimensions is breached.
The second school of thought, the Italian school, has taken over in this theo-
retical entreprise by following similar intuitions as Wand & Wang [1996]. Batini
& Scannapieco [2006] look at the preservation of information quality as a fusion
operation with specific issues and constraints. For instance, how can sets of data be
merged when they are based on qualitative discrepancies? How to accommodate
data that are potentially defective and conflicting with each other? But the lead-
ing role in the Italian Group has been played by Floridi who has defined a new
field called “philosophy of information” following Shannon & Weaver’s Information
Theory as well as Dretske’s influential work on the epistemology of information
[Shannon & Weaver 1949, Dretske 1981]. Initial interests on information have
been considerably extended to new areas of investigation such as semantic and
pragmatic issues, philosophy of science, logic, ethics, etc [see Floridi 2008 2011,
Floridi & Illari 2014, for surveys].
As a matter of fact, the analysis of deceitful information has been left aside by
the Italian school until works by Luciano Floridi and, more centrally, Don Fal-
lis. Before the new millenium, misinformation and a fortiori disinformation were
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not considered as information stricto sensu because semantic data were required
to be true to count as information per se [e.g. Dretske 1981, Grice 1989, Floridi
1996]. From a theoretical perspective, this epistemological debate can be linked
to the debate between subsective and non-subsective adjectives in semantics [Kamp
& Partee 1995]. Subsective adjectives are adjectives like blue or good such that
the adjective-noun extension is a subset of the noun extension: a blue bike is a
bike and a good fisherman is a fisherman. By contrast, non-subsective adjectives
are adjectives like decoy or alleged such that the adjective-noun extension is not
necessarily compatible with the denotation of the noun: is a decoy duck a duck? Is
an alleged thief a thief? More specifically, we can distinguish between two kinds
of non-subsective adjectives: privative non-subsective adjectives (e.g. fake) such that
the denotations of the adjective-noun phrase and the noun extension are mutually
exclusive (a fake gun is not a gun), and plain non-subsective adjectives (e.g. alleged)
such that their respective denotations are compatible with each others (an alleged
thief can be a thief ). Most authors agree with those various distinctions but some
do not [see Pavlick & Callison-Burch 2016, for instance].
Consistent with the dominant view in this semantic debate, Dretske [1983, 57]
considers that “false information, misinformation (...) are not varieties of information
— any more than a decoy duck is a duck”. In his Studies in the Way of Words published
in 1989, Grice makes a similar statement: “False information is not an inferior kind
of information; it just is not information” Grice [1989, 371]. Since then, however,
times have changed. Following Fetzer [2004] and Scarantino & Piccinini [2010]
for whom any meaningful data is information per se, Fallis [2009a] and Floridi
[2011] agree that misinformation and disinformation count as real information.
Misinformation is information that is accidentally defective while disinformation
is information that is purposefully defective.
Over the years, epistemologists have devoted efforts to the analysis of decep-
tive attitudes by combining conceptual analysis with experimental protocols and
formal logic. They have offered definitional accounts of lying, deception and
disinformation. In doing so, however, they have made choices that inevitably
went with ignoring other aspects of deceptive information. My thesis project is
motivated by the following observations:
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➤ Methodological Approaches. When deceptive attitudes have been in-
vestigated by epistemologists, theoretical and formal accounts have been
favored over empirical protocols. But deceptive strategies are social atti-
tudes that are worth investigating from theoretical, formal and empiri-
cal perspectives. This thesis aims to combine these different approaches
for analyzing cases of deception.
➤ Theoretical Aspects. Whenever investigated, standard cases (such as
lies) have received more attention than more non-standard cases (such as
misleading inferences and strategic omissions). But non-standard cases are
as important as classical cases when studying deceptive strategies. This
thesis aims to give a more balanced account of both cases of deception.
➤ Practical Interests. Epistemologists have been mostly interested in
definitional aspects of deceptive attitudes. They have generally left eval-
uative aspects to behavioural psychologists working on lie detection or
to computer scientists concerned by information security. But defini-
tional and evaluative aspects are two sides of the same coin. Accord-
ingly, this thesis proposes to consider these two perspectives through
a comprehensive account of deceptive attitudes.
1. Methodological Approaches
From a methodological perspective, epistemologists have focused on aprioristic
accounts to understand the dynamics of deceptive attitudes. Based on conceptual
analysis, they have tried to isolate (sets of) necessary and sufficient conditions for
capturing these complex attitudes adequately. The definitions they have put
forward are called “checklist definitions” [Fillmore 1975] and are assumed to
exhaust the meanings of the deceptive attitudes they intend to capture. Soon
afterwards, however, checklist accounts were challenged by prototype theory,
motivated by Eleanor Rosch’s criticisms of explicit definitions, and by semantic
and pragmatic results from experiments [see Rosch 1973, Coleman & Kay 1981].
Prototypes do not rely on categorical lists of conditions one should fulfill to be
categorised as a liar or as a disinformer (for instance). They rely on typical properties
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that are more or less salient when one behaves as a liar or as a disinformer. In that
sense, typical properties are not as restrictive as necessary conditions in checklist
accounts.
More recently, logic has entered the definitional scene, particularly logics of
knowledge and belief, to see more clearly into this complexity. Static doxastic
logics have been used to characterize lying, many aspects of deception, as well as
dishonesty [Capet 2006, Sakama et al. 2010, Sakama & Caminada 2010, Sakama
et al. 2014]. Epistemic logicians have introduced specific modal operators in
syntax to express the speaker’s intention to deceive (in particular). Semantically,
these attitudes have been interpreted in basic Kripke models enriched with fur-
ther accessibility relations to express preferences and intentions. More recently,
dynamic epistemic frameworks have also been devised for the logics of lying,
truth-telling and bluffing [van Ditmarsch et al. 2012, van Ditmarsch 2014], as well
as for more exotic cases like self-deception [Sakama 2015] or lies that were false
but become true once announced [Agotnes et al. 2016]. These settings have also
helped define types of epistemic agents depending on their degree of rationality or
of the kind of information they convey.
Concerning rationality-based types, van Benthem & Liu [2004] and Liu [2009]
have characterized more realistic agents than those usually prescribed by dynamic
epistemic settings. They have studied agents with bounded rationality due to
limited inferential power, introspection, observation and memory. Concerning
information-based types, updates and other revision policies have been proposed
to characterize cooperative and non-cooperative agents depending on the infor-
mation they convey. Objective truth-tellers and liars, who respectively convey true
and false information purposefully, have been modelled by Liu [2009] as well as
van Ditmarsch [2014], the latter being also interested by bluffers and subjective
versions of truth-tellers and liars. Then Liu & Wang [2013] gave a syntactic coun-
terpart to those types in a language that authorized self-reference. Their goal was
to verify a classic solution to Boolos’s version of Raymond Smullyan’s Knights
and Knaves puzzle.2 In van Ditmarsch proposal, however, the perspectives of
2 This puzzle has been so-labelled by Smullyan in his 1978 book on paradoxes and puzzles
[Smullyan 1978]. A fictional island hosts two kinds of inhabitants: some who always tell the
truth (Knights) and some who always tell falsities (Knaves). A visitor to the island is asked
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the deceiver are considered along with the perspectives of the dupes who can
either be credulous, skeptical or belief revising agents. This complementary ap-
proach was touched upon by Liu [2009] but not systematically investigated until
van Ditmarsch [2014].
In this whole theoretical entreprise, experimental epistemology has been generally
left aside. In 1981, Coleman & Kay published results supporting prototypical
accounts of lying that challenged classical definitions based on necessary and
sufficient conditions [Coleman & Kay 1981]. But since then, experimentalists
have remained on the fringes of theoretical discussions. It was not until 2013
that Adam J. Arico and Don Fallis released empirical data showing that ordinary
English speakers count bald-faced lies (viz. believed-false utterances made without
any intention to deceive) and proviso lies (viz. utterances in which the speakers adds a
proviso that undermines any warrant of truth) as lies in the proper sense [Arico &
Fallis 2013]. Then John and Angelo Turri argued in 2015 for a revised (checklist)
definition of lying called “objective”, in which lying not only implies uttering a
content you subjectively believe to be false, but also implies that the content itself
is objectively false [Turri & Turri 2015]. Immediately, though, Wiegmann, Samland
and Waldmann responded with new results showing that the Turris’ protocols
were possibly ill-founded and that the subjective definition was sufficient as it
stands [Wiegmann et al. 2016].
Since then, further investigations have followed that argue that the speaker’s
intention to deceive is not necessary for lying [Turri & Turri 2016, Meibauer 2016b,
Rutschmann & Wiegmann 2017]. These cases referred as “bald-faced lies” are
deliberate false utterances that the speaker and the addressee know, or at least
believe, to be false.3 Except for a few philosophers [e.g. Sorensen 2007, Fallis 2009b,
Stokke 2013], most disagree that such false utterances are lies, either because they
suspect that bald-faced assertions are not real assertions [see Leland 2015, Keiser
2016] or that the speaker has still some intention to deceive in case of bald-faced
lies [see Lackey 2013, Dynel 2015, Meibauer 2016a].
to deduce who are the truth-tellers and who are the liars by asking inhabitants a finite set of
questions. Boolos [1996] proposed a personal version of this puzzle called “The Hardest Logic
Puzzle Ever”, and based on a variation due to computer scientist John McCarthy.
3 For instance, a politician makes a bald-faced lie when he or she claims that they are “honest”
while having been recently convicted of misusing public money.
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Other empirical studies concluded that one can lie by falsely implicating [Wieg-
mann & Willemsen 2017] or by omitting relevant facts. In this latter case, Wiegmann
& Willemsen [2017] and Wiegmann et al. [2017] have tested folk intuitions on two
cases of omission. One case is when the dishonest speaker refrains from com-
municating some piece of information by changing the topic of the conversation.
But another case of omission is when the dishonest speaker hides information
from the addressee by witholding some relevant part of the truth. They observed
that if lay participants consider that the speaker lied in the first case, they do not
consider that the he or she did in the second case. Aside from these recent forays,
however, the analysis of unreliable attitudes has remained neglected by empirical
epistemologists.
Based on this background, my first goal in this thesis is to combine conceptual, for-
mal and experimental resources for defining and evaluating deceptive attitudes.
Three deceptive attitudes ranging from standard cases (lying) to more peripheral
ones (misleading defaults and strategic omissions), will be studied using a multi-
methodological approach. Chapter 1 focuses on the definition of lying through
conceptual and experimental lenses. Chapter 2 combines conceptual and formal
tools to analyze a paradox that concerns deception by omission through a misleading
default rule. Chapters 3 and 4 propose an integrative framework for evaluating
information quality and spotting deceptive attitudes based on the strategic use of
vagueness (in particular). In that latter case, my approach will be conceptual and
formal but strongly motivated by empirical findings researchers have made.
2. Theoretical Aspects
From a theoretical perspective, epistemologists have concentrated their efforts
on standard cases of unreliable attitudes. Lying, for instance, is one of these
paradigmatic cases. Traditionally, a speaker lies to some specific addressee if
and only if the speaker makes a dishonest utterance with the intention to deceive
the addressee. Broadly speaking, epistemologists have asked whether making an
utterance and intending to deceive were necessary conditions for lying per se. They
have also wondered whether the speaker’s utterance must also be false to count
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as a lie. In lying, deception concerns the semantic meaning of the content uttered by
the speaker. In fact, the speaker’s utterance aims at making the addressee believe
the opposite of the semantic meaning the speaker has in mind.
But there are many other attitudes by which the speaker is unreliable. Deception
and disinformation are not based only on the literal meaning of the speaker’s
utterance. They rely both on semantic and pragmatic features. Deception is
classically defined as “causing a false belief that is known or believed to be false” by
the deceiver [Mahon 2015]. Disinformation is defined as the dissemination of
“misleading information that is intended, or at least foreseen to be misleading” [Fallis
2009a]. Unlike for lies and disinformation, deceptions are not necessarily made
through utterances and are not necessarily intentional [e.g. Demos 1960, Chisholm
& Feehan 1977, Adler 1997], even though some philosophers do not agree that
there can be non-deliberate deceptions [e.g. Barnes 2007, Carson 2010, Saul 2012].
More crucially, both deception and disinformation can rely on semantic aspects
(as in lies) but also on pragmatic aspects, namely on misinterpretations that are
intended by the speaker. Pragmatic strategies of this kind are for instance double
bluff, presupposition failures and false implicatures. Though being indirect strategies
compared to blatant lies, these deceptive mecanisms are considered classical for
being pervasive in society.
In double bluff strategies, the speaker wants the addresse to falsely believe that a
content p is false. But instead of simply uttering that not-p, the speaker starts out
by arousing the addressees’ suspicion in order for them to believe that the speaker
has misleading intentions (first bluff ). As a second step, the speaker simply utters
that p to them. Since the addressees believe the deceiver to have misleading
intentions, they will come to wrongly believe that p is false and will be deceived
afterwards (second bluff ). Double bluff strategies have been studied by Fallis [2014]
based on Vincent & Castelfranchi [1981, 764-766] who qualify those strategies as
“pretending to lie” or “lying while saying the truth”. An example of double bluff is
the following one [based on Fallis 2014]: imagine that the authorities are looking
for a thief who is used to stealing with a mate. If the policemen go at the mate’s
place to ask him or her where the thief is, they will expect the mate to lie for
protecting his or her partner. So the mate can tell the policemen the exact truth
8
since they will probably believe the opposite and be deceived.4
Presupposition faking happens when the speakers counterfeit their entitlement
to make an utterance they are not entitled to make because appropriate pre-
conditions are missing [e.g. Harder & Kock 1976, Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981,
Meibauer 2014]. Preconditions can be missing either because the content of the
utterance fails to refer to anything real (i.e. there is not state of affair correspond-
ing to the facts the content describes), or because the speakers themselves are not
justified making the utterance they are making in the context. In that case, the
speakers lack evidence for being entitled to make their utterances. Presupposition
faking can be seen as intended presupposition accommodation when there is, in
fact, presupposition failure. In case of presupposition faking, the deceiver delib-
erately makes a misleading utterance that intends the addressee to be mistaken
about his or her preconditions. Let us give an example of presupposition faking
inspired by Vincent & Castelfranchi [1981, 763]: imagine that you are organizing
a party in Paris and say to a renowned guest: “It is rather a pity that Elizabeth and
Philip are at Windsor this week-end”, when in fact you are not on first-name terms
with the British royal couple. In such a case, you are faking the preconditions that
would allow you to make this utterance appropriately.
Another standard case of deception is false implicatures [Adler 1997, Fallis 2014].
In false implicatures, the literal meaning of the speakers’ utterances are true and
may be believed to be true, but the pragmatic interpretations the speakers intend
are false. Most authors like Fallis [2009b] and Sorensen [2012] argue that false
implicatures are not lies because the explicit meaning of the speaker’s utterance is
not defective although the implicit meaning of the utterance is. In fact, speakers
do not believe their utterances to be false and are not lying for this very reason.
But according to Adler [1997], Meibauer [2005 2014], Dynel [2011] and more
recently Viebahn [2017], untruthful implicatures that are directly intended by the
speakers are lies stricto sensu. Ones who conversationally implicate believed-
false statements are lying even though the literal statements they made turn out
4 A famous instance of double bluff is given by Sigmund Freud in his book Jokes and Their Relation
to the Unconscious translated in 1960: “Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia.
’Where are you going?’ asked one. ’To Cracow’, was the answer. ’What a liar you are!’ broke out the
other. ’If you say you’re going to Cracow, you want me to believe you’re going to Lemberg. But I know
that in fact you’re going to Cracow. So, why are you lying to me?’.” [see Freud 1960]. This case of
double bluff is analyzed by Fallis [2014].
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to be true. False implicature is illustrated by the Story of the Mate and the Captain
given by Posner [1980] [see also Meibauer 2005 2011]:
“A captain and his first mate do not get along well. The mate is a heavy drinker and
the captain who never drinks alcohol, wants the situation to stop. So, when the mate
is drunk again, the captain writes into the log: ’Today, May 6th , the mate is drunk’.
When the mate discovers the entry, he is so angry that he looks for revenge. Then, he
writes in the log: ’Today, May 20th, the captain is not drunk’.”
The mate’s entry is true since the captain does not drink any alcohol but it falsely
suggests that the captain is usually drunk, which cannot be possible since he
never drinks alcohol. But aside from these standard cases, some non-standard
cases also count as instances of deception and disinformation. Strategic omissions
and misleading defaults are such non-standard cases. But whether intentional or
not, these attitudes have received less attention in the literature than more classical
cases.
The few times when strategies of omission have caught the attention, they have
been classified as instances of withholding information. Bok [1983, 5-6] has chara-
terized omission as keeping secrets: “to keep a secret from someone (...) is to block
information about it or evidence of it from reaching that person, and to do so intention-
ally”. The speaker keeps a secret s from some addressee if and only if the speaker
intentionally and actively withholds the information contained by the secret s
from reaching the addressee. In 1988, Scheppele has provided a complementary
definition of keeping secrets in which the speaker no longer acts actively to keep
secret s from the addressee [see Scheppele 1988]. Carson [2010, 57] as well as
[Lackey 2013, 240-241] then insisted on the distinction between keeping secrets —
that consists in concealing, or hiding, information that is already available, from
withholding information that consists in non-disclosing information one wants to
omit for strategic reasons. As I said, keeping secrets implies that the speaker plays
an active role in the deceptive process. On the contrary, withholding information
is strict omission: the speaker does not intervene to keep the addressee in the
dark about information he or she has. Following Chisholm & Feehan [1977]’s dis-
tinction between “deception by commission” and “deception by omission”, Fallis [2014
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2018] looks at the speaker’s epistemic goals when he or she conceals information
or simply withholds it. According to Fallis, the speaker causes the addressee to
be deceived in the first case while the speaker simply leaves the addressee in the
dark in the second case. As for concealment, withholding information should
be blamed for epistemic reasons, though not as much as for information conceal-
ment. In cases of omission, the addressee is left in a worse epistemic state than he
or she should have been according to the Gricean principles of cooperation.
Misleading default interpretations are close to false implicatures. Misleading defaults
consist, for the speaker, in making the addressee infer a presumptive or probable
conclusion that is false. But despite being false, this conclusion is a perfectly
reasonable interpretation to make. The conclusion the hearer infers is the pre-
dictable meaning one would normally infer from the speaker’s utterance in natu-
ral circumstances. Some have compared defaults to implicatures, more precisely
generalized conversational implicatures, — the latter being defined as context-
independent pragmatic inferences that are automatic and unconscious [Levinson
1995 2000, Horn 2004]. But the status of defaults with respect to implicatures is un-
clear and a subject of debates: Levinson [2000] classifies defaults as implicatures
per se, Récanati [2004] considers them as a pragmatic enrichment of the output
of syntactic processing while Bach [1994] and Horn [2006] adopt an intermediate
position in which default meanings are a subpart of what remains implicit in
what is explicitly said by the speaker. Debates generally revolve around the can-
cellability (or defeasibility) of default interpretations, their availability, whether
they arise locally (on the basis of a proposition) or globally (during the process
of interpretation), and the time it takes for deriving default conclusions (and
which is usually considered as being shorter than for other inferences). Default
interpretations, and in particular misleading default interpretations, have also
been studied in non-monotonic logics as being cases in which the hearer infers
a default conclusion which is incorrect based on incomplete beliefs. According
to Caminada [2009] and Sakama et al. [2010], the speaker also needs to withhold
relevant information to make the default interpretation misleading. If the speaker
was more informative, he or she would prevent the hearer from reaching a wrong
conclusion based on this false default interpretation.
11
Based on those observations, my second goal in this thesis is to study two non-
standard cases that are instances of strategic omissions and misleading defaults to
improve our understanding of non-standard cases of deception. The paradox I
offer to analyze in Chapter 2 deals with the interpretation one would normally
commit after hearing that one will be deceived in some way or another. In that
situation, one would usually infer that he or she will be deceived by some decep-
tive action (commission). This is the default conclusion to be reached in common
circumstances. But if one is deceived by no action (omission), this conclusion is
false and one is in fact deceived on the type of deception itself.
This thesis will also investigate strategic omissions through the interplay be-
tween lying and vagueness (see Chapter 3 and Appendix). In Lying and Vagueness
published in 2018, Égré and I contrast cases of half-truths with cases of omissions
[see Égré & Icard 2018]. The term half-truth has received different senses in the
literature but our use coincides with the one of Engel [2016] and is very close to
Vincent & Castelfranchi’ definition of “deliberate ambiguity”: “Given an utterance
with two possible interpretations or readings in a given context, one of which is true for
[the speaker] A and one of which is false, A may exploit the ambiguity hoping and intend-
ing that [the hearer] B understands the false reading” [Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981,
763]. In that sense, half-truths are pragmatic exploitations of semantic vague-
ness in which the speaker makes an utterance that is borderline between truth
and falsity. By contrast, omissions are instances of (purely) pragmatic vagueness
whereby speakers are less informative than they should according to Gricean
communication principles [Grice 1989]. In our paper, half-truths and omissions
are considered as subcases of semantic and pragmatic vagueness, and compared
to the standard case of lying.
3. Practical Interests
From a more practical perspective, epistemologists have been mostly interested in
defining deceptive attitudes. They have been less concerned than psychologists
and computer scientists with evaluating informational strategies in order to detect
misleading ones. But, in fact, defining and evaluating deceptive attitudes are two
sides of the same coin. One attempts to define attitudes in order to detect them
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when they materialize. Conversely, detecting deceptive attitudes requires having
clear definitions of them to know when they can be ascribed on a fair basis. On
the whole, epistemologists have focused mostly on definitions whereas computer
scientists have concentrated on evaluation and psychologists, on detection. I
briefly review works from psychologists and computer scientists on those issues
before presenting my own perspective.
Psychologists have contributed a lot to the developpment of detection devices.
The best known technique is the “polygraph” also known as “lie detector”. However,
a polygraph does not directly detect lies but the physiological signals, or arousals,
that are caused by telling lies. The questioning procedure that was first used is
the “control test question” or CQT. In CQT, suspects are asked control questions to
measure the arousal they provoke when they actually lie. Based on this measure,
examiners will be able to detect whether the suspects lie or not when answering
to the test questions. In that respect, control questions are deliberately vague in
order to force suspects to blatantly lie to them and generate arousal. Then test
questions are asked that are relevant to the crime under investigation such as “Did
you kill your wife on July 5th?”. Contrary to guilty suspects, innocents suspects
won’t lie at such questions and, therefore, won’t show arousal compared to the
arousal they have shown at the control questions. In contrast, guilty suspects will
generate equal arousal in both cases and give themselves away. The accuracy
of CQT, however, has been highly criticized for being based on pseudoscience:
no strong evidence indicates that CQT detects deception at a rate better than chance
[Research Council 2003]. CQT is known to have stress-inducing effects which
strongly undermine the accuracy of collected results and may lead to convict
innocent suspects.
A more efficient alternative to CQT is known as GKT for “guilty knowledge test”
[see Lykken 1959 1998]. In this technique, examiners do not ask single “Yes/No”
questions (such as “Did you kill your wife on July 5th?”) but series of suggestive
questions that address details of the crime only known to the criminal and to the
authorities: “How was your wife killed on July 5th? Was she drowned? Was she hit on the
head? Was she stabbed? Was she strangled? etc”. The idea is that the correct option
amongst the series of questions will provoke more arousal in the guilty examinee
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than the other options. One of the advantages of GKT is that false positives
are controlled by the range of alternatives the examiner provides. Accordingly,
polygraphs based on GKT proved to be more accurate than CQT ones but have
remained controversial. If GKT have been proved to have a validity above chance
level, guilty knowledge tests still perform far below perfection [e.g. Meijer &
Verschuere 2015, Meijer et al. 2016].
In recent years, other techniques have been developped that rely on verbal
and non-verbal cues. Most of these techniques are based on the “Cognitive Ap-
proach to Deception” according to which lying and deceiving are more demanding
than truthtelling in terms of cognitive load. Deceptive attitudes take more time
because unlike truth-tellers, liars need to fabricate a new story instead of simply
rememoring a true one [Vrij et al. 2006, Christ et al. 2008]. In addition to that,
liars should have a clear view of the story they elaborate to avoid contradicting
themselves [Suchotzki et al. 2017]. This cognitive approach is grounded on em-
pirical data showing that truth-telling does not provoke more brain activity than
lying but that lying generates more activity in prefrontal and frontal regions of
the brain which are usually activated by complex cognitive tasks [Christ et al.
2008, Abe 2009, Ganis & Keenan 2009, Gamer 2011]. Advocates of the cognitive
approach have proposed to improve GKT by measuring and comparing the sus-
pects’ reaction times to test questions in case of truth-telling and in case of lying
[e.g. Seymour & Kerlin 2008, Debey et al. 2012, Verschuere et al. 2014]. In this
thesis, information evaluation won’t be studied primarily from the perspective of
behavioural psychology but from the one of epistemology. Detection won’t be in-
vestigated by analyzing the cognitive mechanism involved in deceptive attitudes
but by helping figure out the taxonomy of attitudes they correspond to, and the
way these attitudes can be ascribed from a procedural perspective. However, it
is worth mentioning works from psychologists since they have contributed a lot
to improve the detection of deceptive attitudes.
Aside from behavioural psychologists, information evaluation has also aroused
strong interest amongst computer scientists, especially amongst those working on
applications to data security and intelligence processing. They have developped
methods for helping practionners make more accurate evaluations of intelligence
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messages, namely of the credibility of message contents as well as the reliability of
their sources. Rightly conceived, informational messages are linguistic contents,
thus having qualitative attributes — semantic and/or pragmatic, that informational
sources deliver with some specific intent — positive or negative. Since drawing
lines can be useful for clarity purposes, a broad distinction can be made between
quantitative and qualitative approaches to information evaluation.5
Quantitative approaches look at information evaluation as a fusion issue. They are
numerical and usually based on Zadeh’s possibility theory [Zadeh 1978, Dubois &
Prade 1990] or on probabilistic reasoning as in Bayesian analysis [Bayes 1763, Jef-
freys 1939 1946, Pearl 2014] or as in Dempster-Shafer’ theory of evidence [Demp-
ster 1967, Shafer 1976].
Fusion operators based on possibility theory capture degrees of uncertainty
about epistemic and doxastic attitudes through possibility and necessity measure-
ments. Different families of fusion operators have been proposed for aggregating
imperfect and hetereogenous intelligence data in that case [see Lesot et al. 2011
2013]. These operators are defined as conjunctive if the resultant score does not go
beyond the minimum of initial values, disjunctive if the result is greater or equal to
the maximum of the arguments, based on a compromise if the result is intermediary
and, finally, variable if the score alternates depending on the initial arguments.
Bayesian analysis has been used to help officers better appreciate the cred-
ibility of intelligence messages by using probability degrees instead of verbal
quantifiers [e.g. Zlotnick 1972, Fisk 1972, Schweitzer 1978, Schum 1987, Barbieri
2013, Blasch et al. 2013]. This proposal was motivated by empirical data showing
inconsistencies in individual and collective interpretations of the existing ratings.
Probabilities are used to define prior credibility ratings for message contents.
Then, Bayesian rules are defined to update these prior probabilities depending
on incoming information one can use to cross-check the message content. But
incoming information can also concern the reliability of the message source. In
5 Even though this distinction is artificial to some extent: quantitative approaches deal with qual-
itative notions (such as credibility, reliability, truth, likelihood, etc.), and most of the qualitative
proposals have a quantitative flavour (through the elicitation of degrees for qualitative dimen-
sions). However, this coarse delineation gives a clearer representation of the field of information
evaluation [see Rogova & Nimier 2004, Capet & Delavallade 2013, Lesot & Revault d’Allonnes
2017, for surveys].
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both cases, however, incoming information helps strike a balance on the prior
probability distribution of ratings.
Fusion operators based on the Dempster-Shafer theory aim at helping officers
compute the plausibility of some uncertain event, as well as the doxastic attitude
to abide by, depending on data obtained from independent sources of various
sensor types [e.g. Nimier & Appriou 1995, Nimier 2005, Cholvy 2004 2010, Pichon
et al. 2012]. Degrees of credibility are expressed by belief functions rather than
by Bayesian probability distributions. Probabilities encode evidence the officer
has for particular messages. But these probabilities are assigned to sets of pos-
sible messages representing possible outcomes rather than to single and isolated
messages.
Qualitative approaches are symbolic and based on non-classical logics. But depend-
ing on whether they put emphasis on the message content (for rating credibility)
or on the message source (for rating reliability), these approaches split into two
strands.
The first strand is many-valued logic and consists in giving assessments of
the credibility of message contents in semantic framework built on more values
than strict truth or falsity. Contents can receive extra discrete values (as in three-
valued logics) or values on a continuum from 0 to 1 (as in fuzzy logics). In both
cases, values are interpreted in an epistemic way: they capture agents’ degrees of
certainty and uncertainty on information quality. Contrary to existing scales for
intelligence evaluation that are based on 6 levels of discrimination, many-valued
settings provide message contents with more fine-grained credibility ratings. But
the main challenge is to define semantic clauses for the conjunction of message
contents that may receive conflicting semantic values. Various combination rules
have been proposed in this endeavour [e.g. Akdag et al. 1992, Seridi & Akdag
2001, Revault d’Allonnes et al. 2007, Revault d’Allonnes & Lesot 2014].
The second strand of qualitative approaches is modal logic. Static epistemic
operators have been defined to capture the beliefs, desires and intentions of in-
formational sources [e.g. Demolombe & Lorini 2008, Herzig et al. 2010]. These
operators are then combined to express profiles of sources depending on their in-
formational pedigree, that is on their disposition to deliver true messages (validity)
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and to be maximally informative when they do so (completeness) [e.g. Demolombe
2004, Cholvy 2013]. On a higher level, two types of unreliable sources have been
characterized by Demolombe and Cholvy such as falsifiers (who sometimes report
false information) and misinformers (who report only false information). Based on
these syntactic definitions for sources’ profiles and types, axiomatic principles
and inference rules are combined to assess new contents and sources through
adequate derivations. In this perspective, information evaluation is conceived as
a way of ascribing profiles and types to the sources under investigation.
Quantitative and qualitative approaches have played a prominent role in devising
innovative methods for information evaluation. Modal logic proposals are more
recent but can be explained by the influence of quantitative approaches that
already dealt with qualitative notions in need of higher specification (credibility,
reliability, likelihood, confidence, etc.). From those observations, my third goal in
this thesis is to propose a modal approach in numerical belief revision [Aucher
2004, van Ditmarsch 2005, van Ditmarsch & Labuschagne 2007], which aims to
bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative approaches on information
evaluation, and to combine definitional and evaluative perspectives on deceptive
attitudes. In Chapter 4, I define a plausibility setting in which prior distributions
of credibility degrees are defined for intelligence messages based on the evidence
officers have for, or against, their contents. That being done, distributions are
updated depending on the reliability of their sources.
4. General Outline
This thesis is entitled “Lying, Deception and Strategic Omission: Definition &
Evaluation” and aims at improving our understanding of some deceptive attitudes
by combining the methodological approaches, theoretical aspects, and practical
interests I have presented. The dissertation is composed of four chapters and
one appendix. Each chapter is self-contained: the notions I intend to analyze in
those chapters, as well as the experimental and logical materials I use to do so,
are explained in due course and reminded when necessary. But although they
are independent from each others, the chapters and appendix are integrated in a
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deliberate order.
In Chapter 1 entitled Two Definitions of Lying, I combine conceptual resources with
experimental protocols to see more clearly into the definition of lying. People’s
understanding of the verb “lie” seems to alternate between a subjective under-
standing insisting mostly on the speaker’s intention-to-deceive, and an objective
understanding insisting on the falsity of the agent’s utterance as being a necessary
condition for lying. A problematic and disputed case is when an agent intends to
say something false, but ends up saying something actually true. Did the agent
lie in those cases? Turri & Turri [2015] answered negatively, but Wiegmann et al.
[2016] responded positively.
Based on two experiments,6 I argue that the subjective account offers a better
explanation of people’s understanding of “lie” than the objective one. I test lay
people’s intuitions on various predicates derived from the root verb “lie” (viz.
“lied successfully”, “lied”, “liar”, etc.), the aim of which being to frame people’s
intuitions on both definitions, and to show that they favor the subjective definition
in the critical condition. But although I do support this claim, I also discuss the
mechanisms by which the objective definition can be retrieved from the subjective
one when the speaker’s utterance turns out to be false.
While the goal of Chapter 1 is to clarify the definition of lying, Chapter 2 looks
at a more unusual case of deception in which the speaker deceives the addressee
through a misleading default inference. This chapter entitled The Surprise Decep-
tion Paradox combines conceptual resources with formal modelling to analyze a
paradox on deception by omission that was formulated by Smullyan [1978].
In this paradox, a sly speaker makes an announcement that triggers a default
inference leading a vulnerable addressee to falsely believe that he will be deceived
by some action (deception by commission) when in fact, he won’t be deceived by
any action (deception by omission). A paradox arises when the addressee starts
reasoning about the deception he has been preyed to: on the one hand, if he wasn’t
deceived, then he didn’t get what he expected (because he expected to be deceived
after the speaker’s announcement), and hence he was actually deceived. But on
6 Supervised by Paul Égré and Brent Strickland at the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris.
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the other hand, if he was deceived, then he exactly did get what he expected,
and hence he was not “deceived”. However, the paradox dissipates when the
deceiver explains to the addressee the type of deception he has been preyed to.
Then comes a state of surprise: the addressee is surprised to realize that he failed
to expect the deception by omission that would actually happen.
This chapter uses dynamic belief revision theory [Baltag & Smets 2006, van Ben-
them 2007, Baltag & Smets 2008b] to investigate on those theoretical and paradox-
ical issues concerning deception by omission. I argue that the speaker’s intended
default can be reinterpreted through a belief update referred as “radical upgrade”
in the literature. Modelling this rule helps understand the various stages of the
speaker’s deceptive plan as well as the addresse’s resulting surprise. One in-
teresting aspect of this paradox is that it raises similar issues to another famous
epistemic puzzle known as the Surprise Examination Paradox [e.g. O’Connor 1948,
Scriven 1951, Shaw 1958]. In both cases, surprise ensues because the protagonist
fails to be a perfect reasoner and thus, to reach adequate conclusions about the
world. But another interesting aspect in the surprise deception case is that the
speaker’s announcement of deception is literally true (the speaker will deceive the
addressee), but is pragmatically misleading (the addressee won’t be deceived the way
he assumes he will be). For this reason, misleading defaults can be compared with
classical instances of deception such as double bluff strategies, presupposition faking
or false implicatures, but should be classified as non-standard cases of deception
for being less pervasive than the latter.
While Chapters 1 and 2 investigate standard and non-standard cases of deception,
Chapter 3 and 4 integrate these definitional aspects with the evaluative perspective
on deception. Entitled The Definition of Intelligence Messages, Chapter 3 focuses
on the scale that is commonly used for evaluating information in the intelligence
domain [see STANAG-2511 2003, DIA-2 2010]. This scale is based on two eval-
uative dimensions for assessing message contents and message sources, namely
the credibility of contents and the reliability of sources. But these dimensions have
been critized for leading officers to conflate objective facts with subjective inter-
pretations when they evaluate messages. In Chapter 3, I argue that this confusion
follows from the subjective dimensions of credibility and reliability that leave in
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the background objective dimensions of truth and honesty.
Chapter 3 sheds light on these objective dimensions to show that a taxonomy
of messages can be derived which integrates standard and non-standard cases of
deception. I propose a 3×3 matrix that partitions the scale into nine categories
based on the truth of contents and honesty of sources. I distinguish three levels
of truth: true, false or indeterminate when the status of the content is borderline
between true and false. I also distinguish three levels of honesty: honest, dishonest
and imprecise when sources are less cooperative than they should according to
Gricean principles. By combining levels of truth and honesty, I then identify nine
categories of messages in the descriptive space of the intelligence scale. That way,
both standard and non-standard cases of deceptive attitudes can be recovered
during information evaluation.
In Chapter 4 entitled A Dynamic Procedure for Information Evaluation, I combine
conceptual and formal resources to devise a new procedure for intelligence eval-
uation. This procedure aims to comply with empirical findings researchers have
made concerning the dimensions of credibility and reliability. In fact, experiments
have shown that credibility and reliability are seen as highly correlated, and even
redundant, by officers on the field [e.g. Baker et al. 1968, Samet 1975]. Credibility
is perceived as the dominant dimension when evaluating messages, whereas reli-
ability, whose role is secondary, helps mark a score on this dominant dimension.
In that respect, the existing scale is ill-founded from a procedural perspective and
should be revised to comply with empirical findings.
I propose a procedure in numerical belief revision [e.g. Aucher 2004, van Dit-
marsch 2005, van Ditmarsch & Labuschagne 2007] that abides by the overwhelm-
ing importance of the credibility dimension and the ancillary role of the reliability
dimension. The distinct credibility ratings are captured through various degrees
expressing the conditional plausibility of the message under evaluation based
on the evidence the officer has for, or against, its content being true. Reliability
ratings are represented through various update rules that modify these degrees
depending on the reliability of the source. This proposal is comprehensive in the
sense that classical and non-classical cases of deceptive messages can be spotted
in the course of evaluation.
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In the Conclusion, I draw some perspectives for future work. Beside the main
chapters in this thesis, the Appendix contains a paper I have written with my
Advisor for the Oxford Handbook of Lying published in 2018 (J. Meibauer ed.).
Entitled “Lying and Vagueness”, our contribution is devoted to clarifying the link
between standard cases of lies and non-standard cases of vague assertions. We
start out by presenting the conceptual issues around linguistic vagueness through
the distinction between main categories of vague language, namely pragmatic
imprecision vs. semantic indeterminacy, as well as sub-categories of imprecision
(generality vs. approximation) and of indeterminacy (degree-vagueness vs. open-
texture). We then analyze deceptive cases of pragmatic imprecision based on
hiding information as well as deceptive cases of semantic indeterminacy based on
asserting half-truths (i.e. on making utterances whose truth status is borderline
between truth and falsity). If hiding information is not lying (since the speaker
does not breach the Gricean Maxim of Quality in that case), we argue that half-
truths can be classified as lies if the speaker’s utterance is true only under some
very peculiar precisifications. Some of the content of this Appendix infuses the
distinctions made in Chapter 3, regarding the evaluation of information.
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Chapter 1
Two Definitions of Lying
1.1 Introduction
Since Plato fighting against sophistry (Gorgias) and Augustine’ two essays on
lying (De Mendacio) and against lying (Contra Mendacio), the topics of lying and
deception have aroused continuous debates. They have spurred a lot of interest
amongst (developmental) psychologists [e.g. Piaget 1932, Peterson et al. 1983,
Bussey 1999], linguists and semanticists [e.g. Dynel 2011 2016, Meibauer 2014],
experimental pragmaticists [e.g. Danziger 2010] and ethnologists. But philoso-
phers, of course, have been on the front stage, especially analytical epistemologists
who have tried to offer proper accounts of the (verbal) act of lying — that is ade-
quate definitions of what it means for someone to utter a lie to someone else. In this
definitional entreprise, most of them have offered iff -accounts of lying, sometimes
called “checklist definitions” [e.g. Carson 2006, Fallis 2009b 2010, Mahon 2015].
The goal of such definitions is to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for lying, the aim of which being to capture people’s theoretical intuitions on the
notion.
By doing so, however, analytic epistemologists have usually left aside people’s
pre-theoretical intuitions on the notion, — either because they consider that the
concept of lying can be fully determined by pure inquiry,1 or that pre-theoretical
intuitions are strictly reducible to theoretical ones and don’t need to be investigated
1 As it is thought to be the case for abstract concepts such as “set”, “relation”, “knowledge”, etc.
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on their own. As a result, these epistemologists have generally assumed that
lying is not sensitive to context and can be entirely manipulated by thought
experiments. Whether intentional or not, this aprioristic bias necessarily sets
apart extra dimensions (such as blame and conditions of success for the speaker,
costs for the hearer, etc.) that strongly matter for defining lies since lying is
a social action. Indeed, lying typically involves two social agents, one of them
— the speaker — having an intention to deceive the other — the hearer — by
uttering a proposition he or she believes to be false. As a consequence, lying is
a multidimensional concept which is sensitive to external constraints and cannot
be grasped by thought experiments only.
For this reason, some epistemologists have joined the definitional debate through
experimental means. Their ambition is to try to assess, complete or even chal-
lenge the aprioristic definitions (analytic) epistemologists have put forward for
centuries. By asking questions about scenarios that involve a dishonest speaker,
the aim is to evaluate people’s commonsensical intuitions about lying to deter-
mine whether these intuitions actually match with the aprioristic definition. We
can distinguish two different challenging strategies.
The first strategy rejects the iff definitional project as being structurally inad-
equate and illusory. Amongst those who consider that iff accounts are too rigid
to capture all the features of lying are prototypical semanticists [since Fillmore
1975]. For instance, Coleman & Kay [1981] hold that a proper definition of lying
should only highlight the definitional traits that are constitutive of lying, namely
the features called “typical” which materialize when using the verb “to lie”. These
prototypical definitions are more flexible than the previous iff ones. They are
less rigid (since definitional constituents are no longer necessary and/or suffi-
cient), and they introduce a semantic dimension that makes them more sensitive
to contextual variations.
The second strategy proposes to adapt the iff project by adding (or removing)
necessary conditions in order to reach adequate sufficiency. In this endeavour,
some experiments have been conducted by John and Angelo Turri in empirical
epistemology. In 2015, they collected data to show that contrary to the aprioristic
credo which they dub the “subjective account of lying”, uttering lies requires to make
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objectively false statements and not only believed-to-be-false statements. Accordingly,
the subjective account should be reinforced by a so-called “falsity condition”. This
is the “objective account of lying”. Immediately, though, this claim was challenged
by Wiegmann et al. [2016] who argued that the falsity condition was superfluous,
and that the subjective definition was satisfactory as it stands.
A compromise strategy could be to integrate the iff strategy to the prototypical
strategy. The concept of lying would be many-sided and more precisely, two-
sided between the subjective and objective definitions. On that view, lying is
pragmatically ambiguous and may alternate between two acceptable definitions of
the same notion. As a matter of fact, the Turris themselves recognized that their
results are consistent with lying being many-sided: “An alternative interpretation of
our findings is that there are multiple senses of “lie,” some of which require objective falsity
and some of which do not” [166]. But they dismiss this many-sense interpretation as
being an easy way out from offering a straightforward account of lying based on
the one-sense interpretation. So, preferably to any compromise strategy, they first
attempted to give evidence for the objective view of lying.
In this chapter, I argue that the subjective account offers a better explanation of
people’s understanding of “lie” than the objective account. I present the theoretical
features to both definitions, and provide empirical data supporting the subjective
view. More specifically, I test people’s intuitions on various predicates derived
from the root verb “lie”: “lied successfully”, “lied”, “liar”, etc. My strategy is to
elicit people’s intuitions in order to show that they favor the subjective definition
in critical condition. Then, I also discuss the mechanisms from which the objective
definition can be retrieved from the subjective one in particular circumstances.
My chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.2, I briefly review the episte-
mological literature behind the aprioristic accounts. I first present the subjective
definition which is known as the traditional (or standard) definition on lying (subsec-
tion 1.2.1). I then point out how epistemologists have been challenging its limits
concerning the necessity and sufficiency of definitional conditions (subsection
1.2.2). I particularly insist on the objective account that requires a falsity condition
as mandatory.
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Section 1.3 presents the main results of the experiments I have mentioned above
[viz. Turri & Turri 2015, Wiegmann et al. 2016]. I start out by reviewing the Turri
& Turri’ plea for the objective view (subsection 1.3.1), and then present Wiegmann
& al.’ response to support the subjective view (subsection 1.3.2). Reviewing those
results will help me sketch the main issues involved in the empirical debate about
lying. It will also give some preliminary insight to distinguish Wiegmann & al.’
strategy from my own.
My purpose in section 1.4 is to defend the subjective hypothesis by testing different
predicates derived from the root verb “to lie” (subsection 1.4.1). I first present a pi-
lot experiment supporting this subjective hypothesis. Basically, I test two distinct
predicates (viz. “is a liar” and “has lied successfully”) which respectively encode
the subjective vs. objective definitions due to their dispositional vs. episodic
forms (subsection 1.4.2). As it turns out, these data are not replicated for more
basic predicates, namely “is a liar” and “has lied” (subsection 1.4.3). However,
a post hoc analysis of the results shows that “has lied” behaves exactly like “is a
liar” in the critical condition (subsection 1.4.4). Both are tracking identical prop-
erties (viz. the speaker’s intention to deceive). This confirms that people endorse
the subjective definition as a core definition of lying.
In section 1.5, I discuss the subjective definition of lying. Though this definition
accounts for people’s handling of “lie”, some points need clarification to make it
fully operative. In particular, one should explain why the falsity of the speaker’s
utterance is not mandatory for lying but tends to increase the ascription of the
subjective definition. My interpretation is that falsity generates a Knobe effect
[viz. Knobe 2003ab 2006] which naturally increases people’s ascription of the
predicate “has lied”. By clarifying this issue, I hope to secure a stronger basis for
the subjective account when falsity enters the scene.
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1.2 Defining Lying: standard account and theoretical
challenges
1.2.1 The Traditional Definition: the Subjective View
Definitions of lying have a long history. Augustine [395] provided the first account
of the notion by writting that one “may say a true thing and yet lie, if he or she thinks
it to be false and utters it for true, although in reality it be so as he or she utters it”.
According to Augustine, lying only requires for speakers to utter contents that
they believe to be false. Whether contents happen to be objectively true or objectively
false does not matter in that respect. In the same way, having some intention to
deceive and directing this intention to some defined addressee are not required for
lying per se. But since Augustine, many other definitions of lying have been put
forward by philosophers. For instance, Isenberg [1965] writes: “A lie is a statement
made by one who does not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to
believe it”, or by Primoratz [1984]: “Lying is making a statement believed to be false,
with the intention of getting another to accept it as true”. Again, these definitions
do not specify that the utterance should be directed towards a specific addressee to
qualify as a lie. In addition to that, all these philosophers agree that a lie does not
need to be false but only believed to be false and intended to be believed as true. [see
also Fried 1978, Williams 1985, Chisholm & Feehan 1977]
The standard definition of lying is more precise, however. Mahon [2015] frames
it in the following way: “To make a believed-false statement to another person with the
intention that the other person believe that statement to be true”. From this account,
an iff -definition can be given that lists all the necessary and (mutually) sufficient
conditions for lying in the traditional sense. This definition is generally assumed
to be both descriptive and normative of what “lying” means. Here is the definition:
Subjective Def. A speaker X lies to a hearer Y on a proposition p iff
(1) X believes that p is false.
(2) X intends Y to believe that p is true.
(3) X tells Y that p.
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In this definition, condition (1) is usually called the “untruthfulness clause” and
explains why the standard definition is called “the Subjective View on Lying”.
The speaker’s belief is crucial here: this is the perspective from which X starts
deploying a deceptive strategy towards Y. In fact, X determines what he or she
aims Y to believe about p (here, that p is true) by first considering what he or she
actually believes about p (here, that p is false). Finally, X utters that “p” to fulfill
his or her intention towards Y.
Note that the untruthfulness clause is stronger than the clause whereby the
speaker simply disbelieves proposition p. In this latter case, X has a weaker
propositional attitude towards p, whether he or she is skeptic or doubtful that p,
or absolutely unaware of the fact that p. Then, it would be counterintuitive to say
that X lies to Y on p in that case since there is no belief that not-p from which X
could deceive Y by making him or her believe that p. One last remark about the
untruthfulness condition is the following: this subjective clause differs from the
“falsity clause” — the latter being objective: p is objectively false. According to the
subjective view, p can be objectively true so long as X believes it to be false.
Condition (2) is called the “intention-to-deceive clause” and states that X sees to
it that Y believe a proposition p that X believes to be false. This intention is a
purely mental state and must be distinguished from the effective attempt to make
Y believe that p. In fact, X’s intention to deceive can fail to materialize in two
different ways. First, X can decide to leave plans unexecuted. For instance, X
makes no attempt to realize his or her intention by not trying to lie after all.
Second, even if X does try to lie, X can fail to achieve this attempt in case he or
she either does not believe that not-p and/or does not tell that p to Y (but to some
distinct addressee for instance).
Finally, condition (3) is named the “addressed statement clause”: X has to utter
that “p” to a specific addressee Y. Making a statement, more precisely uttering
a declarative sentence to Y, is then a necessary condition for lying. As a conse-
quence, so-called “lies of omission” (which are “lies” with no assertions involved)
are not lies in the colloquial sense. Lies are always lies of commission in that sense.
Furthermore, one cannot lie by cursing, by asking a question, by making an excla-
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mation or by giving an order [see Carson 2010, for many other cases] since lying
necessarily implies to assert a declarative sentence. Also, a lie should be addressed
to a human hearer or to a group of human hearers (a crowd, a targeted audience,
etc.), namely to cognitive human beings who are able to understand (and not only
process) the utterance at stake. In this regard, one cannot lie to other sentient
beings like animals or plants, and to non-living entities like robots or minerals
[contra Chisholm & Feehan 1977].
With respect to condition (3), one may wonder which norm of assertion is violated
when we utter a lie.2 But answering to this question first requires to agree on
which account of assertion is the correct one, that is on whether knowledge [e.g.
Williamson 2000, DeRose 2002, Hawthorne 2003, Engel 2008, Schaffer 2008, Turri
2010], belief [Bach 2008], rational credibility [Douven 2006 2009], reasonable belief
[Kvanvig 2009 2011, Lackey 2007] or truth [Weiner 2007, MacFarlane 2014] is the
correct norm of assertion. According to the subjective definition of lying, however,
condition (1) implies that the speaker is insincere. In other words, the speaker
believes that the content he or she is lying about is false, no matter whether this
content turns out to be true or false. Believing that this content is false implies that
the speaker does not believe it and thus, that he or she does not know it. Then,
norms based on knowledge and belief are breached when one utters a lie in the
subjective sense. If the utterance also turns out to be false, norms based on truth
are also violated in that case.
Compared to other verbs such as “to deceive” and “to mislead”, “to lie” is not usually
considered as an achievement or success verb [e.g. Ryle 2009, Carson 2010]. Since
to deceive (and to mislead) can be defined (in the broad sense) as causing someone
to hold a false belief — whether it is intentional or not, one cannot attempt to deceive
(or to mislead) without succeeding at deceiving (or misleading) — that is at making
someone else believe a falsehood. On the contrary, it is generally admitted that
one can attempt to lie without succeeding at lying. Two causes can be invoked for
such lie failures.
One cause of lie failure is if one fails regarding conditions (1)-(2)-(3) above.
2 See in particular Lackey [2007], Engel [2008 2016] and McKinnon [2016] on the interplay between
lies and norms of assertion.
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First, reaching untruthfulness is not always straightforward. Even though X
wants to believe that p is false, X can fail to make it because he or she involuntarily
believes that p is true, or both believes that p is true and that p is false with
inconsistency. Second, X can fail to intend to deceive because he or she does
not really entertain such a malevolent intention, or because they have mixed
intentions towards their intended addressee. Finally, X can fail uttering that p
due to mispronunciation (for instance), and to address it to someone else due to
a defective communication channel.
But the main cause invoked for lie failure is the following: X fails to lie
because X fails to “deceive”. That is, X does not succeed in making Y trust him
into believing a falsehood. Either Y does not trust X and then does not come to
believe that p is true; or Y does trust X but, finally, p happens to be true and not
misleading after all. In this second sense of lie failure, X does not manage to lie
because X does not reach trust and/or objective falsity.
1.2.2 Main Conceptual Challenges to the Traditional Definition
The standard subjective view, though being standard, has also been strongly
debated by epistemologists over the years. The traditional account is considered
to be either too narrow or too broad. In the first case, epistemologists have claimed
that conditions taken as necessary by predecessors, were not so in reality. In
the second case, they have claimed that the three conditions listed above are not
jointly sufficient for capturing the essence of lying.
Concerning necessity, some hold that the “untruthfulness clause” is not always re-
quired for lying. For instance, Carson [2006 2010] and Shiffrin [2014] are permissive
about untruthfulness. Carson argues that the uttered content does not need to be
believed-as-false: it is sufficient that the content is not believed to be true or simply
believed to be probably false. For Shiffrin, even a statement that is not believed to be
either true or false (as it is the case in “agnoticism”) can be a lie if the speaker also has
some intention to deceive the addressee. In the same way, Davidson [1985] and
Barnes [1994] have made even more radical proposals: they advocate that a truthful
statement that is made with an intention to deceive also counts as a lie. Moreover,
Adler [1997], Dynel [2011] and Meibauer [2011] share the Gricean view that a
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truthful statement which conversationally implicates a believed-to-be-false statement is
a lie.
Concerning necessity again, others have proposed to slightly modify the “intention-
to-deceive clause” [e.g. Chisholm & Feehan 1977, Williams 2002]: the speaker does
not want the hearer to believe a statement he himself believes to be false but he
or she aims for the hearer to believe that he or she believes the statement to be
true. Consequently, these authors propose to substitute clause (2’) to clause (2) in
Subjective Def:
(2)’ X intends Y to believe that X believes that p is true.
Mahon [2015] goes a step further: he proposes not to substitute (2’) to (2) but to
supplement (2) with (2’). But the more radical challengers have been [Sorensen
2007], Fallis [2009b] and Stokke [2013]. They argue that the intention-to-deceive
clause is not necessary for lying since there are borderline cases such as “bald-faced
lies” in which the speaker makes an untruthful assertion but lacks any intention
to deceive. A bald-faced liar is effectively lying according to them.3
The objections made against the necessity of the “addressed statement condition”
have been twofold. First, some have defended that making a statement is not
required for lying stricto sensu [e.g. Vrij 2000, Smith 2007]. Withholding information
with an intent to deceive is lying in that sense. Then, lies of omission are lies in the
same way lies of commission are [e.g. Ekman 1985, Scott 2006]. Second, although
a deceptive statement is made, there is no need to direct this statement to some
specific addressee to count it as a lie [e.g. Shibles 1987, Griffiths 2010]. The lie may
even be directed to no addressee as a matter of fact. From this perspective, making
a believed-false statement while intending to deceive an unspecified addressee is
sufficient for lying per se.
Another major source of disagreement over the subjective definition is that condi-
3 Think for instance of muddy-faced children who are making the untruthful assertion to their
mother that they have not been playing in the mud. Are they lying or not? In case they do lie
to their mother and given that the mother can easily read on their faces that they do, are the
children having any intention to deceive her?
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tions (1)-(2)-(3) are not mutually sufficient for lying. For instance, Simpson [1992],
Frankfurt [1999] and Faulkner [2007] have successively claimed that condition (2)
must be reinforced by the clause (2’) mentioned above. The main point about
sufficiency is that a “falsity condition” should be added to the standard account: p
has to be objectively false [e.g. Krishna 1961, Grotius 2005, Grimaltos & Rosell 2013].
In other words, the adequate view on lying is more surely objective (p is objectively
false) than purely subjective (p is subjectively believed-to-be-false). Others, like
Carson [2006 2010] and Saul [2012], have argued that this extended definition is
not the only right definition of lying. This definition is an other account of lying
that should be considered on top of the traditional one.
Let us give an iff -definition listing all necessary and sufficient conditions for lying
in the objective sense:
Objective Def. A speaker X lies to a hearer Y on a proposition p iff
(1) X believes that p is false.
(2) X intends Y to believe that p is true.
(3) X tells Y that p.
(4) p is false.
As I said, this objective definition is usually considered too strong: most analyt-
ical epistemologists reject the falsity condition as unnecessary. But empirically, this
definition is supported since one of the first experimental studies on lying. In Pro-
totypical Semantics: The English Word LIE published in 1981, Coleman & Kay asked
participants to read eight different stories and then, asked them to rate whether a
statement made by the main character was a lie or not (On scale: 1 = ‘Very sure
non-lie’ - 7 = ‘Very sure lie’). One of the vignettes involved a statement that (i)
was believed to be false, (ii) was intended to deceive and (iii) was objectively false
(Story I), while an other vignette involved a statement that (i) was believed to be
false, (ii) was intended to deceive but (iii) was objectively true (Story IV). Although
both statements were believed to be false and were intended to deceive, the first
statement — which was objectively false, was considered more of a lie than the
second statement which was objectively true (6,96 contra 5,16).
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More recently, the objective view has found new ardent advocates in Turri &
Turri’ empirical work. I will now present the experimental protocol they have
promoted to support the “falsity condition”. Then I will review Wiegmann et al.
[2016]’ response in favor of the subjective account.
1.3 The Subjective vs. Objective View on Lying:
previous experimental results
1.3.1 Turri & Turri’ Plea for Falsity: the Objective View
In The Truth about Lying published in 2015, Angelo and John Turri attempted to
provide empirical data to support the objective definition of lying. They aimed to
show that folk intuitions required that the speaker uttered a statement that was
objectively false in order to lie in the colloquial sense. To this end, they ran three
different experiments involving a slight variation on the same story.
In the first experiment (and the subsequent replication), they considered the follow-
ing scenario:
“Jacob’s friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will
alert the public to serious corruption in the government. Soon some federal
agents visit Jacob and ask where Mary is. Jacob realizes that they want to
detain her for what she did. Jacob thinks that Mary is at her brother’s house.
He is very concerned about Mary and does not want her to be detained.
Jacob tells the agents, “She is at [the grocery store/her brother’s house] on the
corner.” However, unbeknownst to Jacob, Mary is at the grocery store, where
the agents find and arrest her.”
From this story, Turri & Turri built a 2×2 between-subject design, based on 2 factors
(Intention/Predicate), with 2 levels of the factor Intention (“Honest”/“Dishonest”)
and 2 levels of the factor Predicate (“Lied”/“Told the truth”). In dishonest condi-
tions, Jacob told the authorities something true (viz. that “Mary is at the grocery
store”) despite his malevolent intention to deceive the authorities. In honest con-
ditions, he told the agents something false (viz. that “Mary is at her brother’s
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house”) despite his benevolent intention to inform them. Both in honest and dis-
honest conditions, some participants were asked the test question “Did Jacob lie
about Mary’s location?” (Yes/No) while others had to answer the following one:
“Did Jacob tell the truth about Mary’s location?” (Yes/No). In the critical case
[Dishonest/True] in which Jacob said something he believed to be false but that
was objectively true, 78,3 % of subjects answered that he did lie. This result was
then replicated with graded measures (On scale: 1 = “Strongly disagree” - 7 =
“Strongly agree”) instead of dichotomous ones. Participants were asked to rate
the statements “Jacob lied about Mary’s location” and “Jacob told the truth about
Mary’s location”. The preceding results were confirmed: subjects agreed that
Jacob lied at 5,59/7 (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: The Turris’ first experiment (left) and replication (right).
All these data appear to support the subjective view on lying: “A dishonest asser-
tion is a lie even if it turns out to be objectively true”. But the Turris claimed that
interpreting the data this way is biased for two distinct reasons (even though they
did not test those hypotheses afterwards). First, the Turris consider that partici-
pants may have taken the perspective of the speaker for rating his utterance as a
lie. In other words, people would assess how the protagonist would rate his own
attitude if he or she was Jacob: “If the agent [Jacob] makes a dishonest assertion, then
he thinks that he is lying” [163] and his assertion must be rated as a straightforward
lie. Second, the Turris think that the subjects did not really answer to the test
question “Did Jacob lie about Mary’s location?” but used it “as an opportunity to
express their approval or disapproval of the protagonist’s conduct” [163]. This means
that they reinterpreted the test question in the following way “Is Jacob’s conduct
morally good or wrong?” and the collected data were thus purely “artifactual”.
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For those two reasons, Turri & Turri decided to make a second experiment offering
higher flexibility to respondents. They esteemed that the biases they identified
(perspective-taking, blame-opportunity) were created by the formulations of the test
question (“Did Jacob lie about Mary’s location?”) and of the response option (“Ja-
cob lied about Mary’s location”). The Turris make the following point: intending
to lie is not the same thing as lying per se, viz. as succeeding at lying. Even though
both cases require to assert a believed-false statement while intending to deceive,
one only succeeds at lying if one actually asserts a false statement. But the formula-
tions at stake did not make this kind of distinction and relied on ambiguity. To
decide whether Jacob lied in the dishonest case, participants could only evaluate
Jacob’s intention and due to perspective-taking and blame-considerations, were
led to answer positively. To offset these unwanted effects, Turri & Turri slightly
modified the initial scenario in the following way:
“Jacob’s friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will
alert the public to serious government corruption. Soon some federal agents
visit Jacob and ask where Mary is, in order to detain her. Jacob thinks that
Mary is at [the grocery store/her brother’s house], so he tells the agents, “She
is at [the grocery store/her brother’s house].” In fact, Mary is at the grocery
store.”
From this modified version, they built a 2×2 between-subject design, based on
2 factors (Intention/Content), with 2 levels of the factor Intention (“Honest”/-
“Dishonest”) and 2 levels of the factor Content (“True”/“False”). Participants were
randomly assigned to four kinds of vignettes: [Dishonest/True], [Dishonest/False],
[Honest/True] and [Honest/False]. Note that Jacob could now utter a statement
that was either true or false, whether or not he had a benevolent or malevolent
intention towards the authorities. Both in honest and dishonest conditions, par-
ticipants were then asked to choose between four different options describing
Jacob’s attitude when he was talking to the authorities:
(1) He tried to tell the truth and succeeded in telling the truth;
(2) He tried to tell the truth but failed to tell the truth;
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(3) He tried to tell a lie but failed to tell a lie;
(4) He tried to tell a lie and succeeded in telling a lie.
By using these formulations that separated Jacob’s utterance between a trying-
part (“tried to tell a lie”) and a result-part (“succeeded in telling a lie/failed to tell
a lie”), the Turris wanted subjects to rate Jacob’s assertion (as a lie or not) rather
than his moral conduct (as blameworthy or not). More specifically, they wanted
participants to leave aside Jacob’s perspective by asking if he actually succeeded
at lying or failed. In the dishonest conditions in which Jacob intended to deceive
the agents, 88 % of the participants agreed that Jacob tried to lie but failed in the
[Dishonest/True] case, while 95 % of the participants agreed that Jacob tried to lie
and succeeded at lying in the [Dishonest/False] case (see Figure 1.2). The Turris
concluded that intending to deceive and saying something you believed to be
false but that turned out to be objectively true was not lying per se.
Figure 1.2: The Turris’ second experiment.
According to the Turris, these results defeat the subjective view since, by checking
option (4), “only 5 % of the participants (2 of 41) classified a dishonest but true assertion
as a lie” [165]. On the contrary, the Turris claimed that the data strongly supported
the objective account: only statements that were both dishonest and false were
judged as being “lies” stricto sensu. Besides that, they argued that it could be held
that “a failed lie is still a lie, just as a failed attempt is still an attempt” [165]. In other
words, when 88 % of the participants agreed that a dishonest but true assertion
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was a failed lie, they may have misunderstood what a “failed lie” is. They may
have thought that Jacob still lied (since he committed the act of lying) but that he
failed to say something objectively false.
As a consequence, the Turris conducted a third experiment based on the previous
one. They kept the second scenario and the 2×2 Intention vs. Content between-
subject design from the second experiment. But instead of asking people to choose
between four options (“Which better describes Jacob?”), they asked them to choose
between only two:
(1) He tried to lie and actually did lie;
(2) He tried to lie but only thinks he lied.
They also put a prime before presenting the test options: “What Jacob said is
objectively ——.” (True/False). By doing so, they expected people to pay more
attention to the difference between what Jacob subjectively believed and what was
objectively the case, — the aim of such a strategy being to offset any potential
perpective-taking. The results confirmed those of the second experiment in the
(critical) dishonest conditions (see Figure 1.3): only 10 % of the participants (4 out
of 40) qualified a [Dishonest/True] assertion as a lie while 90 % of the participants
(36 out of 40) qualified a [Dishonest/False] assertion as a lie.
Figure 1.3: The Turris’ third experiment.
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From all those experiments, the Turris concluded that only dishonest false statements
count as lies stricto sensu. Contrary to the subjective view, dishonest but true assertions
are not lies according to them: they are only attempts to lie but not real lies. As
a result, the adequate view on lying is the objective definition which requires
a falsity condition as a supplement. Nevertheless, this radical conclusion has
been immediately challenged by three psychologists a year later. Wiegmann,
Samland and Waldmann explained that the Turris’ plea for the objective view
was not conclusive at all. The Turris’ main arguments to dismiss the subjective
view (perspective-taking, blame-opportunity, etc.) were not compelling and could be
easily blocked. Moreover, Wiegmann & al. claimed that the Turris’ protocols were
defective since they generated order and framing effects favoring the objective
view over the subjective one. I now present Wiegmann & al.’ defense of the
subjective definition against the Turris’ attacks.
1.3.2 Wiegmann & al.’ Defense of the Subjective View
In Lying Despite Telling the Truth published in 2016, Wiegmann, Samland and Wald-
mann answer to the Turris by taking into account conversational and experimental
pragmatics [e.g. Grice 1989, Noveck & Reboul 2008]. Their main hypothesis is
that participants in the Turris’ protocols did support the subjective view but “were
led by the two-part response options to interpret the test question being not merely about
whether Jacob lied but about whether what Jacob said was objectively false” [37-38].
Splitting the options between a trying-part and a result-part being pragmatically
misleading, Wiegmann & al. proposed to come back to one-part response options.
They aimed to prove that dishonest but true assertions were lies in the same sense
dishonest and false assertions were. More generally, they wanted to show that
according to folk intuitions, the standard account is a more adequate definition
of lying than the revised one. To this end, they used Turri & Turri’s following
original scenario as a basis to build four different experiments — the last protocol
being a comparison between the verbs “to lie” and “to promise” to address the
Turris’ framing effect(s). Note that this original scenario corresponds to the Turris’
[Dishonest/True] condition in which Jacob intended to deceive the authorities but
unexpectedly turned out to tell them the truth (i.e. that Mary was at the grocery
store):
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“Jacob’s friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will
alert the public to serious government corruption. Soon some federal agents
visit Jacob and ask where Mary is in order to detain her. Jacob thinks that
Mary is at her brother’s house, so he tells the agents, “She is at the grocery
store.” In fact, Mary is at the grocery store.”
Let us first recall that the Turris dismissed theirs findings as artifactual in their
first experiment and replication. In particular, they held that people may have
taken the test questions and options as blame-opportunities to “express their approval
or disapproval of the protagonist’s conduct”. “Of the available options, the best way
to register disapproval is to say that the protagonist lied” when he or she utters a
believed-false statement while intending to deceive, even though the statement
happens to be objectively true [Turri & Turri 2015, 163]. Nevertheless, the Turris
did not provide any empirical data to account for this explanation. So Wiegmann
& al.’ planned their first experiment to fill this gap.
They designed a 2×2 between-subject design, based on 2 factors (Scenario/Pre-
dicate), with 2 levels of the factor Scenario (“Original”/“Dictator”) and 2 levels
of the factor Predicate (“Lie”/“Blame”). Subjects were presented with either the
original scenario or the dictator scenario, the latter being a modified version of the
story taking place in a dictatorship:
“Jacob’s friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will
alert the public to serious government corruption. Soon some federal agents
visit Jacob and ask where Mary is in order to detain her. Jacob and Mary
live in a country ruled by a merciless dictator who commits crimes against
humanity. Mary has reported these crimes and therefore faces torture if she
gets caught. Jacob thinks that Mary is at her brother’s house, so he tells the
agents, “She is at the grocery store.” In fact, Mary is at the grocery store.”
Then, participants were asked either “Did Jacob lie about Mary’s location?”
(Yes/No) or “Is Jacob (morally) to be blamed for trying to deceive the agents?”
(Yes/No). The data are summed up in Figure 1.4. Concerning lying, results were
comparatively the same in the original and dictator versions: 85 % vs. 84 % of
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“Yes” responses. Concerning blame, significantly more participants judged that
Jacob should be blamed in the original scenario than in the dictator one: 33% vs.
16 % of “Yes”. Thus Wiegmann & al. concluded that the Turris’ blame argument
for dismissing the subjective view was irrelevant.
Figure 1.4: Wiegmann & al.’ first experiment.
Wiegmann & al. then ran a second experiment to address the Turri & Turri’s claim
that perpective-taking benefited to the subjective account over the objective account.
They devised a 2×2 between-subject design that was similar to the design of the
first experiment, except that they conceived an alternative version of the original
scenario by adding an extra component to the test options — the aim of which
being to emphasize that Jacob’s statement was objectively true when he tried to
lie. If participants still agreed that Jacob lied when his utterance turned out to
be true, Wiegmann & al. could conclude that the Turris’ argument on perspective-
taking was also disproved. The material used in this experiment consisted of the
preceding original scenario but participants were now assigned to test options that
were put either without ending or with an additional ending (see plus sign and square
brackets not displayed on the screen):
(1) He tried to tell a lie but failed to tell a lie
+[because what he said turned out to be true];
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(2) He tried to tell a lie and succeeded in telling a lie
+[although what he said turned out to be true].
When the original scenario was followed by test options without ending, the Turris’
second experiment was replicated (see Figure 1.5): only 22 % of subjects said that
Jacob succeeded at lying while 78 % said that he did not. But when the original
scenario was followed by test options with an additional ending, the Turris’ claim
was proven false (see Figure 1.5 again): 72 % of the participants judged that Jacob
succeeded at lying when his deceptive utterance turns out to be true while 28 %
judged that he did not. Accordingly, perspective-taking could not be taken as a
confound to invalidate the subjective view of lying.
Figure 1.5: Wiegmann & al.’ second experiment.
Wiegmann & al. criticized the Turris’ prejudices against the subjective view but
they also tried to explain why their experiments favored the objective view over
the subjective one. They ran two further experiments to point out that the objective
account benefited from order effects and framing effects in the Turris’ protocols.
As a reminder, the Turris conducted a third experiment because they thought
that the data obtained from rephrasing the response options (second experiment)
could be seen as “artifactual” (due to perspective-taking). They modified the two-
response options to put more emphasis on the difference between subjective
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truth (viz. Jacob’s belief about Mary’s location) and objective truth (viz. Mary’s
actual location): (1) He tried to lie and actually did lie vs. (2) He tried to lie but
only thinks he lied. Besides that, the Turris put a prime before the test options
(“What Jacob said is objectively ——.” (True/False)) to force participants to pay
more attention to the subjective/objective contrast. Nevertheless, Wiegmann &
al. argued that this prime actually disadvantaged the subjective view of lying
by appearing as a demand characteristic “alerting subjects that (...) objective truth or
falsity [was] particularly relevant for answering the test question” [40]. More precisely,
they highly suspected that this prime led participants to reinterpret the result-part
(“actually did lie”, “only thinks he lied”) as a request to assess objective falsity.
But since falsity was missing in the Turris’ [Dishonest/True] condition, subjects
were necessarily led to answer that Jacob did not lie in this case.
Thus, Wiegmann & al.’ third experiment aimed at testing this potential order effect.
They devised a 2 (Prime: “Present” vs. “Absent”) × 2 (Ending: “Added” vs. “Not
added”) between-subject design based on their original scenario (that matched
with the Turris’ [Dishonest/True] condition). In the “present” conditions, subjects
were asked the same question as before: “What Jacob said is objectively ——.”
(True/False). In the “absent” conditions, they were not asked any question. Then,
in all the conditions, participants were assigned to the test question “Which better
describes Jacob?” and provided with the following response options put either
without ending or with an additional ending:
(1) He tried to lie and actually did lie
+[although what he said turned out to be true];
(2) He tried to lie but only thinks he lied
+[because what he said turned out to be true].
Wiegmann & al.’ prediction was confirmed (see Figure 1.6). When a prime
was added before the original scenario given without ending, the Turris’ results
were replicated: 74 % of subjects agreed that Jacob did not lie while only 26 %
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agreed that he did. But the results reversed when a prime was added before the
original scenario now followed by an additional ending on objective truth: 58 %
of the participants agreed that Jacob did lie while 42 % agreed that he did not.
The results were even more significant when no prime was added to the ending
case: 81 % of people said that Jacob lied while 19 % said that he did not. As a
consequence, adding a prime on objective truth created an order effect that strongly
benefited to the objective view.
Figure 1.6: Wiegmann & al.’ third experiment.
Finally, Wiegmann & al. introduced conversational and experimental pragmatics
to argue that the Turris’ two-parts response options generated a framing effect. We
know that their main point was that splitting the response options led participants
to reinterpret the experimentator’s intentions. Given that one-part response op-
tions were interpreted as requests to assess whether someone lied or not, moving
to two-parts options was understood as a request to assess objective falsity. To
better support their claim, Wiegmann & al.’ fourth experiment drew a compari-
son between verbs “to lie” and “to promise” whose understandings seem to be
affected by framing effects. I won’t go into the details of Wiegmann & al.’ fourth
experiment but they did observe the following phenomena: in case a speaker made
a promise and participants were presented with one-part dichotomous options
to pick (“He made a promise” vs. “He did not make a promise”), participants
strongly agreed that the speaker did make a promise. But in the same situation, they
were immediately less prone to agree that the speaker did make a promise when
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presented with two-parts dichotomous options (“He tried to make a promise but
failed to make a promise” vs. “He tried to make a promise and succeeded in
making a promise”).
From this observation, Wiegmann & al. infered that “as in the case of ’lying’,
participants could be pushed into answering that the agent failed to make a promise
although in the other conditions they clearly expressed that he did make a promise”
[41]. Thus, manipulating the response options strongly influenced the subjects’
understandings of the experimentator’s intended meaning(s). But, according to
Wiegmann & al., taking into account these pragmatical reinterpretations should
not lead to modify our common grasp of the verbs “to promise” and “to lie”. From
the lying perspective, the good reason to keep the standard subjective view is that
moving to the objective one would only result from a misunderstanding caused
by framing effects.
In Lying Despite Telling the Truth, Wiegmann & al. addressed the Turris’ arguments
on perspective-taking and blame-opportunity, and then pointed out two distinct flaws
in their experimental protocols, namely order and framing effects. We know that
their main goal was to rehabilitate the subjective definition against the Turris’
attacks. In the remaining part of this chapter, I also advocate that the standard
account is more adequate than the revised one. I provide new empirical data
showing that people naturally endorse the subjective definition in critical condi-
tion.
1.4 The Subjective Core Definition of Lying
1.4.1 Main Point
Let us first remind the Turris’ results for the predicate “Lied” in their first exper-
iment and replication. Their initial story involved a possibly sly speaker, Jacob,
who was telling the authorities a content he believed to be false but that turned
out to be objectively true. Note that Jacob was alternatively honest or dishonest
depending on whether (or not) he intended to deceive the authorities. In the
dishonest case where Jacob actually intended to deceive the agents, 78,3 % of sub-
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jects answered that he “lied” even though he told the truth. This result was then
replicated with graded measures; participants again strongly agreed that Jacob
lied at 5,59 (out of 7) in that case. Nevertheless, these results were immediately
dismissed: the Turris condemned their protocols as being defective and decided
to run further experiments to fully invalidate the subjective view. Immediately,
though, Wiegmann & al. argued that the Turris’ initial data were perfectly accept-
able (“the best test for assessing how people understand the concept of lying” [38]) and
that the subjective account was the proper definition of lying.
I do believe that Wiegmann & al. brought enough factual evidence that the
subjective definition is appropriate as it stands. But I ran further experiments
to shore up the subjective account through new empirical paths. I hypothesized
that testing dispositional and episodic predicates derived from the root verb
“to lie” could help frame the difference between the objective and subjective
definitions. My goal was to correct a major confound in the Turris’ experiments.
Their designs gave an unfair advantage to the objective view by just providing
episodic predicates4 to assess a dishonest utterance as a lie or not.
So my own protocols aimed to reserve a better place to the subjective view
by testing the respondents’ intuitions on a dispositional predicate in addition
to the episodic ones. I ran a pilot experiment to test people’s intuitions on the
dispositional/episodic pair “is a liar”/“has lied successfully”; and then I attempted
to replicate these results for the more basic pair “is a liar”/“has lied”. By doing so,
participants were allowed to answer that a dishonest speaker lied in the subjective
sense (by ascribing the dispositional predicate “is a liar”) even though he did not in
the objective sense (by not ascribing the episodic predicates “has lied successfully”
or “has lied”), — and the other way around.
But I also wanted to know which role the speaker’s false utterance and
intention-to-deceive play when ascribing both predicative forms. In my exper-
iments, I observed that the subjective sense of “lie” was driven equally by the
speaker’s false utterance and intention-to-deceive, while its objective sense was
driven mainly by the speaker’s intention-to-deceive. I now present the data I
collected in a pilot experiment (for pair “liar”/“lied successfully”) and in a tentative
4 Such as “lied”, “tried to tell a lie”, “succeeded in telling a lie”, etc.
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replication (for pair “liar”/“lied”).
1.4.2 Pilot Experiment
1.4.2.1 Pilot Hypothesis
The Turris’ test questions (“X lied?”) and options (“X tried to lie” vs. “X succeeded
at”/ “X failed to”/“X only thinks”) put a strong emphasis on the act of having
lied successfully, that is on the episodic dimension of the verb “to lie”. Hence,
according to my hypothesis, their design was inevitably biased in favor of the
objective view of lying. In my pilot experiment, the main goal was to correct this
potential confound by offering a more-balanced testing protocol. To do so, my
pilot hypothesis was that asking participants to rate “X is a liar?” (in addition to
“X lied successfully” and to the Turris’ predicate “X tried to lie”), could help
emphasize the dispositional dimension of the verb “to lie” which is crucial but
not treated in an equal way by our predecessors. By doing so, I aimed to show
that the subjective definition more adequately captured people’s understanding
of “lie”.
1.4.2.2 Design and Materials
The experiment rests on a 3×2×2 between-subject design, based on 3 factors (Pre-
dicate/Intention/Content), with 3 levels of the factor Predicate (“X is a liar”/“X
tried to lie”/“X lied successfully”), 2 levels of the factor Intention (“Honest”/
“Dishonest”) and 2 levels of the factor Content (“True”/“False”). The study was
conducted online on Qualtrics and Mechanical Turk with a number of 122 partic-
ipants (Raw Number N = 145). Subjects were randomly assigned to (alternative
versions of) this general story:
“John believes that [Toronto/Ottawa] is the capital of Canada when in fact it is
Ottawa. He is playing a trivia game in a bar. The question for this round is «
What is the capital of Canada ? » An acquaintance from work, playing on one
of the opposite teams, leans over and asks John for help. John [though] really
wants to [win the match/help his friend]. So he responds [Ottawa/Toronto].
His colleague trusts John and answers accordingly.”
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Four conditions were built from this scenario depending on whether or not John
intended to deceive his acquaintance and/or told him the truth about the Capital
of Canada. These different conditions are summed up in the following 2×2 matrix:
CONTENT
True False
INTENTION-TO-DECEIVE
Yes Dishonest/True Dishonest/False
No Honest/True Honest/False
Table 1.1: The 2×2 Matrix for the Pilot Conditions.
Let us clarify our four distinct conditions. In the critical condition [Dishon-
est/True], John intends to deceive his acquaintance but tells him the true answer
(viz. “Ottowa”). In [Dishonest/False], John also intends to deceive his acquain-
tance and actually tells him a false answer (viz. “Toronto”). In [Honest/True], John
is absolutely trustworthy (since he does not intend to deceive his acquaintance)
and tells the truth (viz. “Ottowa”). Finally, in [Honest/False], John does not intend
to deceive his acquaintance but mistakenly tells a falsehood (viz. “Toronto”).
In a randomized order, I asked participants to “agree” or “disagree” concerning
three statements about John. In each case, I put a confidence rating: “How confident
are you about your answer?” (Scale: 0 - 10). Then, all participants were assigned to
two controls in order to evaluate their general understanding of the story. Here
are the three statements and two controls:
Statements:
(1) “John is a liar.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
(2) “John tried to lie.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
(3) “John lied successfully.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
Controls:
1. “Which game is John playing?” [Chess/Trivia/Cards]
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2. “Which city does John believe the capital of Canada to be?”
[London/Toronto/Ottawa]
Here I was mostly interested in the predicates “is a liar” and “lied successfully”.
“Tried to lie” was less essential to my prediction but was included to match the
Turris’ overall designs.
1.4.2.3 Results
Before we elaborate on the data, let us agree on two conventions I will use from
now on. First, if at least 50% of the respondents agree that some factor α is
crucial for ascribing some predicate Γ, then this factor α is assumed as a “necessary
condition” for defining the meaning of Γ. Second, if at least 50% of the respondents
all agree that a finite set of factors α, β, γ, etc. is enough for ascribing Γ, then this
set of factors is considered to provide jointly “sufficient conditions” for capturing
the essence of Γ.
The data of the pilot are summed up in Figure 1.7 above. Concerning the predicate
“lied successfully”, the data confirm the Turris’ ones: a speaker succeeds at lying if
and only if he is dishonest and his dishonest utterance is objectively false. Having
an intention to deceive appears to be a necessary condition for success at lying:
100% of subjects agree that John succeeded at lying in condition [Dishonest/False]
and 41% in [Dishonest/True] while only 6% and 32% of subjects do agree that John
succeeded at lying in conditions [Honest/True] and [Honest/False]. In addition to
that, uttering a false statement is also a necessary condition for a successful lie
(compare [Dishonest/False]: 100% and [Dishonest/True]: 41%). Since the differ-
ence for “Lied successfully” between the [Dishonest/True] and [Dishonest/False]
conditions is significant (Fisher Test, p ≤ 10−6, two-tailed), we can conclude that
“lied successfully” is driven by both the agent’s intention to deceive as well as the falsity
of his or her utterance (in an equal way).
Note that in the [Dishonest/True] condition, 41% of agreement is close to average.
It suggests that if John did not succeed at lying in this case, he may still have lied
in some sense. Let us see if the data confirm predictions for predicate “is a liar”.
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As a matter of fact, the prediction is fulfilled: in the critical case [Dishonest/True],
John is called a “liar” by 69 % of the participants. Even though he has not lied
successfully, he is still a liar when he intends to deceive but happens to tell the
truth.
Figure 1.7: Pilot Results.
The results also show that intending to deceive is a necessary condition for being
a liar: 69 % and 75 % of the subjects agree that John is a liar in conditions
[Dishonest/True] and [Dishonest/False] (respectively) contra 9 % and 25 % in
conditions [Honest/True] and [Honest/False] (respectively). As a matter of fact,
the difference between “is a liar′′ is not significant in the two dishonest conditions
(Yates’ Chi-Square Test, χ2 = 0,062). In addition to that, intending to deceive is
also sufficient for being a liar: compare results from [Dishonest/True]: 69 % and
[Dishonest/False]: 75 % which are above average with results for [Honest/True]: 9
% and [Honest/False]: 25 % which are below average. But the falsity of the asserted
content also plays a role in saying that one is a liar. First, when John intends to
deceive his acquaintance, he is more of a liar when he says something false rather
than something true (compare [Dishonest/False]: 75 % vs. [Dishonest/True]:
69 %). Second, when John does not intend to deceive his acquaintance, more
participants judge that he is a liar when he says an objective falsehood (compare
[Honest/False]: 25 % vs. [Honest/True]: 9 %). Hence, the falsity of the utterance
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increases the tendency to say that one “is a liar” but is not a necessary condition
for being a liar. In that sense, predicate “is a liar” is driven mainly by the agent’s
intention to deceive.
Data for “is a liar” seem to be strongly correlated with the agent’s attempt to lie.
Each time John is said to be a liar (see dishonest conditions), people also strongly
agree that he “has tried to lie” (see [Dishonest/True]: 81% and [Dishonest/False]:
82%). One plausible hypothesis is that the predicate “has tried to lie” also partially
encodes the agent’s intention to deceive. But, I have not deepened this hypothesis
any further.
1.4.2.4 Analyses
We know that the literature distinguishes the subjective vs. objective understand-
ing of “lie” by considering two essential factors: the speaker’s intention to deceive
and/or his ability to say something false. In that respect, a disputed case named
“[Dishonest/True]” is when an agent intends to say something false, but ends up
saying something true. Did the agent lie in this case? The Turris responded “No”,
but Wiegmann & al. answered “Yes”.
My pilot experiment supported Wiegmann & al.’ claim: people’s understanding
of “lie” is tied to the subjective definition. In [Dishonest/True], even though the
agent did not “lie successfully” in the objective sense, he is “a liar” in the subjective
one. This relies on the fact that “is a liar” is driven mainly by the agent’s intention
to deceive whereas “lied successfully” is driven equally by the agent’s intention
to deceive and the presence of a false utterance. Since the agent’s utterance is
true in [Dishonest/True], “lie” is understood through its dispositional predicative
form (“is a liar”) but not through its episodic predicative form (“lied successfully”).
I proposed to replicate the pilot results to see more clearly into the behaviour of
these dispositional vs. episodic forms.
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1.4.3 Replication
1.4.3.1 Replication Hypothesis
I chose to investigate the effect of using distinct predicates based on the same root
verb “to lie”. I compared ascriptions of “X lied” vs. “X is a liar” vs. “X lied to
Y”. In the critical condition [Dishonest/True], I expected the result to be: “X is a
liar” > “X lied” > “X lied to Y”, namely that X is more of a liar than someone who
has lied or has lied to someone else (Y in this case). The reason was that for “liar”, I
expected the intentional factor to prevail over the contentual one, for “lied to Y”
I expected the contentual factor to prevail over the intentional one, and for “lie”,
I expected results to be mixed.5
1.4.3.2 Design and Materials
I came up with a 3×2×2 between-subject protocol based on 3 main factors: Predi-
cate, Intention and Content. I had 3 levels of the factor Predicate (“X is a liar”/“X
lied”/“X lied to Y”), 2 levels of the factor Intention (“Honest”/ “Dishonest”) and
2 levels of the factor Content (“True”/“False”). The study was run online on the
same platforms as before but with a larger number of the participants: 294 (Raw
Number N = 310). People were randomly assigned to slightly modified versions
of the initial scenario:
“John believes that [Toronto/Ottawa] is the capital of Canada [when/and] in
fact it is Ottawa. He is playing a trivia game in a bar. The question for this
round is « What is the capital of Canada? ». Sam, an acquaintance from
work playing on one of the opposite teams, leans over and asks John for help.
John [though] really wants to [fool/help] his colleague. So John tells Sam: “It
is [Ottawa/Toronto]”. The latter trusts John and answers accordingly.”
The general scenario was modified in order to clarify to whom John lied to (viz.
Sam). I clarified that Sam always trusts John such that if John performs a real
“lie”, his lie is necessarily successful. As in the pilot experiment, four differ-
ent conditions were obtained depending on John’s honesty and factual utterance:
5 Central to my prediction was that “X is a liar” > “X lied”. Whether “X lied” > “X lied to Y”
or the opposite, was less essential. I decided to treat “X lied to Y” more as a control than as a
variable of interest.
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[Dishonest/True], [Dishonest/False], [Honest/True] and [Honest/False]. After hav-
ing read one of these possible conditions, participants were asked to rate their
“agreement”/“disagreement” about one statement out of the three proposed. In
each case, I also added a confidence rating: “How confident are you about your an-
swer?” (Scale: 0 - 10). Finally, all participants were assigned to six controls. Here
are the three statements and six controls:
Statements:
(1) “John is a liar.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
(2) “John lied.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
(3) “John lied to Sam.” [Agree/Disagree] (+ confidence rating)
Controls:
1. “Which game is John playing?” [Chess/Trivia/Cards]
2. “Which response John gave to Sam?”[Ottawa/London/Toronto]
3. “Which city does John believe the Capital of Canada to be?”
[London/Toronto/Ottawa]
4. “What is the name of John’s colleague?”[Billy/Jacob/Sam]
5. “Did John say something true or false?”[True/False]
6. “Did John intend to deceive Sam?”[Yes/No]
1.4.3.3 Results
My prediction was that we should find the pattern “X is a liar” > “X lied”
> “X lied to Y” concerning the proportion of “Agree” in the critical condition
[Dishonest/True]. I was expecting that when someone has an intention to deceive,
but says something objectively true, the person is more readily called a “liar”
than someone who “have lied”. I was also entertaining the milder expectation
that “John lied to Sam” is accepted in the cases in which “John lied” is accepted.
The results are presented in Figure 1.8.
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Figure 1.8: Replication Results.
The prediction is defeated. The new set of results indicates that there is basically
no difference between the three kinds of predicates in the critical condition [Dis-
honest/True]. A majority of the participants (around 70%) considers that “John
lied”, “lied to Sam” and “is a liar” — despite saying something objectively true.
In details, 73% of subjects agreed that John lied to Sam, 71% that he lied and 67%
that he is a liar. This difference is in fact not significant (Yates’ Chi-square, Test,
χ2 = 0,027).
Consistent with the previous results (see Pilot results), the use of predicate “is a
liar” appears to be driven mainly by the speaker’s intention to deceive which is still
a necessary and sufficient condition for being called a “liar”. Concerning neces-
sity, John is said to be a liar only in the dishonest conditions (see [Dishonest/True]:
67% and [Dishonest/False]: 76%), not in the honest ones (see [Honest/True]: 6%
and [Honest/False]: 15%). Concerning sufficiency, predicate “is a liar” is ascribed
above average only in the dishonest conditions, not in the honest ones (compare
honest and dishonest results for “is a liar”). Nevertheless, scores confirm that fal-
sity increases the tendency to say that one “is a liar” (first compare [Honest/False]:
15% vs. [Honest/True]: 6%, then compare [Dishonest/True]: 67% and [Dishon-
est/False]: 76%). But “is a liar” is still driven mainly by the agent’s intention to deceive,
not by the falsity of his dishonest assertion.
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Unlike for “has lied successfully” (see Pilot results again), the predicate “has lied”
seems to be driven mainly by the agent’s intention to deceive, not by the falsity of his
or her utterance (whose role is now secondary). Contrary to the Turris’ claims,
intending to deceive is a necessary and sufficient condition for having lied. First,
John “has lied” only in the dishonest conditions: results for [Dishonest/True]: 71%
and [Dishonest/False]: 90% are above average, not results for [Honest/True]: 10%
and [Honest/False]: 8%. Second, even if there is a significative difference between
conditions [Dishonest/True] (71%) and [Dishonest/False] (90%), the agent’s inten-
tion to deceive appears to be sufficient for having lied. The falsity of the speaker’s
utterance plays a secondary role.
Finally, predicate “has lied to Y” is driven mainly by the falsity of the agent’s asser-
tion which is a necessary condition, though not sufficient, for having lied to Sam.
When John is dishonest, more participants are prone to say that he has lied to Sam
when he also tells him a falsehood (compare [Dishonest/True]: 73% and [Dishon-
est/False]: 92%). Similarly, when John is honest, more participants are willing to
judge that he has lied to Sam when his assertion is false rather than true (compare
[Honest/True]: 7% and [Honest/False]: 25%).
1.4.3.4 Post Hoc Analysis
Because of these surprising results compared to the first pilot experiment, I led a post
hoc analysis of the pilot experiment, in which each participant answered questions
concerning three different predicates, namely “X is a liar”/“X tried to lie”/“X
lied successfully”. I did this analysis because there may have been order effects
influencing the results. So, for condition [Dishonest/True] in the pilot experiment, I
calculated the percentage of participants’ who responded to “John lied successfully”
and to “John is a liar” when each of these sentences appears first, or second after a
control question. The results are given in Figure 1.9. In fact, post hoc calculations
are consistent with my pilot results for the [Dishonest/True] condition. So I can
conclude that there are no order effects in people’s responses for predicates “lied
successfully” and “liar” in this case.
As I said, I performed this analysis to make a comparison with the attempted
replication in which participants did not have any potential contrast effect due to
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Figure 1.9: Post Hoc Analysis of the Pilot Results.
the successive presentation of the different predicates (“John is a liar.”, “John lied.”,
“John lied to Sam.”). Let us now compare the data for predicates “lied successfully”,
“lied” and “liar” in the pilot experiment and replication.
1.4.4 Comparing the Results
Now pilot and replication results can be treated as between-subject data of the same
type. Data for “lied successfully” (Post Hoc Analysis) and “lied” (Replication) in the
[Dishonest/True] conditions are summed up in Table 1.2. Concerning predicates
“Lied successfully” and “Lied”, subjects are 27% to judge that John “lied success-
fully” in the pilot experiment and 71% that he “lied” in the tentative replication. A
Fisher test confirms that this difference is significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.0271,
two-tailed).
Experiment Post Hoc Analysis Replication
Predicate Lied successfully Lied
Number “Agree” Responses 3 17
Number “Disagree” Responses 8 7
Total 11 24
Proportion of “Agree” 27% 71%
Table 1.2: Difference between “lied successfully” and “lied”.
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The results for the predicate “Liar” in the [Dishonest/True] conditions are summed
up in Table 1.3. Subjects are 76% and 67% to judge that “John is a liar” in the pilot
and tentative replication (respectively). In this case, a Fisher test indicates that this
difference is not significant (p = 0.7106, two-tailed). The two tables are gathered in
the comparative Figure 1.10.
Experiment Post Hoc Analysis Replication
Predicate Liar Liar
Number “Agree” Responses 10 16
Number “Disagree” Responses 3 8
Total 13 24
Proportion of “Agree” 76% 67%
Table 1.3: Differences for “liar”.
From the tentative replication and comparison with the post hoc analysis, we can
conclude that “lied” and “liar” are in fact tracking identical properties to lay par-
ticipants, who handle them alike (Fisher Test, p = 0,7672, two-tailed). On the
contrary, “liar” and “lied successfully” really are treated differently (Fisher Test, p
= 0,0377, two-tailed). In the [Dishonest/True condition], a consistent majority of
people agrees that “John lied” (71%) and “is a liar” (at 76% and 67%), but only a
small minority is willing to say that “John lied successfully” (27%) in this case. So
the adverb successfully clearly directs participants to the truth or falsity of what is
said. But the default understandings of “lied” and “liar” are driven the agent’s intention
to deceive.
1.5 Discussion
Remind that the main purpose of this chapter was definitional: how can we define
“lying” properly? What is the adequate (viz. “good”) definition of lying? I
started investigating on this issue through conceptual means but rapidly took an
empirical path to provide a more refined analysis of the notion. Conceptually,
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Figure 1.10: Comparison for [Dishonest/True].
I presented the standard subjective account which has been held by (analytical)
epistemologists for centuries:
Subjective Def. A speaker X lies to a hearer Y on a proposition p iff
(1) X believes that p is false.
(2) X intends Y to believe that p is true.
(3) X tells Y that p.
Immediately, though, I explained that this aprioristic account has been challenged
in two empirical ways leading to two distinct theories about lying. One of these
challenging strategies was part of the iff definitional project and was promoted
by Turri & Turri [2015]. Based on empirical results concerning the predicate “suc-
ceeded in telling a lie”, the Turris called for an objective theory of lying. They argued
that a falsity condition should be added to the traditional subjective definition to
promote a new definition called “objective”:
Objective Def. A speaker X lies to a hearer Y on a proposition p iff
(1) X believes that p is false.
(2) X intends Y to believe that p is true.
(3) X tells Y that p.
(4) p is false.
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Their argument was that conditions (1)-(2)-(3) from the subjective definition were
sufficient for the speaker to “have lied” but not to “have succeeded in telling a lie”.
In fact, success is acribed only when condition (4) is also met on top of conditions
(1)-(2)-(3). Even though dishonesty is sufficient for an utterance to be called a
“lie”, falsity is also necessary for the utterance to be called a “successful lie”.
From this, the Turris concluded that the objective definition was more adequate
as a standard definition of lying than the traditional one. In other words, they
used the data obtained for “succeeded in telling a lie” to make a more general
claim concerning the very definition of lying.
In this request for objectivity, another challenging strategy was promoted by
Coleman & Kay [1981] and stemmed from prototype semantics. Basically, Coleman
& Kay condemned the iff project as illusory: no set of necessary and sufficient
conditions could adequately capture the very essence of lying. Their argument
was that “lie” behaves exactly the same as all other semantic categories. The
category of “lie” has “blurry edges and allows degrees of membership” in such a way
that “applicability of a word [such as “lie”] to a thing is in general not a matter of ’yes
or no’, but rather of ’more or less’” [Coleman & Kay 1981, 27]. As a consequence,
Coleman & Kay concluded that there was no core definition of lying but only a
prototypical one — the parameters of which being untruthfulness, intention-to-
deceive and falsity. Here is a prototype for “lie” we can propose from their own:
Prototypical Lie. A prototypical lie is an utterance in which a speaker X asserts
some proposition p to a hearer Y such that...
(1) X believes that p is false;
(2) In uttering p, X intends to deceive Y;
(3) p is false.
The Turris’ objective definition and Coleman & Kay’ prototypical claim have been
the main challenging theories opposed to the subjective account (a summary is
proposed in Table 1.4). But in this discussion part, I argue that the standard
subjective account is sufficient for our definitional matters, viz. capturing the
notion of lying in the colloquial sense. The necessary conditions tied to the
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Turris’ Objective Def. Coleman & Kay’ Prototype.
Speaker X lies to hearer Y on p iff Speaker X lies to hearer Y on p when
(1) X believes that p is false. (1) X believes that p is false.
(2) X intends Y to believe that p is true. (2) In uttering p, X intends to deceive Y.
(3) X tells Y that p. (3) p is false.
(4) p is false.
Table 1.4: The Two Challenging Theories to the Subjective Definition.
subjective view prove to be sufficient for capturing the predicate “lied”. On
the contrary, the challenging theories (whose claims were based on results for
predicate “lied successfully”) are too demanding and fail to capture the root
predicate “lied”. That being said, the data leave two issues concerning predicates
“lied successfully” and “lied”. First, scores for “lied successfully” are quite high in
the [Dishonest/True] case both in the pilot experiment and the post hoc analysis.6
How can we account for this surprising result? Second, scores for “lied” increase
when falsity is met by the deceptive speaker.7 Again, how can we explain that
falsity increases the tendency to say that one “lied”?
The replication results shows that people ascribe the predicate “lied” both in con-
ditions [Dishonest/True] (71%) and [Dishonest/False] (90%), not in conditions
[Honest/True] (10%) and [Honest/False] (8%). So the speaker’s intention-to-
deceive appears to be sufficient to qualify an utterance as a “lie”. The falsity
of the utterance is not required for ascribing the predicate “lied”. Falsity pulls
upwards the tendency to say that one “lied” but only plays a secondary role. A
deceptive speaker is said to have “lied” no matter what she says turned out to be
true or false. As a consequence, the subjective account (which does not adjudicate
on the truth or falsity of the speaker’s utterance) is peoples’ default definition of
lying.
6 Respectively, 41% and 27 % of agreement.
7 Compare the replication results for “lied” in [Dishonest/True] (71%) and [Dishonest/False]
(90%).
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Let us remind that the Turris’ objective claim is based on results they got for
predicate “lied successfully”. Even though a dishonest speaker is said to have
“lied” in [Dishonest/True], they observe that this speaker is considered to have
“lied successfully” only in [Dishonest/False]. For this reason, they hold falsity
to be a necessary condition for “lying successfully” and, basically, for lying prop-
erly.8 Following a similar intuition, Coleman & Kay take falsity to be a typical
property of a lie. My own pilot results converge in this objective direction for “lied
successfully”: a dishonest utterance is considered a successful lie only in [Dis-
honest/False] (100%), not in [Dishonest/True] (41%). The impact of falsity is also
patent when we compare [Honest/True] (6%) and [Honest/False] (32%) for the
same predicate.
Nevertheless, we can argue that an objective claim for “lied” based on results
for “lied successfully” is possibly ill-founded. The adverb “successfully” seems
to direct people to the falsity of what is said. Adding this complement is likely
to be taken as a “demand characteristic”, namely as a request to assess whether
the speaker said something objectively false instead of whether the speaker has
some intention-to-deceive the addressee. As a consequence, results for “lied
successfully” cannot be used to adjucate on people’s handling of “lied”. The
complement “successfully” leads them to set aside the speaker’s intention-to-
deceive to concentrate on his or her success (or failure) to utter a blatant falsehood.
Being biased as such, the Turris’ plea for objectivity stands as a poorer account of
lying that the standard subjective definition.
But in order to be fully operative, the subjective account has to address two re-
maining issues concerning predicates “lied successfully” and “lied”. Regarding
the first, even though “lied successfully” does not obtain in the [Dishonest/True]
case, scores are quite high for this specific condition in the pilot experiment (41%)
as well as in the post hoc analysis (27%). How can we explain this outcome? My
interpretation is that these results are caused by the way I phrased my experimen-
tal scenarios. All the vignettes I have proposed specified that the listener trusts
the dishonest speaker and thus, believes his utterances as true in all cases. Con-
cretely, I obtained this outcome by ending the pilot scenario with: “His colleague
8 Since one cannot be said to have “lied successfully” without also being said to have “lied”.
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[the listener] trusts John and answers accordingly”, and the replication scenario
with: “The latter [the listener] trusts John and answers accordingly”.
In doing so, however, I created a potential confound encouraging people to
agree that in some sense, the speaker “lied successfully” in the [Dishonest/True]
condition although she said something objectively true. In this case, the adverb
“successfully” is not elicited by falsity (such as before) but by the speaker’ success
to deceive the addressee, namely to make him or her believe the opposite of what
he or she believes. In fact, the word “successfully” is ambiguous in some way
or another. “Having lied successfully” can be understood as “having succeeded
in telling a falsehood” (first sense) but “having lied successfully” can also be
understood as “having succeeded in deceiving the addressee” (second sense).
This latter sense is elicited by the way I completed the scenarios and explains the
high scores I get for “lied successfully” in the [Dishonest/True] condition.
Concerning the second issue, falsity appears to have an enhancing effect on the
ascription of “lied”. This is patent in the replication when we look at conditions
[Dishonest/True] (71%) and [Dishonest/False] (90%). How can we account for
this effect? How can we explain that people are more willing to agree that a
dishonest speaker lied when he or she says something false instead of something
true? This could be interpreted as a positive reason to favor one of the challenging
definitions above over the subjective account. Some could argue that people being
more likely to ascribe predicate “lied” when falsity obtains, falsity is a necessary
condition or a typical property of lies. But a rationale can be given for explaining
this increasing effect from the subjective perspective.
In the replication experiment, the potential inconvenience caused to the ad-
dressee differs between conditions [Dishonest/True] and [Dishonest/False]. In the
[Dishonest/True] case, the hearer is deceived by the speaker (which makes him
believe the opposite of his own belief) but he ends up believing something true
(Ottawa is the capital of Canada). So the hearer is deceived about the speaker’s be-
lief but he is not deceived about the world. In the [Dishonest/False] case, however,
the hearer is deceived about the speaker’s belief and about the world (Toronto is
not the capital of Canada). As a result, falsity in false lies allows bad side-effects
that truth in true lies does not. So false lies are more harmful than true lies for
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the addressee and participants are more willing to blame them for their greater
inconvenience.
Following Joshua Knobe’s observations in experimental psychology [e.g. Knobe
2003ab 2006], this moral asymmetry between false lies and true lies might explain
the higher score we obtain for “lied” in the [Dishonest/False] condition. Falsity
tends to create a “Side-Effect Effect”, now known as a “Knobe Effect”, in which
the greater inconvenience (or harmfullness) caused by falsity leads people to judge
a false assertion to be more intentional than a true assertion. As Knobe [2003a]
puts it: people “seem considerably more willing to say that a side-effect was brought
about intentionally when they regard that side-effect as bad than when they regard it as
good”. So a dishonest false assertion (which is seen as “bad” by participants) has
greater chances to be called a “lie” than a dishonest true assertion (which is seen as
“good” by them or as “better” than the first). To sum up, the impact of falsity on
people’s ascriptions of “lied” most likely results from a Knobe effect caused by
falsity itself.
1.6 Conclusion
Contra Coleman & Kay [1981], we can conclude that there is more to the definition
of lying than just prototypical information. There is a core definition of lying. The
definitional clauses are not just typical properties, they are necessary conditions.
The speaker’s intention-to-deceive is one of these necessary conditions but the
falsity of the utterance is not. Falsity enhances peoples’ ascriptions of “lied” but
its role is ancillary. So, contra Turri & Turri [2015], we can conclude that the
subjective account is a better candidate as a core definition of lying. The objective
account is too demanding in that respect.
But endorsing the subjective perspective raised several issues I tried to address
successively. First, my pilot experiment confirmed one of the Turris’ main ob-
servation: a dishonest speaker is said to have “lied successfully” only when she
says something false. My interpretation is that adding “successfully” to the root
predicate “lied” moves people’s interest from assessing the speaker’s utterance
as a “lie” to assess it as “true” or “false”. Based on this confound, I argued that
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the Turris’ defense of the objective definition is possibly ill-founded.
Second, I tried to explain the high scores I got for “lied successfully” in the
[Dishonest/True] condition. My explanation is that this outcome results from the
way I phrased the protocols. In the scenarios, I forced the lie to be successful by
specifying that the hearer always comes to believe the dishonest utterance one it has
been made. Quite naturally then, I got substantive scores for “lied successfully”
even though the speaker’s dishonest utterance turned out to be true.
Third, I tried to account for the enhancing effect falsity has on people’s ascrip-
tions of “lied”. I argue that falsity generates a Knobe effect: being more harmful
for the addressee, false assertions are interpreted as more intentional than true asser-
tions to lay participants. As a result, ascriptions of “lied” tend to increase when
the dishonest speaker tells a falsehood instead of the truth.
Lies are standard strategies of deception. The present chapter has reviewed the tra-
ditional debates on the definition of lying, and defended the subjective account
based on new empirical data. In contrast, Chapter 2 investigates non-standard
strategies of deception that are misleading default inferences and omissions of informa-
tion. For a dishonest speaker, strategic omission consists in hiding relevant pieces
of information to some intended addressee. A misleading default inference is an
inference whereby some addressee reaches a false conclusion through default rea-
soning. In case of deception, a sly speaker can perfectly trigger such a misleading
inference to fool the addressee by omission. This is what happens in the Surprise
Deception Paradox I analyze in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
The Surprise Deception Paradox
2.1 Introduction
In one of his riveting books on paradoxes entitled What is the Name of this Book?,
the logician Raymond Smullyan tells an anecdote concerning his first introduction
to logic [see Smullyan 1978]. As he was suffering from flu on April 1st 1925, his
older brother — Emile — came to his bedroom and said to him: “Well, Raymond,
today is April Fool’s Day, and I will deceive you as you have never been deceived
before!”. After this announcement, Raymond waited all day long to be deceived
but (apparently) nothing happened... So, late at night, he was no longer expecting
to be deceived (or so he thought) but still felt highly concerned by his brother’s
announcement. As a consequence, Raymond’s mother intervened to ask Emile why
he had (apparently) not deceived him. At this moment, Emile turned to Raymond
and said to him:
Emile: “So, you expected me to deceive you, didn’t you?
Raymond: Yes.
Emile: But I didn’t, did I?
Raymond: No.
Emile: But you expected me to, didn’t you?
Raymond: Yes.
Emile: So I deceived you, didn’t I?”
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After this explanation, Raymond lay in his bed and started reasoning about it.
On the one hand, supposing that he wasn’t deceived, then he did not get what
he expected (because he expected to be deceived after Emile’s announcement!),
and hence he was actually deceived. But on the other hand, supposing that he
was deceived, then he exactly did get what he expected, and hence he was not
“deceived”.
In this chapter, I follow two investigative paths. First, I define the theoretical notions
at stake in the story. At first glance, the notions of deception, deception by omission
and surprise are involved in this deceptive tale. In fact, Emile performs a deception
by omission on April 1st 1925 that also leads his brother to be surprised. But, as
a matter of fact, I will show that Emile’s “action” of deception is more complex
than it seems at first sight. It revolves around distinct deceptive moves which lead to
consecutive states of deception and surprise. Second, I deal with some theoretical issues
raised by Smullyan’s story. I want to better understand what is puzzling in the
reasoning Raymond performs later in the evening. But contrary to Raymond’s own
argument, I show that this reasoning is not of a paradoxical nature. Moreover, I
argue that this reasoning is of a lesser significance than the announcement Emile
makes earlier in the morning. This early announcement should not be successful
in principle due to its self-defeating feature. But the announcement is successful
(Raymond is surprised at the end of the day), only because Raymond is not a perfect
reasoner.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I introduce a logical apparatus
for analyzing Smullyan’s story in details. Based on work by van Benthem [2007]
and Baltag & Smets [2006 2008b], the framework consists in an epistemic language
extended with a dynamic operator of Belief Radical Upgrade (subsection 2.2.1).
The syntax is then interpreted in epistemic plausibility models that can be fully
axiomatized by reduction axioms (subsection 2.2.2). This language is finally
matched with Smullyan’s story for clarity purposes (subsection 2.2.3).
This formal setting helps me define in section 2.3 the deception that takes place
in the story. First, I point out that the announcement Emile makes in the morning
is pragmatically misleading (subsection 2.3.1). Then, I focus on the distinct states
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of deception Raymond goes through during that day (subsection 2.3.2). That being
done, I describe the actions that lead to those states of deceptions (subsection
2.3.3). I end by summarizing Emile’s whole deceptive plot (subsection 2.3.4).
My purpose in section 2.4 is to model the dynamics of Emile’s later explanation
step-by-step. To do so, I use the plausibility machinery introduced in section 2.2.
Through this modelization, Emile’s explanation appears as an opportunity to
unveil his whole deceptive trick (subsection 2.4.1). But the story shows that this
disclosure leads Raymond to fall in puzzling thoughts. However, I argue that those
puzzling thoughts are not of a paradoxical nature (subsection 2.4.2). The steps
that might lead to contradictions can be easily bypassed.
Finally, section 2.5 is devoted to analyze the surprise which is induced by
Emile’s explanation. By comparing Emile’s announcement with the announcement
of surprise a teacher makes in the famous Surprise Exam Paradox [e.g. O’Connor
1948, Scriven 1951, Shaw 1958], I argue that Emile’s announcement is also an
announcement of surprise since Emile claims that he will deceive his brother as he
has never been deceived in the past (subsection 2.5.1). However, I argue that though
being true such an announcement cannot be successful in principle. Raymond’s
announcement is successful only because he is not a perfect reasoner. If he were a
perfect reasoner, Emile’s announcement could not be successful and his deception
would fail to be a surprise (subsection 2.5.2). That being said, I finally describe
Raymond’s states of surprise in detail (subsection 2.5.3).
More broadly, I aim to show that Smullyan’s story is informative of the way one
can deceive while saying the truth. We may call veridical deception that strategy
by which one causes someone else to hold a false belief through a true piece
of information [e.g. Adler 1997, Meibauer 2014, Fallis 2015]. In Smullyan’s tale,
veridical deception is used when Emile makes a true announcement (“Today, I
will deceive you as you have never been deceived before!”), which suggests the false
conclusion that he will deceive Raymond by doing some particular action (deception
only by commission) when in fact he does not (deception only by omission). But
veridical deception is a broader category including other types of strategies I will
evoke such as false implicatures, pretending to deceive and presupposition faking.
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2.2 A Language for Analysis
2.2.1 A Dynamic Epistemic Syntax L(B,K,[⇑])
I start out by defining a dynamic epistemic logicL(B,K,[⇑]) which is a propositional
syntax containing static operators for (conditional) belief and knowledge as well
as a dynamic operator for Lexicographic Upgrade [e.g. van Benthem 2007 2014]
or Belief Radical Upgrade [e.g. Baltag & Smets 2006 2008b]. The set F (B,K,[⇑]) of all
L(B,K,[⇑])-formulas is given by the following Backus-Naur Forms:
〈Formulas〉
〈Atoms〉
ϕ,ψ := ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Bψ
R
ϕ | KRϕ | [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ
p := d+ | d−
Here ⊤ is the common abbreviation for tautologies, the subscript R designates
the particular agent Raymond and p is some atomic proposition d+ or d−. The
additional propositional connectives (⊥,∨,→,↔) are defined as usual. According
to standard usage in the epistemic logic literature, the intended interpretations
of the operators Bψ
R
ϕ, KRϕ and [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ are respectively “ Raymond believes that ϕ
conditional on formula ψ”1, “Raymond knows that ϕ” and “after a belief radical upgrade
with formula ϕ, ψ is the case”. The operator BRϕwhich stands for “Raymond plainly
believes thatϕ” can be defined from B⊤
R
ϕ standing for “Raymond conditionally believes
that ϕ on ⊤”: BRϕ := B
⊤
R
ϕ.
2.2.2 Epistemic Plausibility Models for Language L(B,K,[⇑])
I give a semantic interpretation to L(B,K,[⇑]) in terms of “Epistemic Plausibility
Models” [see van Benthem 2007, Baltag & Smets 2006 2008b, van Benthem & Smets
2015] instead of more classical “Kripke Models” used in Public Announcement
Logics for instance [e.g. Gerbrandy & Groeneveld 1997, Baltag et al. 1998, Plaza
2007].
I will show hereafter that this semantic choice is motivated by Smullyan’s own
1 Following Baltag & Smets [2011], we can think of conditional beliefs BψRϕ as ‘contingency’ plans
for belief change: in case Raymond will find out that ψ was the case, he will believe that ϕ was
the case.
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recollection. In fact, Raymond uses a default rule to interpret his brother’s an-
nouncement of a future deception as being a deception of a particular kind,
namely deception only by commission. This default rule can be conceived as a plau-
sibility rule corresponding to the most plausible way people would interpret Emile’s
early announcement: “Well, Raymond, today is April Fool’s Day, and I will deceive
you as you have never been deceived before!”. Let us first introduce the analytic
framework.
A pointed plausibility model for L(B,K,[⇑]) is a relational structure S such that:
S = 〈 S, 6R, ‖ . ‖, s⋆0 〉
The structure S consists of:
❖ Swhich is a finite non-empty set of “possible states” s (or “worlds”).
❖ 6R which is a “plausibility relation” for Raymond such that 6R ⊆ S × S. This
relation 6R is a total preorder, that is to say a transitive, strongly connected
and thus reflexive relation over the set S.
❖ ‖ . ‖ : At→ ℘(S) which is a standard “valuation map” where At is the set of
all atomic formulas p, and ℘(S) is the set of subsets of S.
❖ A pointed state s⋆0 ∈ S is called the “actual state” in model S.
The conventional reading of the plausibility order is the following: when s 6R t
(for all s, t ∈ S), Raymond considers the state t to be “at least as plausible as” the
state s. In other words, he considers t to be equally or more plausible than s.
For simplicity’s sake, we define comparability relations ∼R from plausibility orders
6R as follows: s ∼R t iff either s 6Rt or s >R t (where > is the converse of 6). This
relation is a symmetric preorder since the conditions for s ∼R t and t ∼R s to obtain
are strictly identical. That is: when one obtains, the other is given for free. So ∼R
is an equivalence relation over S.
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Truth of a formula ϕ at a possible state s in an epistemic plausibility model S,
denoted S, s |= ϕ, is defined inductively by simply extending the valuation map
to all formulas belonging to F (B,K,[⇑]):
• S, s |= ⊤ Always.
• S, s |= p iff s ∈‖ p ‖.
• S, s |= ¬ϕ iff S, s 6|= ϕ.
• S, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff S, s |= ϕ and S, s |= ψ.
• S, s |= KRϕ iff for all t ∈ S, if s ∼R t then S, t |= ϕ.
• S, s |= Bψ
R
ϕ iff for all t ∈Max‖ψ‖
6R
: S, t |= ϕ.
Here Max‖ψ‖
6R
is the set of states that satisfy ψ and are maximal for the ordering 6R
in model S. That is: Max‖ψ‖
6R
:= {u ∈ S | ∀v ∈ S v 6R u and S,u |= ψ}. Those states
on which Raymond conditions his beliefs in ϕ are the states he considers to be the
most plausible ψ-states that also satisfy ϕ. As I said, plain beliefs are recovered
from conditional beliefs by conditioning on ⊤, so the last clause can be reduced
to:
• S, s |= BRϕ iff for all t ∈Max
‖⊤‖
6R
: S, t |= ϕ.
Following van Benthem [2007] and Baltag & Smets [2008b], I define a Belief Radical
Upgrade with a formula ϕ, written [ ⇑ ϕ], as a mapping:
[ ⇑ ϕ] : S → S
[⇑ϕ]
Note that S is the initial model and S
[⇑ϕ]
is the transformed model obtained after
having performed the intended operation [ ⇑ ϕ]. Here is the semantic clause for
belief radical upgrade:
• S, s |= [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ iff S
[⇑ϕ]
, s |= ψ.
The epistemic plausibility model S
[⇑ϕ]
is defined from S in the following way:
S
[⇑ϕ]
= 〈 S
[⇑ϕ]
, 6
[⇑ϕ]
R , ‖ . ‖
[⇑ϕ]
, s⋆0 〉
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where:
❖ S
[⇑ϕ]
❖ 6
[⇑ϕ]
R
❖ ‖ . ‖
[⇑ϕ]
:= S
:=
(
6R ∩ (S × ‖ ϕ ‖)
)
∪
(
6R ∩ (‖ ¬ϕ ‖ × S)
)
∪
(
∼R ∩ (‖ ¬ϕ ‖ × ‖ ϕ ‖)
)
:= ‖ . ‖
Here, S
[⇑ϕ]
and ‖ . ‖
[⇑ϕ]
are identical to S and ‖ . ‖ from the initial model S. The
special feature of S
[⇑ϕ]
is the plausibility order 6
[⇑ϕ]
R . Following van Benthem & Liu
[2007], this relation is defined as being equal to the initial plausibility order 6R
in which the ordered pairs (s,t) satisfying respectively formulas ϕ and ¬ϕ have
been put at the bottom of the ordering. This guarantees that all ¬ϕ-states are
eliminated from the top of the ordering and put at the bottom in model S
[⇑ϕ]
. In
practice then, when Raymond makes a belief radical upgrade with a formula ϕ, he
puts all ϕ-states from his initial model S at the top of the plausibility ordering in his
upgraded model S
[⇑ϕ]
, leaving everything else the same. So the states satisfying ϕ
become the most plausible states in model S
[⇑ϕ]
.
Rather than the technicalities, what matters is the particular doxastic attitude
corresponding to the dynamic operation [ ⇑ ϕ]. When some agent performs a
belief radical upgrade with a piece of information ϕ, he or she does not know
the source of the incoming ϕ to be absolutely reliable, thus completely honest and
truthful. But he or she believes the source to be highly reliable, thus strongly honest
and truthful. According to van Benthem’s terminology, the agent does not have
a hard doxastic attitude towards the source of information, but a softer one. The
agent is not sure that the source always tells the truth but he or she is highly
confident that the source does.
From a semantic point of view, a belief radical upgrade is a plausibility rule
of interpretation. More precisely, this is a strong plausibility rule which takes the
incoming information ϕ to be highly plausible and state (ϕ∧ψ) to be more plausible
than state (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). Many other plausibility rules can be found in the literature
which are weaker and take the incoming information and states to be less plausible
than before. They are either conservative upgrades [see van Benthem 2007, Baltag
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& Smets 2008b] or more subtle dynamic attitudes such as positive and negative
upgrades, semi-positive and semi-negative ones, minimal attitudes, trivial ones, etc.
[see Baltag et al. 2012, Rodenhäuser 2014].
Basically, a belief radical upgrade can be conceived as a default rule of interpretation
for a given semantic content. It takes an incoming formula ϕ and computes that,
based on ϕ, formula ψ is more plausible than formula ¬ψ in all the cases in which
ϕ obtains. This notion of higher plausibility is also the core intuition governing
non-monotonic reasoning since the 1990’s. Veltman [1996] has tried to offer a
formal rule to capture default reasoning. Like belief upgrades, this default rule is
based on the notion of higher plausibility. Formally, the rule is written (ϕ ⇒ ψ)
and means that formulas “ϕ are normally ψ” or, to put it another way, that worlds
satisfying the conjunction (ϕ ∧ ψ) are more plausible that worlds satisfying the
conjunction (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). For this reason, I propose in this chapter to approximate
belief radical upgrades with default rules.
Following van Benthem [2007] and Baltag & Smets [2008b], the language L(B,K,[⇑])
can be axiomatized completely by the following axioms:
➤ All instances of propositional tautologies.
➤ The S5 axioms for Knowledge.
➤ The S4 axioms for plain Belief.
➤ This recursion axiom for Conditional Belief:
⊢ B
ψ
Rϕ ↔ ¬KR¬ψ→ ¬KR¬(ψ ∧ BR(ψ→ ϕ))
➤ The usual recursion axioms for Belief Radical Upgrade:
⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ]p
⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ]¬ψ
⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ](ψ ∧ φ)
⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ]KRϕ
⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ]BψRφ
↔ p for all atomic proposition letters p.
↔ ¬[ ⇑ ϕ]ψ
↔ [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ ∧ [ ⇑ ϕ]φ
↔ KR[ ⇑ ϕ]ϕ
↔ (¬KR¬(ϕ ∧ [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ) ∧ B
ϕ∧[⇑ϕ]ψ
R [ ⇑ ϕ]φ)
∨(KR¬(ϕ ∧ [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ) ∧ B
[⇑ϕ]ψ
R [ ⇑ ϕ]φ)
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➤ The necessitation rule for Belief Radical Upgrade:
If ⊢ ψ, then ⊢ [ ⇑ ϕ]ψ
This axiomatization is not purely ornamental. It will ensure the soundness of
the logical derivations I will make concerning Raymond’s conclusion that he is
deceived if and only if he is not deceived (subsection 2.4.2).
2.2.3 Matching L(B,K,[⇑]) with Smullyan’s Story
In the context of Smullyan’s story, the atomic propositions d+ and d− express the
two ways by which one can understand Emile’s early announcement of deception.
The first way is given by proposition d+ meaning that Emile will deceive Raymond
by doing some action on April 1st 1925. In other words, Emile will make some move
such that Raymond will be deceived on some fact after this very move. Such a
strategy is known as “deception by commission” in the literature [e.g. Chisholm &
Feehan 1977]. But another way of understanding Emile’s announcement is given
by proposition d− meaning that Emile will deceive Raymond by no action on April
1st 1925. In that case, Emile won’t perform any action but by doing so, he will
actually deceive Raymond by depriving him of some piece of information. This is
“deception by omission” in the literature [e.g. Chisholm & Feehan 1977]. Here are
listed the exact meanings of propositions d+ and d−:
d+ : “Raymond will be deceived by commission on April 1st 1925”.
d− : “Raymond will be deceived by omission on April 1st 1925”.
Now, we let a complex formula D stand for the content of Emile’s announcement
in the morning:
D : “Well, (...) I will deceive you as you have never been deceived before”.
Propositions d+, d− and formula D can be conceived as types of (predictive) actions
of deception. They encode the different ways by which Emile can deceive his
brother throughout the day, namely the types of deceptive “actions”, and their
combinations, he can deploy to trick him. Actually three distinct combinations can
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be considered in the logical space: (d+∧¬d−), (¬d+∧d−) and (d+∧d−). The first
combination means that Raymond will be deceived only by commission on April
1st 1925, the second means that he will be deceived only by omission on that date
and the last combination means that he will be deceived both by commission and
by omission. In case Raymond will neither be deceived by commission nor by
omission on April 1st 1925, then propositions d+ and d− are false (¬d+∧¬d−) and
the announcement itself would turn out to be false: ¬D.
If we do not take Emile’s announcement as a bona fide action, Raymond won’t be
deceived only by commission but only by omission on April 1st 1925. First, Raymond
won’t be deceived by commission, written ¬(d+∧¬d−), since Emile does not undertake
any action to deceive him after his early announcement. Second, Raymond will
be deceived only by omission, written (¬d+∧d−), since his brother will keep doing
nothing for the rest of the day to trick him. That being said, we can remark that
the combination (d+∧d−) does not play any role in Smullyan’s story. Though
possible, this combination is not taken into consideration by Emile and Raymond.
None of them invoke this combination as plausible in their respective parts. As a
consequence, I will set aside this type of deception in my upcoming analyses.
In the pragmatic sense, formula D seems to imply the conjunction (d+ ∧ ¬d−)
stating that Emile will deceive Raymond only by commission. This relies on the
default inference one would make to interpret some announcement of deception in
common circumstances. After such an announcement, written [ ⇑ D], one would
naturally infer that deception only by commission (d+ ∧ ¬d−) is a more plausible
option than the negation of deception only by commission ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−) and even
more plausible than deception only by omission (¬d+ ∧ d−). In other words, one
would infer that the conjunction D ∧ (d+ ∧ ¬d−) is a more plausible option than
the conjunction D ∧ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−) and even more plausible than the conjunction
D ∧ (¬d+ ∧ d−). The underlying default rule at stake here is then D⇒ (d+ ∧ ¬d−)
and can be approximated by the formula [ ⇑ D](d+ ∧ ¬d−) in language L(B,K,[⇑]).
The problem is that this latter formula is false in the context of Smullyan’s tale
since it is not the case that Raymond will be deceived only by commission after his
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brother’s annnouncement. Actually, Emile’s explanation reveals that Raymond is
deceived only by omission at the end of the day. Though being perfectly natural
as a default, the rule D ⇒ (d+ ∧ ¬d−) should not be used by Raymond on April
1st. In fact, using such a rule leads him to draw the false conclusions that he
will be deceived only by commission and thus, that he won’t be deceived only
by omission. I will show later that having those false beliefs makes him being
surprised afterwards. Before doing this, I take the opportunity to describe Emile’s
misleading announcement in more details.
2.3 The Deceptive Plot
2.3.1 Emile’s Misleading Announcement
I first concentrate on the pragmatic meaning of Emile’s announcement to show
that it is completely misleading. Though semantically true, this announcement
is pragmatically misleading since it naturally conveys the wrong idea that Emile
will deceive Raymond by doing some specific action (deception only by commission)
when, in fact, he only uses deception by omission to trick his brother (deception
only by omission).
So in formal terms, the announcement D is misleading as a content since it prag-
matically conveys the wrong idea that formulas (d+ ∧ ¬d−) and (¬d+ ∧ d−) are
respectively true and false. But after Emile’s early announcement and then on,
Raymond will not be deceived by commission, and for this reason, he will actu-
ally be deceived only by omission. So formula (d+ ∧ ¬d−) is false while formula
(¬d+ ∧ d−) is true.
In Smullyan’s story, Raymond’s states of deception result from the fact that he has
wrong beliefs about formulas (d+ ∧¬d−) and (¬d+ ∧ d−) throughout the day. I will
now describe these two states of deception Raymond successively goes through
during the day.
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2.3.2 Raymond’s Successive States of Deception
I start out by defining what it means for Raymond to be deceived on a formula ψ.
Let us agree that Raymond is in a state of deception about ψ, written Deceived On ψ,
if and only if Raymond believes that ψ is false (true) when in fact, ψ happens to be
true (false). So, for some formula ψ ∈ L(B,K,[⇑]), the state Deceived On ψ is defined by
the conjunction:
Deceived On ψ := ψ ∧ BR¬ψ
On this basis, I make the stipulation that Raymond is deceived simpliciter on April
1st 1925, written Deceived, if there is (at least) one formula ψ on which Raymond is
deceived. Let us write [Postulate] this stipulation that being deceived on at least
one formula ψ, written Deceived On ψ, implies to be deceived simpliciter, written
Deceived:
[Postulate] Deceived On ψ → Deceived
Emile’s morning announcement that D brings about Raymond’s first state of de-
ception. By applying the default rule D ⇒ (d+ ∧ ¬d−) to this announcement,
Raymond computes the wrong conclusion (d+ ∧¬d−) that he will be deceived only
by commission on April 1st 1925. From then on, Raymond believes that the for-
mula (d+ ∧ ¬d−) is true when in fact, this is not the case: ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−). So after
his brother’s announcement and until his brother’s explanation, Raymond holds
the false belief that (d+ ∧ ¬d−) and his state of deception can be described by the
conjunction:
Deceived On (d+∧¬d−) := ¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−) ∧ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)
This first state of deception vanishes right before Emile’s explanation. Raymond
realizes that he has not been deceived by commission. Then, a second state of
deception substitutes the first. After having waited all day long to be deceived
by commission, his mother asks Emile why he has not deceived Raymond by
commission. This way, Raymond confesses that he does not believe that he could
be deceived (only) by omission. Since he will be deceived as such (that’s the sense
of Emile’s explanation), formula (¬d+ ∧ d−) is true and Raymond falls in a second
state of deception expressed by the conjunction:
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Deceived On (¬d+∧d−) := (¬d
+ ∧ d−) ∧ BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)
To sum up, Raymond goes through two states of deception in Smullyan’s tale.
First, he is deceived on the fact that he will be deceived only by commission:
Deceived On (d+∧¬d−). Then, he is deceived on the fact that he will be deceived only
by omission: Deceived On (¬d+∧d−). While the first state of deception concerns a con-
tent, namely the content that can be infered from Emile’s announcement that D,
the second state of deception concerns a type of action, namely the kind of strategy
that can be used to trick one on April 1st 1925. It will prove helpful to keep this
distinction in mind from now on.
The first state of deception is made possible by the default rule D ⇒ (d+ ∧
¬d−) Raymond mistakenly applies after hearing Emile’s announcement that D.
The second state of deception is triggered by the fact that Raymond does not
realize that he will be deceived only by omission after realizing that he has not
been deceived (only) by commission. The next subsection is devoted to studying
the events leading to those states of deception.
2.3.3 The Events Leading to Raymond’s States of Deception
Properly speaking, the events that lead to those states are not “actions” made by
Emile for deceiving Raymond since Emile does not perform any action to deceive
his brother on April 1st 1925. Those events are better conceived as epistemic
“reactions” from Raymond corresponding to the distinct ways his mental states
evolve throughout the day. These mental reactions are captured by belief radical
upgrades with formulas ϕ, written [ ⇑ ϕ]. More precisely, Emile is said to deceive
Raymond on a formula ψ by a formula ϕ, written Deceive By ϕOn ψ, if and only if ψ
is true (false) and after upgrading his beliefs with formula ϕ, Raymond comes to
believe that ψ is false (true). So for some formulas formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L(B,K,[⇑]), the
event Deceive By ϕOn ψ is defined by the conjunction:
Deceive By ϕOn ψ := ψ ∧ [ ⇑ ϕ]BR¬ψ
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Mental reactions with formulas ϕ lead Raymond to be deceived on a formula ψ
(Deceived On ψ). So, the actions Deceive
By ϕ
On ψ can be defined from formula Deceived On ψ
as follows:
Deceive By ϕOn ψ := [ ⇑ ϕ]Deceived On ψ
In order to simplify the expression of the first deception that takes place in
Smullyan’s tale, I will use the abbreviation “Default” to name the default rule
D⇒ (d+ ∧ ¬d−) Raymond applies:
Default := D⇒ (d+ ∧ ¬d−)
Raymond’s first state of deception is that he wrongly believes that he will be deceived
only by commission on April 1st 1925: ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−) ∧ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−). As I said, this
state results from the default rule he applies to Emile’s announcement that D. So,
the event that leads Raymond to be deceived a first time can be captured by an
upgrade with formula (D ∧Default):
Deceive By (D∧Default)
On (d+∧¬d−)
= ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−) ∧ [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)
Or to put it more simply:
Deceive By (D∧Default)
On (d+∧¬d−)
= [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived On (d+∧¬d−)
Late in the afternoon, Raymond realizes that he has been deceived on the fact
that he would be deceived only by commission. But though realizing that, he
does not come to conclude that he will be deceived only by omission. In other
words, he does not draw the right conclusion that (¬d+ ∧ d−) from learning that
¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−). In terms of belief upgrade, this learning can be captured by a belief
radical upgrade with formula ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−). We can now sum up the event that
leads to Raymond’s second state of deception:
Deceive By ¬(d
+∧¬d−)
On (¬d+∧d−)
= (¬d+ ∧ d−) ∧ [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)
Or to put it more simply:
Deceive By ¬(d
+∧¬d−)
On (¬d+∧d−)
= [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
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2.3.4 Emile’s Whole Deceptive Plot on April Fool’s Day
Emile’s whole deceptive trick can be expressed by embedding the content of
Deceive By ¬(d
+∧¬d−)
On (¬d+∧d−)
into the one of Deceive By (D∧Default)
On (d+∧¬d−)
. The result is given by formula
Deception which describes what Emile’s deception comes down to:
Deception = [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]
(
Deceived On (d+∧¬d−)
∧ [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
)
So far, I have shown that Emile’s announcement naturally triggered a pragmatic
interpretation (deception only by commission) that was false. But I have explained
that learning the falsity of such a content did not help Raymond infer the right
strategy Emile would use to deceive him on April 1st (deception only by omission).
In a broader sense, Raymond has been deceived because he did not reach the exact
sense that Emile’s announcement implied. He did not reach the true semantic
content that D encompassed. After hearing Emile’s announcement, he reached a
pragmatic conclusion that he mistakenly equated with D’s literal meaning and
that turned out to be false. This conclusion being false, he had been tricked.
Later on that day comes Emile’s explanation. Raymond’s mother asks Emile why he
has not deceived Raymond (at least, as he expected). As a result, Emile unveils the
trap that led his brother to be deceived. In some sense, Emile’s explanation acts as
a way of teaching Raymond the exact meaning of D. To make things clearer, I will
use dynamic plausibility models in the next section to describe Emile’s explanation
step-by-step.
2.4 Unveiling the Deception
2.4.1 Emile’s Explanation on Deception
As I said, Emile’s explanation can be conceived as a way of teaching Raymond the
deceptive strategy he has been preyed to. By using epistemic plausibility models
to represent the dynamics of Emile’s explanation, I aim to put more emphasis on
the reasons why Raymond is surprised on April 1st 1925. Before modelling these
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dynamics, let us describe the epistemic landscape of the day. The set of all possible
states S is:
S = {s⋆ (¬d
+∧d−)
0 , s
(d+∧¬d−)
1 , s
(¬d+∧¬d−)
2 , s
(d+∧d−)
3 }
The upperscripted formula means that the formula holds at the state. For instance,
formula (¬d+∧d−) holds at the pointed state s⋆0 because Raymond will be deceived
only by omission in the actual state. Note that Raymond will be deceived in
states s⋆0 , s1 and s3 but not in state s2 which corresponds to the failure of Emile’s
announcement (¬D). As I said (see subsection 2.2.3), the combination (d+ ∧ d−)
encodes a type of deception which is irrelevant in the context of Smullyan’s story.
Neither Emile nor Raymond takes this combination as a plausible deceptive option.
For this reason, I set aside state s(d
+∧d−)
3 in my modelization.
Graphically, to represent the fact that the state t is at least as plausible as the state
s for Raymond (s 6R t), I draw a subscripted right arrow “
→
R ” from state s to state
t. When states s and t are equally plausible for Raymond (s 6R t and t 6R s), I draw
a subscripted left-right arrow “↔R ” between states s and t. Reflexive arrows are
omitted at each state to simplify the pictures. Let us now model the different steps
of the story.
Late in the afternoon, Emile’s deceptive entreprise is achieved but Raymond has
still not gotten the trick. On the one hand, he now believes that the default
conclusion he has derived in the morning is false: BR¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−). But on the
other hand, he does not conclude that he will be deceived only by omission:
BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−). Actually, Raymond believes that the most plausible option is
that he won’t be deceived at all: BR(¬d
+ ∧ ¬d−). Here is the epistemic model
representing Raymond’s beliefs at this stage:
SLate a f ternoon s1
(d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s⋆0
(¬d+ ∧ d−)
s2
(¬d+ ∧ ¬d−)
R R
Model SLate a f ternoon shows that Raymond is no longer deceived on the false formula
(d+ ∧ ¬d−) since he now believes this formula to be false: Slate..., s⋆0 |=
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¬Deceived On (d+∧¬d−). But model SLate a f ternoon also shows that Raymond is still de-
ceived on the true formula (¬d+ ∧ d−) since he believes this formula to be false:
SLate..., s
⋆
0 |= Deceived On (¬d+∧d−). Immediately after Raymond complains to his
mother that Emile has not deceived him (at least as he expected). So next comes
Emile’s explanation that teaches Raymond why and how he has been deceived by
his brother. The first part of Emile’s explanation is the following one:
Emile: “So, you expected me to deceive you, didn’t you?
Raymond: Yes.”
Here Emile’s question can be understood as “So, you expected me to deceive you by
some action, didn’t you?”. Since this question is in the affirmative form, it can be
formally expressed by Raymond upgrading his beliefs with formula BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)
corresponding to the belief he reached by default interpretation. The matching
operation [ ⇑ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)] : SLate... → SDe f ault returns the following model:
SDe f ault s⋆0
(¬d+ ∧ d−)
s2
(¬d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s1
(d+ ∧ ¬d−)
R R
The arrows being reflexive, we can easily verify that SDe f ault, s⋆0 |= BRBR(d
+ ∧¬d−).
Here Raymond acknowledges that he came to believe that (d+ ∧ ¬d−) after his
brother’s announcement that D. Immediately, though, Emile informs him that this
default interpretation was wrong:
Emile: “But I didn’t, did I?
Raymond: No.”
By those lines, Emile invites his brother to retract his belief in formula (d+ ∧ ¬d−).
The dynamic operation corresponding to such a removal can be expressed by
[ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)] : SDe f ault → SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) . Graphically, the model we obtain is:
SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) s1
(d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s⋆0
(¬d+ ∧ d−)
s2
(¬d+ ∧ ¬d−)
R R
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In model SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) , Raymond now believes that formula (d
+ ∧ ¬d−) is false:
SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) , s
⋆
0 |= BR¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−). By doing so, he acknowledges that he was
wrong to believe that (d+ ∧ ¬d−) after his brother’s announcement and thus, that
he has been deceived on (d+ ∧¬d−). But Emile’s demonstration goes even further.
In the remaining part of his explanation, he shows that not only has Raymond
been deceived on formula (d+ ∧ ¬d−) but he has also been deceived on formula
(¬d+∧d−). The reason is that Raymond kept dismissing the true fact that he would
be deceived only by omission (¬d+ ∧ d−) after realizing, as he just did, that he
would not be deceived only by commission ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−). Emile starts explaining
why in the following lines:
Emile: “But you expected me to, didn’t you?
Raymond: Yes.”
Here Emile repeats the same question he has asked before (“So, you expected me to
deceive you, didn’t you?”) to produce a second-order thought in his brother’s mind.
This repetition, and the way the question is introduced by the contrastive word
“But”, tend to generate a meta-level interpretation which can be translated by
reformulating Emile’s question: “But you kept dismissing that you could be deceived
only by omission, didn’t you?”. That way, Raymond is invited to realize that he kept
considering deception only by omission as an implausible option even though he
knew that he could not be deceived only by commission.
This recognition can be captured by Raymond upgrading his beliefs with the
doxastic formula BR¬(¬d
+∧d−) expressing his initial disbelief to be deceived only
by omission. From a modeling perspective, however, this recognition leaves the
model SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) as it is since the formula BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−) is a validity of the
model. Then, the corresponding operation [ ⇑ BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)] is simply vacuous.
The model is still:
SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) s1
(d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s⋆0
(¬d+ ∧ d−)
s2
(¬d+ ∧ ¬d−)
R R
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Immediately, though, Emile informs Raymond that his disbelief was unfortunate
and led him to be deceived a second time:
Emile: “So I deceived you, didn’t I?
Raymond: Yes.”
By those lines, Emile invites Raymond to acknowledge the truth of formula (¬d+ ∧
d−), namely to recognize that he has been deceived only by omission. The cor-
responding operation is [ ⇑ (¬d+ ∧ d−)] : SDeceived On (d+∧¬d−) → SDeceived On (¬d+∧d−) and
returns the final model:
SDeceived On (¬d+∧d−) s1
(d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s2
(¬d+ ∧ ¬d−)
s⋆0
(¬d+ ∧ d−)
R R
Through the latter upgrade, Raymond comes to believe that formula (¬d+ ∧ d−)
is true: SDeceived On (¬d+∧d−) , s
⋆
0 |= BR(¬d
+ ∧ d−). Now he has adequate beliefs on the
situation (since s⋆ (¬d
+∧d−)
0 ), and he also acknowledges that he has been deceived
on this very formula all along.
I have described in detail the different steps by which Raymond learns why and
how he has been fooled by his brother on April 1st 1925. By going backward from
model SDeceived On (¬d+∧d−) to the initial model SLate..., we can reconstitute the whole
formula capturing the dynamics of Emile’s explanation. Let us start out by listing
the four distinct steps of the dialogue:
(1) [ ⇑ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)]
(2) [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]
(3) [ ⇑ BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)]
(4) [ ⇑ (¬d+ ∧ d−)]
Formulas (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) correspond to the distinct steps by which Raymond comes
to learn the deception Emile’s announcement implied. At step (1), he learns that
after hearing that D, he made the default interpretation that this announcement
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meant that he would be deceived only by commission: [ ⇑ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)]. But
at step (2), Emile reveals that this default interpretation was wrong since, as
Raymond realized by himself late in the afternoon, he had not been deceived
(only) by commission: [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]. By concatenating steps (1) and (2),
Raymond can conclude that he has been deceived on the pragmatic meaning of the
announcement: Deceived On (d+∧¬d−). At step (3), Emile tells Raymond that though
realizing that he had been deceived on this pragmatic meaning, he kept dismissing
that he could be deceived only by omission: [ ⇑ BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)]. But at step (4),
Emile finally informs Raymond that since he has done nothing to deceive him
throughout the day, the right conclusion he should have reached is that he would
be deceived only by omission: [ ⇑ (¬d+ ∧ d−)]. By concatenating steps (3) and
(4), Raymond can conclude that he has been deceived on the type of action Emile
would use to trick him: Deceived On (¬d+∧d−).
By learning the steps above (see Table 2.1 for a summary), Raymond can reconsti-
tute Emile’s whole deceptive plot on April 1st 1925:
Deception = [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]
(
Deceived On (d+∧¬d−)
∧ [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
)
To conclude, Emile’s explanation can be conceived as a way of teaching Raymond
the deceptive plot he has been preyed to. Through the learning process, Raymond
understands why and how he has been deceived by his malicious brother. But I
will show that this learning also throws Raymond into paradoxical thoughts.
2.4.2 Raymond’s Self-Referential Reasoning
After his brother’s explanation, Raymond lies in bed and starts reasoning about
the deception he has been preyed to. He eventually falls in a paradox which can
be summed up as follows:
On the one hand, supposing that he wasn’t deceived, then he didn’t get what
he expected (because he expected to be deceived after his brother’s announce-
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Explanation Dynamic Step Deceptive State
E: “So you expected...? [ ⇑ BR(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)]
R: Yes.” ...
E: “But I didn’t...? [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]
R: No.” Deceived On (d+∧¬d−)
E: “But you expected...? [ ⇑ BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)]
R: Yes.” ...
E: “So I deceived you...? [ ⇑ (¬d+ ∧ d−)]
R: Yes.” Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
Table 2.1: Emile’s Explanation Flow.
ment!), and hence he was actually deceived. But on the other hand, supposing
that he was deceived, then he exactly did get what he expected, and hence he
was not “deceived.”
I will now express Raymond’s reasoning in more formal terms. Actually, only the
first line of his reasoning (“On the one hand...”) leads to a contradiction. The
second line (“On the other hand...”) is not contradictory as it stands. Let us start
with the second line before studying the first in details.
Raymond’s second line of reasoning can be reformulated as such: if Raymond
supposes that he is deceived by Emile, he has to suppose that the formula Deceived
is true after having processed Emile’s announcement: [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]Deceived.
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But then, he exactly did get what is expected (because he expected to be deceived after
his brother’s announcement): [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]BRDeceived. From those starting
points, the following derivation shows that Raymond can finally conclude that he
is not deceived on the fact that he is deceived: [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]¬Deceived On Deceived.
But from this conclusion, Raymond cannot conclude that he is not deceived at all.
Doing so would be logically incorrect: it would consist in denying the antecedent
in the (stipulative) statement [Postulate]: Deceived On Deceived → Deceived. However,
Raymond does so when he concludes that he is not deceived from the assumption
that he is. Let us examine his reasoning to point out the guilty step:
[1][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived [Hypothesis].
[2][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BRDeceived [Hypothesis].
[3][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived [1]-[2], Conjunction.
∧ [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BRDeceived
[4][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)](Deceived ∧ BRDeceived) [3], Reduction Axiom.
[5][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived On Deceived [4], Failure of Deceived On ....
[6]¬Deceived On Deceived → ¬Deceived [5], By [Postulate].
[7][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)](¬Deceived On Deceived [6], Necessitation rule.
→ ¬Deceived)
[8][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived On Deceived [7], Axiom K.
→ [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived
[9][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived [5]-[8], MP. Contra [1].
In the derivation above, the guilty step is [6]: it is logically incorrect to de-
rive that ¬Deceived On Deceived → ¬Deceived by denying the antecedent in formula
Deceived On Deceived → Deceived. For this reason, the conclusion Raymond derives
is wrong: he cannot logically conclude that after having processed his brother’s
announcement that D, he is deceived only if he is not deceived. So this line in Ray-
mond’s reasoning does not lead to a genuine contradiction. Concerning the first,
I will now point out that it does lead to a genuine contradiction since one of the
assumptions (viz. that Raymond is not deceived after his brother’s announcement)
is false. Let us examine this reasoning.
Raymond’s first line of reasoning can be reformulated as follows: on the one
86
hand, if Raymond supposes that he is not deceived by Emile, he has to sup-
pose that formula ¬Deceived is true after processing his brother’s announce-
ment: [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]¬Deceived. But then, he did not get what he expected
because he clearly expected to be deceived after his brother’s announcement:
[ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BRDeceived. We can now derive a contradiction by applying the
following principles:
[1][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived [Hypothesis].
[2][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BRDeceived [Hypothesis].
[3]¬[ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived [1], Reduction Axiom.
[4][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]¬Deceived [1]-[2], Conjunction.
∧ [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]BRDeceived
[5][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)](¬Deceived [4], Reduction Axiom.
∧ BRDeceived)
[6][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived On ¬Deceived [5], Def. of Deceived On ....
[7]Deceived On ¬Deceived → Deceived By [Postulate].
[8][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)](Deceived On ¬Deceived [7], Necessitation rule.
→ Deceived)
[9][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived On ¬Deceived [8], Axiom K.
→ [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived
[10][ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]Deceived [6]-[9], MP. Contra [3].
But though perfectly sound, Raymond’s first line of reasoning is based on a false
premise, namely [1]: [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]¬Deceived. It is false that Raymond is
not deceived after computing the default interpretation of his brother’s morning
announcement. We saw in the previous subsection that Raymond is deceived
on formula (d+ ∧ ¬d−) after this computation since this default interpretation is
wrong: [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]Deceived On (d+∧¬d−). Due to the stipulation we assumed
to hold, one who is deceived on a specific formula after Emile’s announcement is
deceived simpliciter. So the formula [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)]Deceived is also true. This
way, the contradiction with conclusion [10] simply vanishes.
To sum up, the puzzling thoughts Raymond has late on the evening are not of
a paradoxical nature. In his first line of reasoning, the assumption that he is
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not deceived after his brother’s announcement can be suspended. In the second
line of reasoning, the step leading to the contradiction can be blocked. Of more
interest is the state of surprise Raymond is led to by his brother’s explanation.
Such a surprise is noticeable in Raymond’s late reasoning. He is surprised both
by the deceptive content and the type of deception Emile’s announcement involved.
In the next section, I explain why Raymond is surprised as such at the end of his
brother’s explanation.
2.5 A Source of Surprise
2.5.1 Emile’s Surprise Announcement of Deception
From now on, let us go back to Emile’s early announcement: “Well, Raymond,
today is April Fool’s Day, and I will deceive you as you have never been de-
ceived before!”. We have shown that this announcement pragmatically suggests
the false conclusion that Raymond would be deceived only by commission. But
what does this announcement really mean? What is the exact meaning of Emile’s
announcement? How can it be expressed in natural and more formal terms? To
give an answer, I introduce a famous epistemic puzzle called the ‘The Surprise
Examination Paradox’ in the literature [e.g. O’Connor 1948, Scriven 1951, Shaw
1958]. In the latter, a teacher announces to his or her students that he or she will
give a (single) surprise exam on the next week. The way it is formulated, the
teacher’s announcement of surprise can be compared with Emile’s announcement
along similar lines. Both announce a surprising event to come and both raise
similar issues concerning the possibility for the announcement to be fulfilled. In
this section, we focus on the two-day version of the Surprise Exam Paradox and
provide a formal expression of Emile’s announcement based on the formaliza-
tions Gerbrandy [1999 2007] and van Ditmarsch & Kooi [2006] have given to the
teacher’s announcement in the Surprise Exam case.2
In the two-day version of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the teacher makes the fol-
2 See also van Benthem [2004] and Bonnay & Égré [2011] on discussions of related epistemic para-
doxes in dynamic logic settings (Fitch’s paradox, Moore’s paradox and Williamson’s Margin
for Error paradox).
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lowing suprise announcement: “I will give you a (single) surprise exam either on
Monday or on Tuesday next week”. Between the teacher and his or her students,
it is common knowledge that an exam comes as a surprise if the students do not
know the evening before the exam that it will happen the next day. But after this
announcement of a surprise exam, the students (who are assumed to be perfect
reasoners) start reasoning and finally conclude that such an exam is impossible.
Logically speaking, the exam would fail to be a surprise on any day of the week.
Their argument is based on a type of reasoning called backward induction. If the
test takes place on Tuesday, the students would know on Monday evening that
the test is on Tuesday because Tuesday is the last available working day of the
week. Then, it would not be a surprise. But nor will it be a surprise if the test
is on Monday because the students would know on Sunday evening that the test
is on Monday (for they know that the test is not on Tuesday due to the previous
reasoning). At the end of this backward reasoning, the students would conclude
that the test cannot be a surprise on any day of the week. Unfortunately, the
teacher unexpectedly gives the exam on Tuesday and this is a complete surprise
for the students.
Let us reformulate Emile’s early announcement. If we consider the deceptive op-
tions he has, a more explicit formulation of his announcement might be: “I will
surprise you by deceiving you either only by commission or only by omission”.
We know that Raymond misinterprets this explicit announcement in the following
sense: “I will surprise you by deceiving you only by commission”. But from a se-
mantic point of view, both deceptive options (namely deception only by commission
and deception only by omission) should be taken into account to capture the exact
meaning of Emile’s announcement.
This informal formulation of Emile’s announcement can inspire many formal
expressions depending on the way we capture the concept of surprise. Following
a basic intuition we will elaborate on later (see subsection 2.5.3 for details), a state
of surprise is generally triggered by a mismatch of beliefs: facts or events come out
to be true but remain unacknowledged by agents until they come out to be true.
As a result, the latter agents undergo states of surprise, or even of astonishement,
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when they learn the existence of those facts and events. To see more clearly into
this, let us first give the formal expression of the announcement we favor:
D = ((d+ ∧ ¬d−) ∧ BR¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−))
∨((¬d+ ∧ d−) ∧ [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−))
This formal expression of Emile’s announcement is loosely based on Gerbrandy’s
formalization of the teacher’s announcement in the Surprise Exam case.3 Formula
D encodes the fact that Emile’s deception will be a surprise for the reason that if
Raymond is deceived only by omission, formula (¬d+ ∧ d−) is true but Raymond
denies it (viz. BR¬(¬d
+ ∧ d−)) even after having recognized that he won’t be
deceived only by commission: [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]. But if Raymond is deceived only
by commission (d+ ∧ ¬d−), he denies it too: BR¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−). So no matter whether
he is deceived only by commission or only by omission, in both cases it will come
as a surprise according to D.
That being said, we can rewrite formula D by using the abbreviations we have
used for Emile’s deceptive states. So formula D becomes:
D = Deceived On (d+∧¬d−) ∨ [ ⇑ ¬(d
+ ∧ ¬d−)]Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
Let us now remind the full deceptive action Emile put forward to trick his brother
on April 1st 1925:
3 A (two-day) Gerbrandy’s formalization of the teacher’s announcement of surprise would be:
(mon ∧ ¬K mon) ∨ (tue ∧ [!¬mon]¬K tue) ∨ K⊥, such that “mon” and “tue” stand for monday
and tuesday, and “!” is some learning operation. Gerbrandy’s formalization means that the
exam will come as a surprise for the reason that if the exam is on tuesday (tue), the agent does
not know this (¬K tue) after having learned that it is not on monday ([!¬mon]); if the exam
is on monday (mon), the agent does not know it either on monday (¬K mon); if the agent has
contradictory information about the date of the exam (⊥), the latter will also come as a surprise
(according to Gerbrandy). This proposal has been restated by van Ditmarsch & Kooi [2006]
in the following way: (mon → ¬K mon) ∧ (tue → [!¬mon]¬K tue). Though van Ditmarsch
& Kooi’ formalization does not take inconsistency as a source of surprise, both forms opt for
a non-self-referential reading of the teacher’s announcement. Failure of the Success Axiom in
Public Announcement Logic makes self-referential sentences of the Moorean type impossible to
express in those settings. In my case, the formalization of Emile’s announcement also relies
on a non-self-referential reading of the announcement. Self-referentiality is excluded since the
announcement itself is not considered as a bona fide action (see subsection 2.2.3 for details).
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Deception = [ ⇑ (D ∧Default)]
(
Deceived On (d+∧¬d−)
∧ [ ⇑ ¬(d+ ∧ ¬d−)]Deceived On (¬d+∧d−)
)
Setting aside the default interpretation Raymond makes of his brother’s announce-
ment, namely [ ⇑ (D ∧ Default)], it is clear that being deceived the way he is, Ray-
mond is also necessarily surprised. In language L(B,K,[⇑]), the conjunctive subform
in Deception implies the disjunctive formula D, namely ⊢ Deception → D. This is
perfectly consistent with Smullyan’s story: we do observe that at the end of the
day, Raymond is surprised by the deception he has been preyed to. Crucially, the
deception Emile has performed (viz. Deception) is the deception that has made
Raymond being surprised.
Nonetheless, a problem immediately arises with this type of announcement. In
the Surprise Exam case, it is usually accepted that the teacher’s announcement is
an “epistemic blindspot” for the students and that it cannot succeed in principle
for this exact reason [see Sorensen 1988]. In the same way, I argue that Emile’s
announcement cannot be fulfilled in principle and that assuming the opposite leads
to a paradox. My argument is the following: if Raymond is a perfect reasoner, he
has the (temporal) resources to conclude that Emile’s announcement is false, and
then he cannot be surprised after this very announcement. But then, he necessarily
ends up in a paradox since the announcement turns out to be true at the end of
the day: he is surprised by his brother’s explanation. So how can this be possible?
How can Raymond be surprised without inconsistency ?
2.5.2 Emile’s Successful Action of Surprise
To put it briefly: Emile’s announcement of surprise is fulfilled only because Ray-
mond is not a perfect reasoner. If Raymond was a perfect reasoner, his brother’s
announcement could not succeed, Raymond could not be surprised afterwards.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that Raymond is a perfect reasoner. If
he now computes his brother’s announcement by using the default rule, then, no
matter whether he will be deceived only by commission (d+ ∧ ¬d−) or will be
deceived only by omission (¬d+∧d−), in both cases it cannot be a surprise for him.
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This relies on the fact that Raymond has the temporal resources to adjust his
beliefs in time before looking for his brother to get more information. After
Emile’s announcement, he can come to believe that he will be deceived only by
commission. In case he is, it won’t be a surprise since he would have expected
to be deceived as such. But in case he is not deceived as such, it won’t be a
surprise either. The reason is that if he is not deceived only by commission, he
will necessarily be deceived only by omission. Late in the afternoon and before
going to see his brother, he would have had enough time to realize it and to come
to rightly believe that he would be deceived only by omission. As a consequence,
it cannot be a surprise either. In other words, no matter whether he will be
deceived only by commission or only by omission, his brother’s explanation will
fail to be a surprise. Emile’s announcement cannot be fulfilled in principle. That
being said, it is time to study the distinct states of surprise Raymond goes through
late on that day.
2.5.3 Raymond’s Distinct States of Surprise
In Smullyan’s tale, Raymond’s surprise does not follow from the completion of
Emile’s deceptive plot but from his brother unveiling this very plot. The reason is
that a cognitive agent reaches a state of surprise when he or she is led to recognize
an inconsistency, that is a discrepancy or a mismatch, between what he or she believes
about the world and what the actual world is [e.g. Meyer et al. 1997, Lorini &
Castelfranchi 2006].
Following a basic intuition, an event which is unexpected is considered “surpris-
ing” and the more unexpected it is, the more surprising it turns out to be [e.g.
Ortony & Partridge 1987, Meyer et al. 1997]. In other words, an event which was
expected but does not happen is surprising. But an event which actually happens
while being totally unexpected is even more surprising.
In that sense, Lorini & Castelfranchi distinguish two main kinds of surprise. The
first kind is called “mismatch-based surprise” and results from a “conflict between a
perceived fact and a scrutinized representation”. The agent is surprised because he or
she has some anticipatory representation of a fact or event, but he or she cannot
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make the incoming data fit with this anticipatory representation they have. In
that case, the intensity of the induced surprise depends of the probability, more
crucially on the implausibility, which is assigned by the agent to the conflicting
data he or she receives.
But Lorini & Castelfranchi contrast this first type of surprise with a stronger
form named “astonishment” (or “surprise in recognition”). Contrary to the first, this
form of surprise is of a second-order nature because it is rooted on the recognition of
the implausibility of a perceived fact compared to expectations: “I perceive a certain
fact and recognize the implausibility of this”. Lorini & Castelfranchi also precise that
this astonishment can depend upon two distinct mental processes. First, I can
be astonished by a fact/event ϕ because I assigned a high probability to ¬ϕ and
after perceiving ϕ I realize that “I would not have expected that event ϕ” [see Lorini
& Castelfranchi 2006, 3]. Second, I can be astonished by ϕ because perceiving
ϕ leads me to infer the falsity (and incongruity) of my initial disbelief that ϕ or
belief that ¬ϕ.4
In Smullyan’s tale, both kinds of deeper surprise are involved because both cases
of unexpectation are involved. On the one hand, Raymond expects to be deceived
only by commission after his brother’s announcement but later in the evening, he
is led to notice that nothing has happened as such. In fact, Emile has not perfomed
any particular action to deceive him. Due to this obvious discrepancy between
his scrutinized representation (to be deceived only by commission) and the lack
of any deceptive action, Raymond is preyed to a surprise of the mismatch-based
kind.
But on the other hand, Emile’s explanation also leads Raymond to be astonished
(or surprised in recognition). Indeed, Emile tells him that he has actually been
deceived only by omission although he kept discarding such an option as being
plausible (even after noticing that it was no longer plausible that he would be
deceived only by commission). Since he judged deception only by omission as
being very implausible, Raymond is astonished when he recognized that Emile
4 Lorini & Castelfranchi contrast those “deeper and slower forms of surprise which are due to symbolic
representations of expected events” [see Lorini & Castelfranchi 2006, 1] to a first-hand surprise which
corresponds to a perceptual mismatch between a stimulus (viz. what the agents can see or hear
in their immediate environment) and their sensory-motor expectations.
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used this type of deception to trick him. Consistent with Lorini & Castelfranchi’s
distinction is the fact that Raymond’s astonishment is stronger in term of surprise
than his first mismatch-based surprise. His astonishement is tied to his strongly
entrenched disbelief that he could be deceived only by omission. In contrast, his
belief that he would be deceived only by commission is less entrenched and only
leads him to be moderately surprised.
2.6 Conclusion
Emile’s trick relies on a misleading default and pertains to the broader category
of veridical deception. Veridical deception concerns all the deceptive strategies
whereby a non-cooperative speaker uses a true piece of information to induce
a false belief in some intended addressee. Apart from misleading defaults, non-
cooperative speakers can use other forms of veridical deception. For instance, they
can use false implicatures to make someone falsely believe a piece of information ϕ
by telling them a true information ψwhile intending for them to infer that ϕ from
ψ [e.g. Adler 1997, Meibauer 2005 2014]. But veridical deception also includes
strategies like pretending to deceive [e.g. Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981, Fallis 2014]:
to make someone disbelieve a true piece of information ϕ by arousing his or her
suspicion towards the source of ϕ; or presupposition faking [e.g. Harder & Kock
1976, Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981]: to make someone inadequately believe a true
formula ϕ he or she fails to semantically or pragmatically account for.
A I said, veridical deception is performed through a misleading default in Smullyan’s
story. Emile’s strategy relies on a true but misleading announcement. As a seman-
tic content, D happens to be true: Emile will deceive Raymond as he has never been
deceived before. But pragmatically, D leads Raymond to draw a false conclusion:
contrary to what Emile suggests, he won’t deceive Raymond (only) by commission.
Though being false, however, this conclusion is based on a natural process. This
is usually the case that one who is deceived is deceived by some action (commis-
sion) instead of by none (omission). So the interpretation Raymond makes is the
natural interpretation one would make in common circumstances.
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From a theoretical perspective, I have shown that the surprise deception paradox
can be seen as a variant, and interesting illustration, of the two-day version of
the Surprise Exam Paradox. But an important difference between the two puz-
zles is that the (projected) failure of the teacher’s announcement only relies on
logical reasoning, whereas the (projected) failure of Emile’s announcement relies
both on logical and pragmatic reasoning. Emile’s trick succeeds because Ray-
mond first makes the wrong pragmatic inference that deception implies deception by
commission. This inference makes him logically, and falsely, conclude that being
not deceived by commission, he is not deceived simpliciter. If Emile was cynical
enough, his last word and final recommendation to his brother could be: “If you
want to deceive someone else, whether or not you do so actively, start with pragmatics!”
This chapter was devoted to investigating deception by omission provoked by a
misleading default inference. Contrary to the standard case of lies (Chapter 1), mis-
leading defaults and strategic omissions are non-standard cases of deception, and
have received less attention from epistemologists working on deception. Chap-
ter 3 aims to integrate these standard and non-standard cases into a definitional
account of informational messages.
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Chapter 3
The Definition of Intelligence
Messages
3.1 Introduction
One of the activities provided by intelligence agencies is called “Information Eval-
uation” and consists in assessing “an item of information in respect of the reliability
of the source, and the credibility of the information” [see STANAG-2511 2003, DIA-2
2010]. A competent authority also known as intelligence officer performs the evalu-
ation along a 6×6 alphanumeric matrix based on 2 ratings (“Content Credibility”
vs. “Source Reliability”) with 6 levels of the rating Credibility and 6 levels of the
rating Reliability. Both ratings are then crossed to give an overall insight into the
quality of sources and contents.
But the alphanumeric scale has been criticized for being based on an assumption
we may call “fact vs. interpretation” and such that “intelligence reports transmit
facts and/or assessments. The distinction between fact and interpretation must always be
clearly indicated” [see STANAG-2511 2003, 2]. As a matter of fact, experimental
results show that intelligence officers fail to comply with this distinction between
objective facts and subjective interpretations when they evaluate intelligence data
[e.g. Baker et al. 1968, Kelly & Peterson 1971, Johnson 1973]. A straightforward
explanation is that the scale is built on confused notions that should be clarified
and better specified. Researchers have observed that officers misunderstand the
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dimensions of credibility and reliability that underlie the scale, their distinct levels
of evaluation, as well as resultant scores.
But to help officers better separate facts from interpretations, it seems impera-
tive to first point out the objective-subjective divide that remains implicit in the
existing scale. My hypothesis is that this divide is nothing over and beyond
the distinction between descriptive and evaluative terms. Basically, credibility and
reliability are evaluatives that are used for assessing descriptive terms of truth for
message contents, and of honesty for message sources. More precisely, credibility
and reliability are used to elicit degrees of truth for contents and degrees of honesty
for sources. In the first case, contextual evidence is used to assess contents while
in the second case, past experience with the source is used to determine the source
reliability.
Once elicited, degrees of truth and degrees of honesty are descriptive features
of intelligence messages. They are objective dimensions that define intelligence
messages and can be used for isolating distinct categories, or types, for them.
But these dimensions remain implicit in the existing scale and spotting types is
tedious, especially concerning deceptive messages. No clear link can be drawn
from the existing scale to necessary and sufficient conditions commonly used to
frame informational types: information, misinformation, lie, omission, etc. Lies are
notoriously difficult to rate along the scale [Capet & Revault d’Allonnes 2013],
but even more difficult is spotting mischievous messages that involve omission
of information.
In this chapter, I present a descriptive account to see more clearly into informa-
tional types. I propose a 3×3 matrix that distinguishes 3 levels of Truth for contents
(“True”, “False”, “Indeterminate”) and 3 levels of Honesty for sources (“Honest”,
“Dishonest”, “Imprecise”). This will help me isolate 9 categories of messages de-
pending on the extent to which messages are true or false and sources honest or
dishonest. Regarding deceptive messages, I mainly focus on categories that appeal
to omission from the standpoint of linguistic vagueness [based on Égré & Icard
2018]. Even more than lies, omission poses an increased difficulty to intelligence
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officers for omitting information always involves keeping intact the Maxims of
Quality that would imply easy detection. As a result, spotting vague messages
remains a critical issue for intelligence raters but I believe that a precise taxonomy
of the phenomenon would be a crucial advance in that direction. Accordingly, I
distinguish two main categories of vague messages: semantic indeterminacy and
pragmatic imprecision, each of which with more specific varieties (semantic degree-
vagueness and open-texture vs. pragmatic generality and approximation).
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I start out by describing the
wide range of activities intelligence agencies usually engage in (subsection 3.2.1).
I then focus on the activity of information evaluation by describing the scale officers
commonly use in this endeavour (subsection 3.2.2). I then insist on some virtues
of the alphanumeric scale before pointing out its shortcomings for information
evaluation (3.2.3).
My purpose in section 3.3 is to analyze the fact vs. interpretation assumption to
show that this assumption is not respected by intelligence officers on the field
(subsection 3.3.1). As I said, a straightforward explanation for this failure is
that the evaluative dimensions of the scale, as well as their descriptions, are
confused. Based on the empirical literature, I argue that the definitions of the
credibility and reliability ratings, as well as their distinct levels of evaluation, lead
to misunderstandings and inconsistencies amongst officers and between them
(subsection 3.3.2). This hypothesis is valid. But making the fact vs. interpretation
assumption efficient first requires to shed light on the objective dimensions of truth
and honesty that remain in the background of the scale (subsection 3.3.3).
Section 3.4 is devoted to presenting my descriptive account in detail. I start out
by explaining the 3×3 matrix I propose to define messages and to isolate their
informational types (subsection 3.4.1). I first concentrate on classical types obtained
when the content of the message is either true or false and the source, honest
or dishonest (subsection 3.4.2). Following Égré & Icard [2018], I then put more
emphasis on some borderline types that rely either on semantic vagueness — in
case the status of the content is semantically indeterminate (subsection 3.4.3), or
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on pragmatic vagueness — in case sources are less informative than they should
according to the Gricean Maxims (subsection 3.4.4).
3.2 Information Evaluation in Intelligence
3.2.1 The Intelligence Cycle in a Nutschell
Intelligence agencies usually engage in a cyclic sequence of activities [TTA 2001,
DIA-2 2010] consisting (roughly)1 in four distinct stages (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: The Intelligence Cycle.
In the first stage called “Direction” (or “Planning”), a competent authority or
decision maker determines the “intelligence requirements” of the agency, namely
the kind of data the service needs on a specific matter of interest (that can be of a
strategical, tactical or operational nature). These requirements are expressed by a
“Request for Information” (RFI).
The stage of “Collection” (or “Gathering”) immediately follows: in response to
the requirements defined above, the intelligence organization recruits sources that
are relevant on the topic of interest. These sources can have different sensor
types: they can be human sources (HUMINT) if intelligence is collected from
human agents on the field. There also exists many different types of technical
1 To be fully accurate, we should distinguish four-stages cyclic models (on which the French model
is based [DIA-2 2010]: “Orientation”, “Collection & Processing”, “Analysis” and “Dissemination”)
from five-stages (or more) cyclic models (on which the American model is based [ODN 2011]:
“Planning & Direction”, “Collection”, “Processing & Exploitation”, “Analysis & Production” and
“Dissemination & Integration”). To keep things simple, the model I use in this chapter is based on
four stages. This model is usually accepted as a minimal ground by the intelligence community.
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sources like geospatial imagery (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT), interception of signals (SIGINT), cyber intelligence (CYBINT), analysis
of monetary transactions (FININT), etc.
Then comes a third stage called “Processing” (or “Exploitation”) in which the col-
lected data are classified into categories of the same nature (Grouping), evaluated
depending on the quality of their sources and contents (Evaluation), interpreted
through the intelligence requirements that have been defined (Analysis) and even-
tually merged with other messages in an enriched framework (Fusion). This
framework will be used for grounding future decisions (Interpretation).
In the last stage of “Dissemination”, a conclusive report is delivered to the decision-
maker that fits with the intelligence requirements. Recipients generally conduct
further collection and exploitation stages which lead to new iterations of the
intelligence cycle.
3.2.2 The Traditional Scale for Information Evaluation
Message Content Credibility
Scores 1 2 3 4 5 6
S
o
u
rc
e
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
B B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
C C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
E E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
F F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
Table 3.1: The 6×6 Traditional Alphanumeric Matrix.
In the present and next chapters, I focus on the evaluation step of the processing
stage. This step proposes to assess “an item of information in respect of the reliability of
the source, and the credibility of the information” [e.g. STANAG-2511 2003, FM-2-22.3
2003, DIA-2 2010].2 This evaluation is made along a 6×6 alphanumeric matrix
2 The doctrine precises that intelligence reports based on credibility and reliability ratings “must
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Content Credibility Source Reliability
1: Confirmed A: Completely Reliable
2: Probably True B: Usually Reliable
3: Possibly True C: Fairly Reliable
4: Doubtfully True D: Not Usually Reliable
5: Improbable E: Unreliable
6: Cannot Be Judged F: Cannot Be Judged
Table 3.2: Linguistic Labels for Ratings.
which is based on 2 ratings (“Content Credibility” vs. “Source Reliability) with 6
levels of the rating Credibility and 6 levels of the rating Reliability. Both credibility
and reliability ratings are then crossed (e.g. “B3”, “E5”) to give an overall insight
into the quality of messages. Visual representations of the matrix and of the
distinct levels of evaluation are provided by Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The conventional reading for score “E1” (for instance) is that the source of
the message is judged as “Unreliable” while the content the source delivers is
“Confirmed” by other sources. It should be noted that, strictly speaking, credibil-
ity and reliability ratings range from 1 to 5 and from A to E (respectively). Ratings
6 and F are not evaluatives stricto sensu since in these cases, external evidence is
lacking to cross-check contents and sources. Exact descriptions of the linguistic
labels are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 based on the US Army Field Manuals [see
FM-2-22.3 2003, Appendix B].
Concerning credibility, ratings are captured through different labels that express
decreasing degrees of confirmation given contextual information consistent or incon-
sistent with the message (contextual evidence). Degree 1 corresponds to an absolute
label (“Confirmed”) that captures cross-checked certainty. Degrees from 2 to 5
correspond to adverbial modulations (“Probably True”, “Possibly True”, etc.) that
capture high consistency (“Probably True”), moderate consistency (“Possibly True”),
weak inconsistency (“Doubtfully True”) and blatant inconsistency (“Improbable”).
have the four basic qualities of relevance, conciseness, clarity and timeliness” [STANAG-2511 2003, 2].
But those qualities should not be taken into account when evaluating credibility and reliability.
They are only writing guidelines to make the reports valid and actionable for operationals.
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Ratings Linguistic Labels Descriptions
1 Confirmed Confirmed by other independent sources;
consistent with other information on the subject
2 Probably True Not confirmed; consistent
with other information on the subject
3 Possibly True Not confirmed; agrees with
some other information on the subject
4 Doubtfully True Not confirmed; possible;
no other information on the subject
5 Improbable Not confirmed; contradicted by
other information on the subject
6 Cannot Be Judged No basis exists for evaluating
the validity of the information
Table 3.3: The Credibility of the Message Content.
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Ratings Linguistic Labels Descriptions
A Completely Reliable No doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency;
has a history of complete reliability
B Usually Reliable Minor doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency;
has a history of valid information most of the time
C Fairly Reliable Doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency
but has provided valid information in the past
D Not Usually Reliable Significant doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency
but has provided valid information in the past
E Unreliable Lacking in authenticity,
trustworthiness, and competency;
history of invalid information
F Cannot Be Judged No basis exists for
evaluating the reliability of the source
Table 3.4: The Reliability of the Message Source.
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Degree 6 is ascribed when no evidential ground exists for assessing the credibility
of the information.
Concerning reliability, ratings are captured through adverbial modulations of the
evaluative term “reliable” (“Completely Reliable”, “Usually Reliable”, etc.). They
correspond to decreasing degrees of trustworthiness based on past experience with
the source (historical evidence). Assuming that the sources we consider are always
authentic (because they are competent on the topic they inform about), reliability
is a two-dimensional concept that aggregates the sources’ propensity to be truthful
(viz. to regularly provide true information) as well as their propensity to be honest
(viz. to regularly provide information they believe to be true). In this chapter,
analyses of reliability only rely on the sources’ honesty since their truthfulness is
controlled by the truth or falsity of the content they deliver.
3.2.3 Some Virtues of the Alphanumeric Scale
The existing scale is balanced since both semantic and pragmatic features of infor-
mational messages are taken into account. Semantic aspects are framed through
credibility ratings associated to the truth of the message contents. Pragmatic as-
pects are covered through reliability ratings linked to the sources’ intentions. This
parity conforms with Grice’s intention-based semantics according to which both
semantic and pragmatic aspects contribute to the meaning of messages [see Grice
1957].
But the existing scale is also relevant since credibility and reliability are common
dimensions one would use to assess a given message. Credibility is a crucial
parameter for believing a content while reliability is another crucial criterion for
trusting a source on a secure basis. Sometimes called “veracity” or “accuracy”,
credibility refers to the plausibility that a message be true with respect to a given
context of evidence. Reliability refers to the officer’s relative certainty that a
given source is honest with respect to their informational pédigree (that is to their
disposition to tell what they believe to be the truth as well as the objective truth).
Defined as such, credibility and reliability should not be confused with truth
and honesty. Credibility and reliability are subjective dimensions while truth and
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honesty are objective dimensions of messages.
But one major issue of the scale is that it does not emphasize these objective di-
mensions of truth and honesty on which the subjective dimensions of credibility
and reliability are built. Yet surprisingly, the scale is followed with the assump-
tion that intelligence officers should always make clear the distinction between
objective facts and subjective interpretations in their intelligence reports. Based on
past empirical findings, I argue that it is not the case (see section 3.3). The scale
comports various dimensions that should be clarified accordingly (see section
3.4).
3.3 Discerning Facts from Interpretations
3.3.1 The Fact vs. Interpretation Assumption
The 6×6 alphanumeric matrix is based on a major assumption we may label “fact
vs. interpretation” and that is expressed in the NATO Standardization Agreement
as follows [see STANAG-2511 2003, 2]:
“Intelligence reports transmit facts and/or assessments. The distinction be-
tween fact and interpretation must always be clearly indicated.”
The fact vs. interpretation assumption states that intelligence officers must separate
intelligence facts from contextual interpretations they make of those facts. In other
words, they should clearly distinguish what the scale objectively measures from
what they think the scale measures from a subjective perspective. But does the
existing scale allows such a practical distinction? Are the basic features of the
scale clear enough to avoid pragmatic equivocation?
In the remaining part of this section, I first argue that ratings labels, as well as
their respective levels, are not provided with clear definitions and descriptions.
For this reason, the distinction between facts and interpretations cannot be made
by officers since they cannot well understand the theoretical notions on which
the scale is built. As a matter of fact, experimental results tend to support this
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hypothesis. Researchers have observed that confusion in the scale leads to mis-
understandings and inconsistencies amongst and between raters. A given officer
varies in interpretations he or she makes of the ratings in different contexts while
different officers disagree over a single interpretation in a given context. Since
officers do not well understand the dimensions of the scale, it is unclear how they
could actually comply with the fact vs. interpretation assumption.
3.3.2 Identifying Issues in the Assumption
3.3.2.1 Semantic Confusion in the Definition of Ratings
Semantic confusion can be observed at three different stages in the fact vs. interpre-
tation assumption: credibility ratings, reliability ratings and their combination. First,
labels and descriptions associated to credibility ratings are conflicting. These la-
bels are based on plain adverbial quantifiers (“Probably True”, “Possibly True”,
etc.) while their matching descriptions define them as conditional adverbial quan-
tifiers. In fact, the labels “Probably True”, “Possibly True”, etc. express levels of
credibility for intelligence messages based on a set of consistent/inconsistent evidence.
Furthermore, Capet & Revault d’Allonnes [2013, 115] stress that the highest level
of credibility is labelled “Confirmed” as if simple confirmation by a source se-
cured absolute certainty in the message. But without any additional information
concerning the source at stake, in fact that the source is “Completely Reliable” in
the case in point, no absolute certainty can be ascribed to the message itself [see
DIS 2001, Capet & Revault d’Allonnes 2013, for more details on the confirmation
issue].
Second, reliability ratings are prone to semantic confusion. Their labels and in-
tended descriptions are ambiguous between three senses.3 It can refer to: (1)
the trust the officer puts into the source of the message; (2) the credibility that
the source itself attributes to the message; and (3) the capacity of the source to
well understand the message he or she delivers. On the other hand, descriptions
associated to reliability labels are opaque. They are based on complex notions of
authenticity and trustworthiness without providing minimal definitions of them or
3 Especially in the case of HUMINT intelligence.
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explaining how they combine in reliability ratings.
Third, semantic confusion is inherent to resultant scores since they attempt to cross
credibility and reliability ratings whose descriptions are confused. Resultant
scores naturally inherit from the unclear meanings of the first. It seems that
resultant scores are deprived of proper meanings and references since they do not
fuse but simply cross credibility and reliability ratings to give an overall insight
into sources and contents. As a consequence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
know whether resultant scores have proper extensions and intensions on their own.
3.3.2.2 Pragmatic Misunderstandings Intra-Officers
Rather expectedly, pragmatic misunderstandings follow from such semantic con-
fusion. As Phelps, Halpin, Johnson & Moses point out, many authors insisted on
the “loose, ambiguous language used to communicate uncertain intelligence information”
[Phelps et al. 1980, 1]. To begin with, they have observed that the existing scale
is “not used at full range” by intelligence officers, thus indicating that officers have
difficulties understanding and interpreting the meaning of credibility ratings, re-
liability ratings and resultant scores. For instance, Baker et al. [1968] analyzed 695
rating reports made by American army officers during field exercises. In all the
intelligence reports they examined, only 40 % of the reports contained ratings of
both the content credibility and the source reliability. And when both evaluations
were made, 74 % of the reports received a score of B2 (viz. “Usually Reliable”-
“Probably True”, N = 518). Results from Baker & al. were latter replicated by
Baker & Mace [1973] who observed no improvement in comprehension when
officers were assisted by a decision flow chart (viz. a sequence of basic clear-cut
questions) to help them make more appropriate evaluations. Later studies also
confirmed these interpretative issues by comparing the current intelligence scale
with officers’ subjective interpretations of them [see Miron et al. 1978, Halpin et al.
1978, for details].
Moreover, data collected on the officers’ confidence judgments also reveal asym-
metries in their respective understandings. When officers were asked to express
their relative confidence in the scores they provided, Meeland & Rhyne [1967]
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observed that the 36 possible scores were not equally weighted by intelligence per-
sonnels. Officers turned out to be six times more confident of a B1 rating than of
a F3 rating. However, this discrepancy seems intuitive after some clarification.
The higher the credibility rating of a message content, the more consistent evi-
dence officers have for cross-checking it and the more confident they are that the
message is true. By contrast, the lower the credibility rating of a message content,
the less consistent evidence officers have for verifying it and the less confident
they are that the message is true (see Table 4.1). Similar arguments can be given
for confidence judgments based on reliability ratings [see Peterson 2008, on this
point].
Lee & Dry [2006] have shown that judges’ confidence in ratings of information
conveyed by advisors were not only determined by the accuracy (or credibility) of
the information at stake but also by the frequency of the advisors to convey accurate
information over time, namely by their reliability. In the field of intelligence,
however, officers may be forced to establish their confidence on little feedback
concerning the credibility of the message and/or the reliability of the source, —
either because external evidence is rare or because the source is new to the officer.
In a recent study, Hainguerlot et al. [2018] have been interested by the way judges
can learn from their confidence judgments in the absence of external feedback.
They have observed that the judges’ efficiency to make adequate evaluations in
the absence of external feedback increased with their metacognitive abilities and
that confidence judgments happened to be an adequate proxy for measuring such
abilities when feedback is missing.
3.3.2.3 Pragmatic Inconsistencies Inter-Officers
If misunderstandings have been pointed out concerning individual officers (intra-
raters), inconsistencies have been noticed between officers in their respective in-
terpretations of the ratings (inter-raters). Adverbial quantifiers (probably, possibly,
usually, fairly, etc.) happened to be interpreted differently by intelligence per-
sonnels. To begin with, Baker et al. [1968] noticed high inconsistencies in the
responses provided by different officers in similar contexts. Looking at the rat-
ings made during an intelligence course, they found that those ratings differed
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from the instructor solution about 49 % of the time concerning credibility, and
15 % of the time concerning reliability. Based on those observations, researchers
have proposed to provide adverbial quantifiers with numerical encodings such
as percentages, probabilities, odds, etc. In 1964, the first Director of CIA’s Office of
National Estimates, Sherman Kent, made a theoretical proposal to match intelli-
gence quantifiers with probabilities and percentages concerning the certainty that
events will occur or not. His proposal was intended for the alphanumeric scale
in particular [see Kent 1964, 60-61], and to credibility ratings 2 (“Probably True”),
3 (“Possibly True”) and 5 (“Improbable”) more specifically.
From a probabilistic perspective, a reasonable prediction is that intelligence of-
ficers would assign the following probabilities to the credibility ratings ranging
from 1 to 5:
Credibility Ratings Probability Ranges Probability Means
1 0.80 - 1.0 0.90
2 0.60 - 0.80 0.70
3 0.40 - 0.60 0.50
4 0.20 - 0.40 0.30
5 0 - 0.20 0.10
Table 3.5: Expected Probability Degrees for Credibility Ratings.
Except for rating 3 (“Possibly True”), these expected probabilities are consistent
with the ones Kent [1964] has proposed based on his experience on the field. Kent
matched the adjective probable with a probability range of 0.63 - 0.87 (mean: 0.75)
and the adjective improbable with a probability range of 0.20 - 0.40 (mean: 0.30).
By contrast, he matched the adjective possible with a wider range of probability,
that is to more than 0 but less than 1.0, which corresponds to a range of 0 - 1.0
and to an absolute degree of 0.50. But are these degrees and ranges confirmed by
empirical findings?
Results that have been collected only concern the assignation of absolute degrees.
These results are consistent with expected probabilities but they give rise to high
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variability between officers [see Levine & Eldredge 1970, Kelly & Peterson 1971,
Samet 1975]. Although Wark [1964] observed that the modal adverb “Probably”
corresponds to a probability degree of 0.75 with a very high consensus (90% of
inter-agreement), he observed no real consensus that chances are about even (0.50)
in case of the modal adverb “Possibly” (only 53% of inter-agreement). This lack
of consensus was also observed by Johnson [1973] for the adjective “Possible”
whose mean probability was 0.62 but with results varying from 0.04 to 0.80 across
officers. The consensus observed by Wark in case of “Probably” was not replicated
by Johnson for adjective “Probable” whose results varied from 0.10 to 0.99 across
officers (mean: 0.51). Johnson also tested the adjective “Improbable”, which was
assigned an absolute degree of 0.17 but with results varying from 0 to 0.70.
Such variability in the officers’ probabilistic interpretations of adverbs shows
the vagueness induced by qualitative vocabulary. Similar results have been ob-
tained in other fields of investigation. In linguistics, for instance, Lichtenstein
& Newman [1967] collected results that were consistent with the ones of Wark
[see also Budescu & Wallsten 1985]. They observed consistency for the adjective
“Probable” (as well as for the adverb “Usually”), and variability for “Possible”.
In the field of medicine, a comparison of studies from O’Brien [1989] and Bryant
& Norman [1980] also show consistency for adjective “Probable” that turned out
to be associated to a probability of 0.75 in O’Brien’s study and to a probability of
0.77 in Bryant & Norman’ study [see also Hobby et al. 2000]. But their studies
disagree over adjective “Possible” that was associated to a probability degree of
0.25 in O’Brien’s study and to a degree of 0.47 in Bryant & Norman’s. Besides
that, O’Brien and Bryant & Norman obtained similar rates for “Probable” to those
of Wark for “Probably” (p = 0.75), but results were different for “Possible” in case
of O’Brien (p = 0.25).
In the intelligence field, proposals for numerical encodings of adverbial quantifiers
remain a major challenge due to this high variability in the officers’ interpretations.
But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that we could finally reach inter-
officers agreement concerning the correspondence between intelligence adverbs
and probability degrees and ranges. Then, probabilities could be completely
111
substituted to modal adverbs since officers would agree on a single interpretation
for each probability degree or range. However, other issues materialize that
have been pointed out in the literature on people’s asymmetric perception of risk
and probability. Pighin et al. [2011] observed that for two distinct numerical
probabilities 1/307 < 1/28 such that 1/307 is the probability for a child to have
Down Syndrome while 1/28 is the probability for a child to have insomnia, Down
Syndrome was interpreted as more likely to happen than Insomnia on a 7-point
scale ranging from “extremely low” to “extremely high”. This effect qualified
as a “Severity Bias” [Weber & Hilton 1990, Bonnefon & Villejoubert 2006] shows
that the interpretation of probabilities is not purely extensional but strongly linked
to expected utilities, more particularly to the severity of the outcome associated to
the probability at stake. The more detrimental the outcome associated to the
probability, the lower the threshold for qualifying the outcome as being highly
likely.
Similar observations have been made for numbers by Egré [2014] and Egré & Cova
[2015].4 Égré and Égré & Cova showed that the ascription of the vague quantifier
many is not only determined extensionally by the (absolute or relative) number
of things at stake but is tied intensionally to moral expectations associated to these
things, that is to what counts as desirable or undesirable in a given context or
society. Basically, Egré & Cova [2015] tested people’s ascriptions of many for pairs
of sentences based on the following prediction: participants are more prone to
ascribe many in case the sentence is linked to a more detrimental outcome. To
show this, they asked participants to agree whether “Many children perished in the
fire” or “Many children escaped the fire” in case exactly 5 children survived and 5
children perished out of an absolute number of 10. Their prediction was con-
firmed, thus indicating that cardinals, like probabilities, are not interpreted from
a sole extensional perspective (based on a given comparative class) but are also in-
terpreted intensionally based on moral expectations of desirability. Their findings
on judgments about cardinalities parallel those of Knobe’ on the increasing effect
of moral considerations concerning people’s ascriptions of intentions [see Knobe
2003a].
4 Following Petit & Knobe’ results on the asymmetric perception of the gradable adjective cold in
the context of different liquids [see Pettit & Knobe 2009].
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We have seen that the semantic confusion in the labels and descriptions makes
officers misunderstand the ratings and scores. This confusion is also apparent
when the officers disagree over the correct interpretation of the ratings and scores.
Following Kent [1964], some have proposed to substitute numerical encodings to
intelligence adverbs to mitigate this confusion. However, results from Pighin et al.
[2011] and Egré & Cova [2015] show that, even though consensus could be reached
on these various encodings, risks associated to probabilities and cardinalities
would create new asymetries in the officers’ interpretations of the numerals. For
this reason, I will continue to use qualitative adverbs for intelligence ratings. But I
will clarify the definitions and descriptions of the ratings to mitigate confusion and
to help officers better tease apart facts from interpretations in their evaluations.
3.3.3 A Descriptive Proposal for Intelligence Messages
Regarding the intelligence scale, empirical results weaken the hypothesis that
officers have a clear comprehension of the scale and can effectively tease apart
facts from interpretations on this basis. Of course, semantic confusion in the
ratings contribute to this failure so that clarification is needed from a theoretical
perspective. But a more practical imperative is to help officers clarify the divide
between objective facts and subjective interpretations. In that sense, clarification
should be first and foremost a matter of making relevant distinctions.
Basically, evaluative terms for contents and sources (viz. credibility and reliability)
should be set aside from the dimensions that are more surely descriptive terms
for those: truth for the content and honesty for the source. To use the words of
the first assumption, truth and honesty are the facts that characterize intelligence
messages (in an objective sense) while credibility and reliability are subjective
interpretations of those facts based on contextual and historical evidence. My
proposal will consist in trying to understand how intelligence messages can be
defined and described from an objective perspective.
The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to explaining this descriptive account.
I aim to show that once we set aside the evaluative dimensions of credibility and
reliability, truth and honesty can be used to define intelligence messages and to
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describe the informational type they correspond to in an objective sense (informa-
tion, misinformation, lie, omission, etc.). At the semantic level, various degrees of
truth can be distinguished for characterizing contents, — either because the content
corresponds to objective facts (truth) or not (falsity), or because its truth status is
objectively unclear (semantic indeterminacy). At the pragmatic level, various de-
grees of honesty can also be isolated for charactering sources in an objective sense,
— either because the source is clearly cooperative (honest) or non-cooperative
(dishonest), or because he or she is less cooperative than they should according to
the Gricean principles of communication (pragmatic imprecision). Once combined,
these semantic and pragmatic aspects lead to isolate distinct informational cate-
gories for messages, or “types”. I will also associate these types to more familiar
categories based on existing taxonomies (information, misinformation, lie, etc.).
3.4 The Definition of Intelligence Messages
3.4.1 A Matrix for Defining Informational Types
Informational messages m are contents that specific sources deliver to intended
addressees. Determining the type of a given message consists in ascribing a truth-
value to its content (viz. true, false, etc.) as well as a pragmatic intent to its source
(viz. honest, dishonest, etc.). In doing so, we are led to isolate pairs of truth-
value and pragmatic intent for all the messages we have. Such pairs, written
t(m), constitute objective characterizations of the messages. I call them informational
types. Thanks to existing taxonomies, more familiar names can be given to those:
information, misinformation, lie, half-truths, etc.
In this section, I propose a 3×3 matrix to see more clearly into informational types.
Consistent with my proposal, the matrix is built on the descriptive dimensions of
the existing scale: “Truth of the Content” vs. “Honesty of the Source”. I distinguish
3 levels of Truth (“True”, “False”, “Indeterminate”) and 3 levels of Honesty (“Hon-
est”, “Dishonest”, “Imprecise”). Concerning truth, a content is said to be true if it
corresponds to objective facts, false if it does not and indeterminate if its status is
semantically unclear. Concerning honesty, sources are said to be honest in case
they tell what they believe to be the truth, dishonest if they tell the opposite of what
114
they believe and imprecise if they partly tell what they believe. Levels of truth and
honesty are finally crossed through the following format: [Level of Honesty/Level
of Truth]. For instance, [Dishonest/True] means that the source is dishonest but that
the content he or she delivers is true.
3.4.2 The Most Classical Types of Messages
Message Type Truth of the Content
t True Indeterminate False
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t1 t2
Honest = =
[Honest/True] [Honest/False]
Imprecise
t3 t4
Dishonest = =
[Dishonest/True] [Dishonest/False]
Table 3.6: The Classical Types of Messages.
Classically, a message content can be either true or false while a message source can
be either honest or dishonest. According to Table 3.6, we distinguish four classical
categories of messages: t1 = [Honest/True], t2 = [Honest/False], t3 = [Dishonest/True]
and t4 = [Dishonest/False]. I now describe those classical types in detail and
determine to which informational category they may correspond according to
existing taxonomies.
Let us first consider types t1 and t2 in which the source is clearly honest. In
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both cases, the source is fully cooperative and informative: he or she delivers
information they believe to be true. But in type t1 , the information is objectively true
while in type t2, the information is objectively false. So in this second case, the
information the source provides is more misleading than in the first, even though
the source does not have any intention to deceive the officer in both cases. We
may call information, type t1 , and misinformation, type t2.
From an epistemological perspective, information is usually defined as “well-
formed, meaningful and veridical data” [Floridi 2007, 31]. Veridical must be under-
stood as truthful: indeed, information is true data conveyed by honest sources.
Following this traditional definition, information necessarily qualifies as true [e.g.
Dretske 1981, Grice 1989, Floridi 1996]. Accordingly, Dretske [1983, 57] states that
“false information, misinformation (...) are not varieties of information” while Grice
[1989, 371] considers that “false information is not an inferior kind of information; it
just is not information”. Following this traditional view, false information is not
information in the proper sense.
But since Fallis [2009a] and Floridi [2011], false information is taken as in-
formation per se. They call misinformation “well-formed and meaningful data (i.e.
semantic content) that are false” [Floridi 2011, 260]. But though being false, mis-
information is not falsidical data in the same way information is veridical data.
Misinformation is false data conveyed unintentionally. In case of misinformation,
sources are honest since the semantic content is only “accidentally defective” [Fallis
2011, 204]. Accordingly, I call misinformation type t2.
Let us now address types t3 and t4 in which the source is clearly dishonest. In
both cases, the source is non-cooperative and even deceitful: her or she delivers
information they believe to be false. In that respect, the source inevitably flouts
Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“Do not say what you believe to be false”). But in
type t3, the information he or she provides turns out to be objectively true while
in type t4 , the information is objectively false. Then, the source breaches the
Gricean Supermaxim of Quality (“Try to make your contribution one that is true”)
only in the second case. For that reason, information of type t3 is less misleading
than information of type t4 . Even though sources are dishonest in both cases,
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information they provide is epistemically worse in the second case than in the first.
We may call subjective lie, type t3, and objective lie, type t4 .
According to the literature on lying, a piece of information qualifies as a lie if
this piece is a “believed-false statement” that is uttered to “another person with the
intention that the other person believe that statement to be true” [Mahon 2015]. So a
content does not need to be false to count as a lie but only to be believed as false.
If dishonesty is a necessary condition for lying, truth or falsity are not. I have
shown in Chapter 1 that dishonesty is a sufficient condition for an utterance to
count as a lie but that traditional epistemologists distinguish between subjective
lies and objective lies along the truth value dimension of the content involved in
the speaker’s utterance. A dishonest true statement counts as a subjective lie while
a dishonest false statement counts as an objective lie.
Note that type t4 would be more appropriately called disinformation in case the
false information is not uttered but, more generally, disseminated by the dishon-
est source. Dissemination can be a linguistic phenomenon (as in subjective and
objective lies made through deliberate utterances) but it can also be a visual phe-
nomenon as in falsified maps or forged documents, for instance. In such cases, the
addressee has not been stated anything but directed to false information through
visual means (such as pointing for instance).
We have seen that classical types of messages are based on binary contents, that
can be either true or false, and binary sources, that can be either honest or dishonest.
But a more realistic account of types requires making more fine-grained distinc-
tions between contents and sources by introducing intermediate semantic and
pragmatic values. Based on joint work with Paul Egré [see Égré & Icard 2018], I
now present several types of messages that are vague for semantic or pragmatic
reasons.
3.4.3 Some Types Based on Semantic Vagueness
Linguistic vagueness is a pervasive phenomenon in society as well as in intelli-
gence affairs [see Kent 1964, Capet & Revault d’Allonnes 2013, Barnes 2016]. In a
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Message type Truth of the Content
t True Indeterminate False
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t5
Honest =
error-avoidance
Imprecise
t6
Dishonest =
half-truth
Table 3.7: Some Types Based on Semantic Vagueness.
seminal article published in 1923, Russell defines vagueness as follows: “a repre-
sentation is vague when the relation of the representing system to the represented system is
not one-one, but one-many”. According to him, the relation between an expression
and a representation is one-one in formal languages: “no two words would have the
same meaning”. On the contrary, vagueness naturally arises in natural languages
because meaning is no longer one-one but one-many. As Russell puts it: “there
is not only one object that a word means, and not only one possible fact that will verify
a proposition” [Russell 1923, 89-90]. Based on Russell’s article, two general forms
of vagueness can be set apart: semantic vagueness vs. pragmatic vagueness. I focus
on semantic vagueness in the present subsection. Pragmatic vagueness will be
addressed in the next one.
According to Table 3.7, types t5 and t6 are instances of semantic vagueness (or
semantic indeterminacy). Such vagueness can be observed, for instance, in the
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gradable expression about (e.g. “there were about 200 guests at their wedding”) or
in the adjective intelligent (e.g.“John is intelligent”). In the first case, quantitative
indeterminacy is attached to about (since the number 200 is compatible with an
indeterminate range of numbers between 190 and 210) while qualitative indetermi-
nacy is tied to the adjective intelligent (since John can be intelligent in some respect,
i.e. relative to some field of expertise, but not necessarily in all respects).
The meaning of expressions that are semantically vague is “intrinsically uncertain”
according to Peirce [1902, 748]. These expressions have truth conditions that
vary from one context to another such that they are true in one sense but false
in another. However, type t5 must be distinguished from type t6 : the source is
honest in the first case and dishonest in the second. In fact, the source flouts the first
Maxim of Quality only in type t6 , even though information he or she provides is
indeterminate in both situations.
In type t5, sources are clearly honest but the message they deliver has unclear
truth conditions. For a fully cooperative source who turns out to be uncertain
whether an event occured or not [see Channell 1994, Frazee & Beaver 2010],
indeterminacy is a truthful way for conveying maximum information without
risking any falsehoods. Vagueness is indeed an optimal rationale between honesty
and truthfulness in case of uncertainty. If the source was more precise, he or she
would either be dishonest (by conveying messages they lack evidence for) or
untruthful (by delivering messages that are blatantly false). Based on Égré & Icard
[2018, 10-12], we may label “error-avoidance” such message types in which the
sources are epistemically cautious towards the officer they will to inform.
In type t6 , the source is clearly dishonest and the message he or she delivers is
indeterminate. Here vagueness is no longer a resource for honesty and truthfulness
but a strategic way to mislead the officer. Even though the message may be true
in some way of resolving its vagueness, this way is tendencious and biased.
Following Égré & Icard [2018, 15-19], I may call “half-truths” such message types
based on amphiboly (or mental reservation) [Bok 1979, Mullaney 1980, Adler 1997].
In case of message types t5, the source expects that the meaning the officer will
infer from the message actually differs from the meaning he or she has in mind.
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Types t5 and t6 could be more finely characterized by distinguishing two specific
cases of semantic indeterminacy: degree-vagueness and open-texture [e.g. Waismann
1945, Burks 1946, Alston 1964]. To see more clearly into that, let us consider two
examples of Questions & Answers between an intelligence officer and a source
belonging to a belligerent country. The source has revelations to make concerning
8 nuclear submarines his or her country is building. Such pieces of information
are of a major interest to the intelligence officer due to the devastating power of
these nuclear ships.
(1) Officer: “How many submarines did your country build?
Source: Many.”
(2) Officer: “What can you tell me about their submarines?
Source: They are powerful.”
Examples (1) and (2) are cases of semantic indeterminacy: the answers provided
by the source are difficult to interpret in one way or another. But (1) is a case of
degree-vagueness while (2) is a case of open-texture.
In (1), the source goes against the officer’s expectations for a numerically
precise answer. The source gives a response that is consistent with a wide range
of states of affairs (5 submarines? 10 submarines? 20 submarines? etc.) and that
prevents the officer from representing a precise state of affairs. The use of many
is misleading here since many is not a verbal quantifier to which one can settle
precise truth conditions relative to a fixed countable domain because many is a
context-dependent expression in this case [see Sapir 1944, Partee 1989, Lappin
2000, Greer 2014, Egré & Cova 2015]. Due to strategic issues associated to nuclear
submarines, many can be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways that have distinct
implications in the context at stake.
In (2), the source provides an answer whose semantic meaning is open. The
adjective powerful is multidimensional [Sassoon 2012] since submarines may be
powerful in some respect (because they can launch nuclear missiles) but not pow-
erful in all respects (because their top speed is limited compared to other nuclear-
powered submarines). In the sense of Alxatib & Pelletier [2011], adjective powerful
can be sub-interpreted (when understood as “in some respect”) or super-interpreted
(when understood as “in all respects”).
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Like for many nominal expressions such as game [see Wittgenstein 1953], it seems
difficult to frame a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the adjec-
tive powerful. For this reason, the officer cannot be sure of what the meaning the
source endorses in the context. However, Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity (“Make
your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange”)
requires that the source gives answers that are maximally specific to the officer.
Then, it is expected that the source has the stronger sense of powerful in mind when
saying to the officer that the submarines are “powerful”. The assumption that
powerful should be interpreted as powerful in all respects has also been defended by
Dalrymple et al. [1998] concerning plural predicates such as reciprocals. According
to their “strongest meaning hypothesis”, a sentence expressing reciprocity will be
preferably interpreted as expressing strong instead of weak reciprocity, for instance
the sentence “The girls know each other” will be preferably interpreted as “Every
girl knows every other girl” [see also Alxatib & Pelletier 2011, Cobreros et al. 2012].
Consistent with this hypothesis, the officer is also expecting that the source will
answer along the stronger sense of the adjective powerful. In other words, if the
source answers that the country’s submarines are “powerful” but means that they
are only powerful in the weaker sense, the source is misleading the officer in that
respect. Now that we have dealt with cases of semantic vagueness, we can turn
to borderline types based on pragmatic vagueness.
3.4.4 Some Other Types Based on Pragmatic Vagueness
According to Table 3.8, types t7 and t8 are instances of pragmatic vagueness (or
imprecision). Their linguistic contents are semantically clear-cut but their sources
are pragmatically imprecise. In fact, they are less informative than they should
according to the first Maxim of Quantity. However, the same sources keep intact
all the Maxims of Quality by not telling some content they believe to be false or
some content they lack evidence for.
However, type t7 can be distinguished from type t8 in terms of pragmatic pur-
poses. Both types involve concealing information instead of simply withholding
information but in distinct ways. Imprecision is used to hide the truth in type t7
and to hide falsity in type t8 . Following Chisholm & Feehan [1977] as well as Fallis
121
Message type Truth of the Content
t True Indeterminate False
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Honest
t7 t9 t8
Imprecise = = =
negative omission mixed positive omission
Dishonest
Table 3.8: Some Types Based on Pragmatic Vagueness.
[2014 2018], both types correspond to different epistemic goals. Messages of type
t7 aim to prevent the officer from acquiring a true belief (by not unveiling the truth)
while messages of type t8 aim to maintain an existing false belief in their mind (by
not unveiling falsity). Consistent with those analyses, I label t7 negative omission
and t8 , positive omission.5
As for semantic types t5 and t6 , pragmatic types t7 and t8 can be more finely
characterized by differentiating two specific cases of pragmatic imprecision: generality
and approximation [e.g. Pinkal 1995, Kennedy 2007, Solt 2015]. To see more clearly
into those refinements, let us consider two further variations on the dialogue
between the officer and the source.
5 Those types are named, respectively, “Negative deception secundum quid” and “Positive deception
secundum quid” by Chisholm & Feehan [1977] and then Fallis [2014]. But for simplicity’s sake, I
prefer to use the more basic labels negative omission and positive omission.
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(3) Officer: “Who is in charge of this new submarine program?
Source: Some General at the Admiralty.”
(4) Officer: “What is the shape of the submarines hulls?
Source: They are cylindrical.”
Examples (3) and (4) are cases of pragmatic imprecision: the answers provided
by the source are less informative than it is required by the Gricean Cooperative
Principe and the first Maxim of Quantity. But (3) is a case of generality while (4) is
one of approximation.
In (3), vagueness does not mean any indeterminacy in the truth status of the
adverb some contrary to (1). Unlike for many, some can receive determinate truth
conditions relative to a fixed countable domain. But in (1), the source fails to be
maximally informative by being too general and underspecific in the response he
or she gives to the officer. Specifying a precise individual whose role is “General
at the Admiralty” would be more informative in that respect.
In (4), the source relies on approximation for answering to the officer’s ques-
tion. Submarines hulls do not have the exact shape of a cylinder but viewing
those as cylinders is a reasonable coarsening. The shape of submarine hulls is suf-
ficiently close to that of cylinders to see the expression cylindrical as acceptable. A
well-known geometrical approximation given by Austin [1962] and discussed by
Lewis [1979] is that “France is hexagonal”. Like cylindrical, hexagonal is semantically
determinate but used with slack to approximate the shape of France.
Finally, type t9 is a (very) borderline type mixing semantic indeterminacy with
pragmatic imprecision: t9 = [Imprecise/Indeterminate]. In case of t9 , the content
of the message has unclear truth conditions and the source of the message is less
informative than he or she should according to the Gricean Maxim of Quantity. I
will not describe this type in detail since t9 is a compound of the primitive borderline
typest5, t6 , t7 andt8 . I chose to label typet9 as “mixed” to insist on this specificity.
Based on the nine types I have identified, I can give a concluding table that wraps
up all the informational labels I have proposed for them (see Table 4.10).
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Message type Truth of the Content
t True Indeterminate False
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t1 t5 t2
Honest = = =
information error-avoidance misinformation
t7 t9 t8
Imprecise = = =
negative omission mixed positive omission
t3 t6 t4
Dishonest = = =
subjective lie half-truth objective lie
Table 3.9: Informational Labels for Message Types.
3.5 Conclusion
The scale commonly used for intelligence evaluation is provided with the as-
sumption that officers should always make a clear distinction between intelligence
facts and their subjective interpretations of these facts [STANAG-2511 2003, 2]. They
should indicate when they report objective facts and when they interpret these
facts on a more subjective basis. However, empirical results show confusion in-
tra and inter-officers concerning their respective interpretations of the message.
Officers misunderstand the credibility and reliability ratings and fail to separate
their respective levels. But officers also disagree over a single interpretation of
these ratings in different contexts of evaluation. In that sense, it is unclear how
officers could comply with the objective-subjective divide since they do not have
a clear and consistent understanding of the scale’s various dimensions.
Facing those issues, intelligence researchers have proposed to substitute numer-
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ical probabilities to the qualitative labels used for the credibility and reliability
ratings. However, empirical results show that assignations of degrees of probabil-
ity give rise to high variability between officers, although probability means are
consistent with the probability means we can expect for credibility ratings (see Ta-
ble 3.5). Supposing that some agreement could be reached in their assignments of
probabilities, I also argued that expectations and risks associated to probabilities
tend to generate new asymetries in the officers’ understandings of the probability
rates. For those reasons, I continued to use qualitative adverbs to address the
scale’s confusion and help officers comply with the distinction between facts and
interpretations.
My proposal to mitigate misunderstandings and disagreement has been twofold.
To make the fact vs. interpretation assumption effective, I have proposed to separate
the subjective dimensions of credibility and reliability from the objective dimen-
sions of truth and honesty on which the first dimensions rely. That distinction
being made, I have proposed to clarify the objective dimensions of the scale. I
distinguished three degrees of truth for describing contents and three degrees of
honesty for characterizing sources. By combining these degrees, I obtained a 3×3
descriptive matrix that isolates nine categories of informational messages: infor-
mation, misinformation, subjective lie, objective lie, error-avoidance, half-truth, negative
omission, positive omission and mixed.
It is important to note that my 3×3 matrix is not meant as a substitute for the 6×6
matrix. The 3×3 matrix only gives a descriptive insight into the 6×6 evaluative one.
However, the 3×3 matrix is meant to clarify some aspects that remained implicit
in the 6×6 matrix and led to confusion. Let us point out the main efforts we have
made in this direction.
Concerning the ratings, the 3×3 matrix helps see more clearly into the descrip-
tive dimensions that determine the 6×6 evaluation of credibility and reliability.
The 3 degrees we consider for truth and honesty offer a clear-cut insight into
the objective aspects of contents and sources. We have two absolute degrees of
truth (true vs. false) and two absolute degrees of honesty (honest vs. dishonest),
with one fuzzy degree for truth (indeterminate) and one fuzzy degree for honesty
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(imprecision). Though more delineations are possible, these 3 degrees of truth and
honesty give a comprehensive perspective on classical and borderline aspects of
messages. Being coarser than the 6×6 matrix, the 3×3 matrix is more straightfor-
ward and, thus, easier to understand and to handle. This coarser granularity can
be seen as positive. By authorizing less degrees of discrimination, the 3×3 matrix
forces officers to make more resolute decisions when they categorize messages.
Concerning resultant scores, the 6×6 matrix simply crosses the 6 degrees of
credibility with the 6 degrees of reliability to give an overall insight into the
quality of messages. Resultant scores are of the form “RC” with R standing for
reliability and C standing for credibility. Defined as such, however, resultant
scores raise difficulties that the 3×3 matrix addresses. Resultant scores RC do not
fuse information provided by the reliability rating R with information provided
by the credibility rating C. In other words, resultant scores are strictly redundant
relative to the initial credibility and reliability ratings R andC. In other words, RC
do not provide more information than R and C. In contrast, the informational labels
I have proposed in the 3×3 matrix (e.g. misinformation, subjective lie, objective lie,
etc.) provide more information than the initial degrees of truth and honesty they
are based on. These qualitative categories transform abstract dimensions of truth
and honesty into more familiar categories that are meaningful for intelligence
officers. On the contrary, resultant scores are obscure and difficult to interpret
meaningfully as it was shown by empirical results [e.g. Baker et al. 1968, Baker &
Mace 1973, Meeland & Rhyne 1967]. Such instrumental opacity is avoided in the
nine categories I have proposed.
Based on the descriptive account of Chapter 3, I offer a new evaluative account in
the next chapter. Consistent with the fact that the 3×3 matrix does not replace the
6×6 matrix (descriptive aspects do not conflate with evaluative ones), I continue
to use six degrees for evaluating the credibility of contents as well as six degrees
for evaluating the reliability of sources. However, my proposal is motivated by
experimental results showing that contrary to another STANAG assumption [see
STANAG-2511 2003, A-2], officers do not put equal weight on the dimensions of
credibility and reliability. As we shall see, they perceive the credibility dimension
as being prevalent over the reliability dimension in their respective evaluations.
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Procedure for
Information Evaluation
4.1 Introduction
The doctrine for intelligence evaluation has been critized for wrongly assuming
that “intelligence reports transmit facts and/or assessments” and that “the distinction
between fact and interpretation [can] always be clearly indicated” (see Chapter 3). But
this doctrine has also been criticized for making the irrealistic assumption that
“reliability and credibility, the two aspects of evaluation, [be] considered independently
of each other” [see STANAG-2511 2003, A-2]. This assumption which we may call
credibility vs. reliability is actually challenged by empirical results: field officers
perceive dimensions of credibility and reliability as being strongly correlated and
even redundant [see Baker et al. 1968, Samet 1975]. Credibility is seen as the
determinant factor for evaluating intelligence messages. The evaluation is made
along a credibility continuum on which the reliability of the source helps strike a
balance.
The aim of this chapter is to specify a new evaluative procedure that conforms
with empirical findings. The setting must respect the overwhelming importance
of the credibility dimension as well as the balancing role of the reliability dimen-
sion. I propose a syntactic procedure in numerical belief revision whose semantic
interpretation complies with those requisits. Syntactically, credibility ratings are
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expressed by degrees operators indexed from 1 to 6, while reliability ratings are cap-
tured by dynamic operators indexed from A to F. Semantically, plausibility models
help interpret credibility operators for a given message m. States are indexed
from 1 to 6 depending on the evidence they satisfy or not, — the aim of which
is to provide a prior distribution of ratings for m. That being done, reliability
ratings act as scoring functions on this prior distribution. Based on the reliability of
the source, initial distributions are updated in ways that have positive or negative
impacts on the prior credibility of the message.
Let us remind ourselves that the basis for evaluating the truth and honesty of
contents and sources through credibility and reliability ratings are relevant con-
textual evidence for truth and relevant historical evidence for honesty. A content is
said to be “true” (or false, etc.) depending on the evidence the officer detains in
the context at stake. Sources are said to be “honest” (or dishonest, etc.) depending
on the information they have delivered in the past on similar topics. Consistent
with those intuitions, levels of truth and/or honesty cannot be ascribed when no
contextual and/or historical information is available to the officer.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I briefly review the main
notions involved in intelligence evaluation. I present the alphanumeric scale
used in this endeavour and put emphasis on its positive features (subsection
4.2.1). I then present the credibility vs. reliability assumption on which the scale
relies (subsection 4.2.2), and review extant results showing that this assumption
is strongly challenged (subsection 4.2.3).
In section 4.3, I explain my evaluative proposal in detail. Inspired by previous works
from Aucher [2004 2008], van Ditmarsch [2005], van Ditmarsch & Labuschagne
[2007], the setting is based on numerical belief revision for expressing a more
subjective characterization of intelligence messages (subsection 4.3.1). Credibility
ratings are captured through a set of conditional credibility operators indexed from
1 to 6 (subsection 4.3.2). Reliability ratings are captured through updates of degrees
labeled from A to F (subsection 4.3.3). Once applied, these updates help get
posterior credibility degrees depending on the reliability of the message source.
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Section 4.4 is devoted to discussing the scoring operation prescribed by this nu-
merical procedure. I start out by explaining the inner workings of the scoring op-
eration and show that ratings, informational types and resultant scores can be linked
further (subsection 4.4.1). The correspondence between ratings and message types
is investigated first (subsection 4.4.2). I argue that dimensions of credibility and
reliability can be used for recovering the informational types I have isolated in
Chapter 3. I then focus on the correspondence between scores and message types
to put more emphasis on the limitations of the numerical procedure in terms of
discriminative power (subsection 4.4.3).
4.2 Some Reminders on Information Evaluation
4.2.1 The 6×6 Matrix for Intelligence Evaluation
Let us briefly review the routine commonly used for intelligence evaluation. A
competent authority also known as intelligence officer is charged of assessing
informational messages along a 6×6 scale provided with 6 levels for evaluating
the credibility of message contents as well as 6 levels for evaluating the reliability
of sources [see STANAG-2511 2003, FM-2-22.3 2003, DIA-2 2010]. Both credibility
and reliability ratings are then crossed to give an overall insight into the quality
of intelligence messages.
Basically, credibility ratings are captured through 6 degrees ranging from 1 to 6 (see
Table 4.1). The way they are defined, credibility ratings express decreasing degrees of
confirmation given some contextual evidence the officer has for or against the message
being true. In other words, detaining some pieces of evidence in the context is a
precondition for making an evaluation of the message. Evidence is consistent with
the message in case some pieces are true when the message is true. Evidence
is inconsistent with the message when pieces are true but the message is false.
Finally, precondition fails when pieces of evidence are missing for making an
evaluation of the message. Accordingly, degree 1 corresponds to cross-checked
certainty: all the evidence the officer has is consistent with the message being
true (“Confirmed”). Degrees 2 to 5 correspond to adverbial modulations that
express weaker states of consistency: from high consistency (“Probably True”) to
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Ratings Linguistic Labels Descriptions
1 Confirmed Confirmed by other independent sources;
consistent with other information on the subject
2 Probably True Not confirmed; consistent
with other information on the subject
3 Possibly True Not confirmed; agrees with
some other information on the subject
4 Doubtfully True Not confirmed; possible;
no other information on the subject
5 Improbable Not confirmed; contradicted by
other information on the subject
6 Cannot Be Judged No basis exists for evaluating
the validity of the information
Table 4.1: The Credibility of the Message Content.
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moderate consistency (“Possibly True”), weak consistency (“Doubtfully True”) and
blatant inconsistency (“Improbable”). Degree 6 is ascribed when no evidence exists
for assessing the credibility of the message (“Cannot Be Judged”). Precondition
fails in that latter case.
Reliability ratings are captured through 6 levels ranging from A to F (see Table
4.2). These ratings express decreasing degrees of trustworthiness based on the offi-
cer’s attitude towards the source. Level A corresponds to absence of suspicion
(“Completely Reliable”): no doubt of authenticity. Levels from B to E correspond to
increasing suspicion againt the source being honest: from minor doubt (“Usually
Reliable”) to doubt (“Fairly Reliable”), significant doubt (“Not Usually Reliable”)
and lack of trustworthiness (“Unreliable”). Level F is ascribed when no evidence
exists for assessing the reliability of the source (“Cannot Be Judged”), — either
because the source is new to the officer or because he or she has not delivered
relevant information in the past.
We know from Chapter 3 that the existing setting has strengths. The scale is
balanced and relevant since both semantic and pragmatic dimensions of messages
are taken into consideration. Semantic dimensions are covered through credibility
ratings associated to the contents of messages. Pragmatic aspects are considered
through reliability ratings linked to the sources’ intentions [see Grice 1957]. But
the existing scale is also sensitive since officers are given 5 levels for evaluating
the credibility of the content (“Confirmed”, “Probably True”, etc.) and 5 levels
for evaluating the reliability of the source (“Reliable”, “Fairly Reliable”, etc.), as
well as one extra level on each scale when no evaluation can be made (“Cannot Be
Judged”). The intelligence scale being a 6×6 matrix, officers can choose between
36 combinations to evaluate the quality of intelligence messages. That being
said, however, the existing procedure is based on a misleading assumption I will
present now.
4.2.2 The Credibility vs. Reliability Assumption
In addition to the fact vs. interpretation assumption, the scale relies on a second
assumption we may call “credibility vs. reliability” and such that:
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Ratings Linguistic Labels Descriptions
A Completely Reliable No doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency;
has a history of complete reliability
B Usually Reliable Minor doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency;
has a history of valid information most of the time
C Fairly Reliable Doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency
but has provided valid information in the past
D Not Usually Reliable Significant doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency
but has provided valid information in the past
E Unreliable Lacking in authenticity,
trustworthiness, and competency;
history of invalid information
F Cannot Be Judged No basis exists for
evaluating the reliability of the source
Table 4.2: The Reliability of the Message Source.
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“Reliability and credibility, the two aspects of evaluation, must be considered
independently of each other.” [see STANAG-2511 2003, A-2].
This assumption states that intelligence officers must perform their evaluations of
credibility and reliability on an independent basis. According to the Field Man-
ual 30-5: “Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation of an
item of information, they are independent of each other” [FM-30-5 1971]. Evaluations of
credibility should not interact with evaluations of reliability and, conversely, eval-
uations of reliability should not interplay with evaluations of credibility. But this
presupposes that the credibility and reliability evaluations are indeed perceived
as independent and non-overlapping by officers. Is this really the case?
Empirical findings actually challenge the “credibility vs. reliability” assumption. As
for the distinction between facts and interpretations (see Chapter 3), the distinction
between credibility and reliability is not effective in the alphanumeric scale. Results
show that the two dimensions are not ascribed independently by intelligence officers.
The credibility dimension prevails over the reliability dimension in scores they
mark.
4.2.3 Identifying Issues with the Assumption
In 1968, Baker, McKendry & Mace analyzed 695 joint ratings obtained from two
US intelligence corps during field exercises (Raw Number N = 716). Based on
the distribution of the ratings, they concluded that the credibility and reliability
dimensions were seen as highly correlated by officers [see Baker et al. 1968]. In
fact, Baker & al. observed that 87 % of the scores fell stricly along the diagonal of the
scale, that is on the continuum A1-B2-C3-D4-E5-F6 (N = 608). Moreover, score
B2 alone comprised 75 % of all the ratings they analyzed (N = 518). Results from
Baker & al.’ experiment are presented in Table 4.3.
In 1975, Samet conducted four experiments to see more clearly into the correlation
between the credibility and reliability ratings: Form 1, Form 2, Form 3 and Form
4 [see Samet 1975]. Based on 37 intelligence officers, Samet aimed to confirm the
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Distribution Content Credibility Raw
of Ratings 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
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y A 43 11 2 0 0 0 56
B 11 518 57 2 0 0 588
C 0 0 5 1 1 0 7
D 0 0 0 8 0 0 8
E 0 0 0 0 3 1 4
F 0 0 1 0 0 31 32
Total 54 529 65 11 4 32 695
Table 4.3: Results from Baker, McKendry & Mace’ 1968 Experiment.
correlation Baker & al. had observed and to determine which of the credibility
and reliability dimensions was prevalent in resultant scores.
The goal of Form 2 was simply to confirm or invalidate the correlation Baker &
al. had noticed. The 37 intelligence officers were asked to express the conditional
probability that a given report carried a specific credibility (or reliability) rating
provided that the report already carried a specific reliability (or credibility) rating.
Results proved to be highly significant 73 % of the time since reponses provided
by 27 officers showed a strong interaction between the probabilities the officers
assigned to credibility and reliability ratings.1 This first experiment did confirm
Baker & al.’ observations. But does one of the evaluative dimensions prevail
over the other one? Is credibility or reliability the dominant dimension when
evaluating intelligence messages?
Forms 1, 3 and 4 were devoted to answering to these questions. I will review
Form 1 in detail but simply present the conclusions Samet drew from Forms 3
and 4 by using techniques of multiple linear regression. In Form 1, officers were
given the following scenario:
1 For 10 intelligence officers, however, the two dimensions were treated independently. But
these results have not been included in Samet’s analysis for the following reason: officers have
different conceptualizations of the ratings in this case. For these officers, the credibility of
the content gives no indication of the reliability of the source who delivered that content, —
which is counterintuitive according to the doctrinal descriptions (see Table 4.1). Conversely, the
reliability of the source is not seen as the determinant parameter for estimating the credibility
of the content he or she delivers, — which is also counterintuitive based on the doctrinal
descriptions (see Table 4.2).
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“Suppose that you know that one of two camps, X or Y, is definitely going to be
attacked by the enemy. Now suppose that you have two intelligence reports,
one saying that camp X will be attacked and the other saying that camp Y will
be attacked. The reports differ only in their respective ratings for the reliability
of the report’s source and the [credibility] of the report’s information. Assume
further that the given reliability and [credibility] ratings for each report are
correct assessments of their actual reliability and [credibility]. On the basis
of this information alone, your task is to decide whether it is more likely that
camp X will be attacked or that camp Y will be attacked.”2
Officers were then presented a sheet of the following form:
X will be attacked Y will be attacked
vs.
RiC j RkCl
In which RC are resultant scores such that Ri, Rk can be any of the 5 reliability
ratings from A to E, — F being excluded, while C j, Cl can be any of the 5 credibility
ratings ranging from 1 to 5, — 6 being excluded. Of all the possible 625 combi-
naisons of joint ratings, Samet excluded all the combinaisons in which reliability
or credibility ratings happened to be identical (viz. i = k and/or j = l), or in which
both the ratings of one score were higher than the reliability-credibility ratings of
the other score (viz. i≤k and j≤l or k≤i and l≤j). Officers were finally asked to
circle camp X or camp Y depending on whether they thought that camp X or that
camp Y would be attacked based on their corresponding scores. Basically, each of
the 37 officers had to evaluate 100 different combinaisons presented in a random
order.
For a given combinaison of scores RiC j vs. RkCl, Samet’s prediction was the
following: in case i≤k and the officer elicits the response corresponding to score
RkCl, then he or she decides in favor of higher reliability. But in case j≤l and the
2 Samet’s scenario used the term “accuracy” instead of the term “credibility” (see intended brack-
ets). But this difference has no impact on our claim since the two evaluative terms received
the same scales ranging from 1 to 6 with the same linguistic labels (“Confirmed”, “Probably
True”, “Possibly True”, “Doubtfully True”, “Improbable” and “Cannot Be Judged”) as well as
the same descriptions [see Samet 1975, for details].
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officer elicits the response corresponding to score RkCl, then he or she decides in
favor of higher credibility. Results showed that about 72.1 % of the responses were
made from scores based on higher credibility but lower reliability. In other words, the
credibility dimension prevailed over the reliability dimension in resultant scores.
As a matter of fact, Baker & al.’ data already gave a slight indication of this
prevalence. Setting aside the diagonal continuum which comprised 87 % of joints
ratings (N = 608), Table 4.3 shows that scores were generally confined to the high end
of the scale, thus indicating a weak preference for the credibility dimension over
the reliability one. In fact, 11 % of the scores fell (stricly) above the diagonal of
the scale (N = 75) whereas only 2 % of the scores fell (strictly) below the diagonal
(N = 12). But Samet’s results gives a clear-cut insight into the dominance of the
credibility dimension.
Samet’s further experiments aimed to estimate the relative influence of the indi-
vidual credibility and reliability ratings in joint ratings. In Form 3, Samet asked
the 37 intelligence officers to assign a probability degree to each of the 25 possible
scores to express the level of likelihood these degrees correspond to. In Form
4, officers were asked to assign a probability degree to each of the 5 credibility
ratings and to each of the 5 reliability ratings. Both experiments revealed high
consistency in the responses officers provided. Mean probabilities for ratings and
scores are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Ratings Mean Probabilities
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
A .86
B .73
C .57
D .36
E .18
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1 .93
2 .79
3 .61
4 .38
5 .21
Table 4.4: Samet’s Mean Probabilities for each Rating.
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Mean Content Credibility
Probabilities 1 2 3 4 5
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y A .96 .86 .74 .55 .38
B .92 .81 .67 .48 .31
C .87 .74 .60 .42 .25
D .81 .64 .48 .32 .19
E .75 .56 .40 .24 .14
Table 4.5: Samet’s Mean Probabilities for each Score.
Based on techniques of multiple linear regression, Samet conducted a post-hoc
analysis of the results to determine the extent to which the probability degrees of
joint ratings (Form 3) could be derived from a linear combination of the probabil-
ities of credibility and reliability ratings (Form 4). The analysis was made from
mean probabilities each officer gave to individual ratings and to their combina-
tion. For 35 of the 37 offficers, the credibility dimension turned out to account
for 76.6 % of resultant scores whereas reliability only accounted for 23.4 % of
them [see Samet 1975, 199]. In other words, the credibility dimension was seen
as three times as important as the reliability dimension by intelligence officers. This
strong dominance was later observed by Miron et al. [1978] based on 40 different
messages and 55 officers enrolled in an intelligence course at the US Army. They
found that credibility accounted for 57 % of the quality of intelligence messages,
even though other dimensions also played a role of lesser importance such as
relevance (19 %) and directness (6 %) (in particular).
Practically then, these empirical results show that the evaluative procedure needs
revisions. Following recommendations from Samet [1975] and Phelps et al. [1980],
intelligence evaluation should be made along a single credibility scale on which
reliability plays an ancillary role to be determined. In the next section, I propose
a new procedure for intelligence evaluation which aims to keep the virtues of the
existing scale but to remedy its shortcomings.
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4.2.4 A New Proposal for Intelligence Evaluation
I propose to represent the evaluation of intelligence messages in numerical belief
revision theory. To conform with empirical findings [see Samet 1975, Phelps
et al. 1980], the evaluation is made along a single credibility scale on which
reliability helps strike resultant scores. Basically, numerical plausibility models
are used to define a prior distribution of credibility ratings ranging from 1 to 6.
In this distribution, each credibility rating is framed through a specific notion of
conditional belief. Semantically, officers ascribe a credibility rating to a message
m at a given state s depending on the pieces of evidence that are consistent or
inconsistent with m at state s. Once this prior distribution is determined, officers
elicit a reliability rating that corresponds to the level of confidence they put into
the source of message m. To this end, reliability ratings are framed by a set of
belief revision operators labeled from A to F. That being done, the evaluation per
se consists in marking posterior credibility ratings, or resultant scores, by updating
prior distributions of ratings thanks to the reliability operators that may have been
elicited. The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to explaining this evaluative
proposal in detail.
4.3 The Evaluation of Intelligence Messages
4.3.1 A Formal Language L(intel) for Information Evaluation
Let us define a dynamic-epistemic language L(intel) for assessing the quality of
intelligence messages through credibility and reliability ratings. The setting is
inspired by previous works in qualitative belief revision that have a quantitative
flavour3 [see Spohn 1988, Aucher 2004 2008, van Ditmarsch 2005 2008, van Dit-
marsch & Labuschagne 2007]. L(intel) is a propositional syntax in which (condi-
tional) credibility operators Cn
O
and dynamic reliability operators R±
O
are primitives
in the language for expressing 6 degrees of credibility for contents as well as 6
degrees of reliability for sources. The set F (intel) of allL(intel)-formulas is given by
the following Backus-Naur Form:
3 To use the words of Baltag & Smets [2008a] and van Ditmarsch [2008].
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〈Formulas〉 ϕ,ψ := ⊤ | m | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Cn
O
ϕ | [R±
O
ϕ]ψ
with n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and± ∈ {A,B,C,D,E,F}. Subscript O refers to the intelligence
officer in charge of assessing intelligence messages. The basic features of L(intel)
are the conventional ones: ⊤ is the common abbreviation for tautologies and
additional connectives (⊥,∨,→,↔) are defined as usual. Atomic propositions
stand for contents of some informational messages m.
The intuitive interpretation of the (set of) conditional operators Cn
O
ϕ is “Officer O
ascribes a degree of credibility n to formula ϕ”. More precisely, Cn
O
ϕ means that O
ascribes a degree n to formula ϕ based on some piece(s) of evidence ε ∈ L(intel) he or
she detains in the context (in a sense I will make precise). The intended reading of
the (set of) dynamic operators [R±
O
ϕ]ψ is the following: “After officer O performs a
reliability update of type ±with formulaϕ, ψ is the case”. I give more precise semantic
interpretations to these conditional operators in a doxastic plausibility model:
S = 〈 S, 6O , ‖ . ‖ 〉
Structure S consists of a non-empty set S of possible states, a well-preorder4 6O for
the officer such that 6O ⊆ S × S and a standard valuation map ‖ . ‖: M → ℘(S).
The preorder should be interpreted as a (prior) plausibility order: when s 6O t (for
all s, t ∈ S), officer O considers that state t is “at least as plausible as” state s in
model S. I now provide semantic clauses to interpret the non-epistemic formulas
ofL(intel). The clauses for the credibility and reliability operations will be defined
after some clarifications.
• S, s |= ⊤ Always.
• S, s |= m iff s ∈‖ m ‖.
• S, s |= ¬ϕ iff S, s 6|= ϕ.
• S, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff S, s |= ϕ and S, s |= ψ.
4 Let us remind that a preorder over S is a reflexive and transitive relation over S. A well-preorder
overS is a preorder such that every non-empty subset ofShas least elements. Well-foundedness
is crucial in our setting: it ensures that non trivial formulas ϕ are always conditionally believed
on some formula ψ [see van Ditmarsch 2008, Baltag & Smets 2006 2008b].
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Note that according to the intelligence doctrine, pieces of evidence ε are pre-
conditions for evaluating information ϕ. In that sense, evidence ε can be either
consistent or inconsistent with information ϕ. Sometimes also, pieces of evidence
ε can be all false and fail as preconditions for evaluating the credibility of ϕ.
Semantically, I propose to capture these notions of consistency, inconsistency and
failure of adequate precondition through the notion of conditional plausibility. The
more plausible a message m is relatively to some contextual evidence ε, the more
evidence ε can be seen as consistent with m being true. On the contrary, the more
the negation of message m, namely ¬m, is plausible based on some evidence ε,
the more ε can be seen as inconsistent with m being true. When all pieces ε are
false, precondition fails for evaluating the credibility of m. They cannot serve as
a basis to adjudicate on m.
4.3.2 Rating Credibility Through Credibility Degrees
4.3.2.1 Expressing Degrees of Credibility
Before matching credibility degrees with credibility ratings, let us define ‖ ε ‖ as
the set of states of domain S that satisfy some formula ε ∈ F (intel): ‖ ε ‖ := {u
∈ S | S,u |= ε} for some ε ∈ F (intel). From the order 6O and set ‖ ε ‖, we can define
6 degrees of credibility strength based on formula ε. We write degreei(6O , ‖ ε ‖) the
set of all states of degree i that also satisfy some formula ε. Since 6O is a well-
preorder, every non-empty subset of 6O has maximal elements. Then, we can
derive various degrees of credibility strength relative to formula ε by restricting
further and further the set of6O-maximal states that are ε-consistent. Up to degree
n = 5, sets degreen(6O , ‖ ε ‖) are defined by induction:
degree1(6O , ‖ ε ‖) = Max
‖ε‖
6O
degreen(6O , ‖ ε ‖) = Max
‖ε‖\
⋃
i<n
degreei(6O ,‖ε‖)
6O
for some ε ∈ F (intel).
For n = 6, I define degree6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖) by the clause:
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degree6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖) = Max
‖¬ε‖
6O
for all ε ∈ F (intel).
Here Max6
O
is the set of states that are maximal for the plausibility ordering 6O :
Max6
O
:= {u ∈ S | ∀v ∈ S v 6O u}. That is: Max6O is the set of worlds that officer
O considers to be the most plausible of the entire ordering. Then, the set Max‖ε‖
6O
is
the set of the most plausible states of the entire ordering that also satisfy formula
ε ∈ F (intel), that is: Max
‖ε‖
6O
= Max6
O
∩ ‖ ε ‖. Contrariwise, Max‖¬ε‖
6O
is the set of the
most plausible states of the ordering that do not satisfy any formula ε ∈ F (intel).
Intuitively, degree1(6O , ‖ ε ‖) is the set of most plausible states that also satisfy
some formula ε ∈ F (intel): Max
‖ε‖
6O
for some ε ∈ F (intel). Then, the sets from
degree2(6O , ‖ ε ‖) to degree
5(6O , ‖ ε ‖) are obtained by successively removing ε-
states from the top of the plausibility ordering. In that sense, degree2(6O , ‖ ε ‖)
is the set of most plausible states that are not the most plausible ε-states of the entire
ordering, namely that are not in degree1(6O , ‖ ε ‖). Set degree
3(6O , ‖ ε ‖) is the set of
most plausible ε-states that are neither in degree1(6O , ‖ ε ‖) nor in degree
2(6O , ‖ ε ‖),
and so on. But degree6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖) is defined differently: degree
6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖) is the
set of the most plausible states of the entire ordering that do not satisfy any formula
ε ∈ F (intel), namely Max
‖¬ε‖
6O
for all ε ∈ F (intel).
Up to n = 5, formula(s) ε can be seen as an ordering source in the sense of Kratzer’
[see Kratzer 1981 1991, Lassiter 2017]. Definitions of sets degree1(6O , ‖ ε ‖) to
degree5(6O , ‖ ε ‖) are based on whether states that belong to them satisfy at least one
formula ε ∈ F (intel). But since degree
1(6O , ‖ ε ‖) to degree
5(6O , ‖ ε ‖) are obtained
by successively removing ε-states from the top of the plausibility ordering, states
are finally ordered depending on which formula(s) ε they do satisfy or not. In
that sense, formulas ε induce a plausibility ordering over the distinct possible
states depending on whether some of these ε turn out to be true or false at these
states. This notion of ordering source will become clearer in the evaluative case I
will present later.
From those six sets of credibility strength, six degrees of conditional credibility can
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be defined for the intelligence officer. Up to degree n = 5, the officer’s conditional
credibility of degree n in formula ϕ is given by the clause:
• S, s |= Cn
O
ϕ iff for all t ∈ degreen(6O , ‖ ε ‖): S, t |= ϕ.
for some ε ∈ F (intel)\{ϕ,⊤}.
This semantic clause means that formula ϕ is judged as credible by officer O at
a degree n ≤ 5 in state s (of model S) if and only if formula ϕ is true in the most
plausible states of degree n that also satisfy some other formula ε (distinct from
ϕ itself). In other words, some precondition ε exists for evaluating the credibility of
ϕ.
The restriction ε ∈ F (intel)\{ϕ,⊤} is made to avoid lack of informativity of evidence
ε (in case ε = ⊤) and trivialities (in case ε = ϕ). But this restriction will also prove
useful in the next subsection when credibility degrees will be matched with the
doctrinal credibility ratings. For degree n = 6, conditional credibility is defined
by:
• S, s |= C6
O
ϕ iff for all t ∈ degree6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖): S, t |= ϕ.
for all ε ∈ F (intel)\{ϕ,⊤}.
Here the restriction ε ∈ F (intel)\{ϕ,⊤} is made to avoid lack of informativity of ε
as well as contradictions (in case ε = ϕ). The semantic clause means that formula
ϕ is judged as being credible to degree 6 by officer O at state s (in model S) if
and only if formula ϕ is true in the most plausible states of the ordering where
no other formula ε (distinct from ϕ itself) also turns out to be true. In that case,
precondition fails for making an evaluation of ϕ since all the pieces of evidence ε
are false.
For clarity’s sake, let us rewrite the sets degree1(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖) to degree
5(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖),
as well as set degree6(6O , ‖ ¬ε ‖), in a simpler way: degree
i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
From the sets degreei, we can define the degree function dg : S → {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
such that: dg(s) = i iff s ∈ degreei. This means that the degree of state s is equal
142
to i if and only if state s belongs to the set of states of degree i. Accordingly, the
semantic clause for operators Cn
O
ϕ can be rewritten in the following way:
• S, s |= Cn
O
ϕ iff for all t such that dg(t) = n : S, t |= ϕ.
with n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. This clause intuitively means that formula ϕ is judged as
being credible by officer O to a degree n ≤ 6 in state s of model S if and only if
formula ϕ happens to be true in the states of degree n of model S.
Now I propose to match the various credibility operators with the doctrinal cred-
ibility ratings ranging from 1 to 6. First note that the doctrinal ratings are not strict
but all conditional, — at least when the evaluation is possible. According to Table
4.1, ascribing a level of credibility to a message m consists in determining the
conditional credibility of message m based on a set of contextual evidence ε the officer
has for, or against, m. For this reason, doctrinal credibility ratings can be captured
by teasing apart sets of consistent evidence in terms of plausibility strength. Let
us proceed step-by-step.
4.3.2.2 Matching Credibility Degrees with Credibility Ratings
According to doctrinal descriptions (see Table 4.1), a message m is classified as
“Confirmed” and rated 1 if it is confirmed by independent sources and consistent
with other information on the subject. Being confirmed, the message is expected to
reach the maximum credibility score. In such a case, m is judged as credible for
being true in the best set of plausible states satisfying some relevant evidence
ε consistent with it: Max‖ε‖
6O
for some evidence ε ∈ F (intel)\{ϕ,⊤}. Accordingly, I
propose to match this top credibility rating with conditional credibility C1
O
from
language L(intel).
By contrast, a message is classified as “Probably True” and rated 2 if it is not
confirmed but consistent with other information on the subject. Semantically, this
rating is weaker than rating 1. When rated 2, a message is consistent with most
but not all the highly plausible evidence the officer has. This can be understood as
follows: the message m is true in the second set of most plausible states satisfying
some evidence ε consistent with it. So the best set is no longer Max‖ε‖
6O
but a
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slight restriction of it: Max‖ε‖\degree
1
6O
. I propose to match this credibility rating with
conditional credibility C2
O
m.
In the same vein, a content is classified as “Possibly True” and rated 3 if it is not
confirmed and only consistent with some other information on the subject. Now the set
of consistent evidence is even more tenuous than for rating 2: the officer judges
that some but not most of the states that are consistent with m are highly plausible.
Based on similar intuitions as before, I propose to match credibility rating 3 with
degree C3
O
. In that case, the set of most plausible states is the third best set overall:
Max‖ε‖\{degree
1∪degree2}
6O
. Accordingly, rating 3 is matched with conditional credibility
C
3
O
m.
The description provided with rating “Doubtfully True” is more difficult to inter-
pret: a message m is rated 4 if it is not confirmed, possible but not conclusive since
no other information on the subject is available. However, this description cannot be
taken at first value because of two difficulties. First, if a message was classified
as “Doubtfully True” because no other information on the subject was available,
rating 4 could not be distinguished from rating 6. Second, words used for the
label “Doubtfully True” conflict with the description itself: doubtfully suggests
that the truth status of the message is uncertain.
As a matter of fact, the label “Doubtfully True” indicates that there is doubt
concerning the credibility of message m. The message is only moderately plau-
sible based on the contextual evidence the officer has. Accordingly, the set of
states in which m is true is weaker than before in terms of plausibility strength.
So we can assume that the message m is rated 4 when m turns out to be true
in the fourth best plausible states satisfying some evidence ε consistent with it:
Max‖ε‖\{degree
1∪degree2∪degree3}
6O
. The corresponding credibility operator for rating 4 is
then C4
O
m.
Concerning rating “Improbable”, the doctrine tells that a message is classified 5 if
it is not confirmed as well as contradicted by other information on the subject. In such
a case, m is very implausible based on the contextual evidence the officer has.
Intuitively then, m is true only in the fifth set of most plausible states that are also
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the least plausible states of the ordering: Max‖ε‖\{degree
1∪degree2∪degree3∪degree4}
6O
. Quite
naturally, the credibility operator for rating 5 is C5
O
m.
Finally, rating 6 is ascribed when the message m “Cannot Be Judged”: no basis exists
for evaluating the validity of m. There is no evidence ε, consistent or inconsistent
with m, on which the officer can condition his credibility on m. I propose to match
rating 6 with credibility operator C6
O
m for this reason. The clauses I have given
for expressing credibility ratings are summed up in Table 4.6.
Rating Label Set of States in Max6O
C
1
O
m Confirmed ‖ ε ‖
C
2
O
m Probably True ‖ ε ‖ \{degree1}
C
3
O
m Possibly True ‖ ε ‖ \{degree1 ∪ degree2}
C
4
O
m Doubtfully True ‖ ε ‖ \{degree1 ∪ degree2 ∪ degree3}
C
5
O
m Improbable ‖ ε ‖ \{degree1 ∪ degree2 ∪ degree3 ∪ degree4}
C
6
O
m Cannot Be Judged ‖ ¬ε ‖
Table 4.6: Semantic Conditions for Credibility Ratings.
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4.3.2.3 A General Case Study
Let us model a practical case of evaluation. Graphically, to represent the fact
that the state t is at least as plausible as the state s for officer O (s 6O t), I draw a
right arrow “ → ” from state s to state t: s → t. When states s and t are equally
plausible for the officer (s 6O t and t 6O s), I draw a left-right arrow “↔ ” between
s and t: s↔ t. Reflexive arrows are omitted at each state to simplify the models.
Each arrow is labelled with a numerical integer n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} that indicates
the degree of the state located on top of the arrow. For instance, if →n s, then the
degree of state s is n. When two states are equally plausible, for instance s↔n t,
they receive the same plausibility degree n.
Suppose the intelligence officer has to evaluate the following message from a
given source:
m : “My country is building 8 nuclear submarines”
Suppose that for evaluating the credibility of m, the officer detains three pieces of
contextual evidence e, f and g:
e : “Imagery shows that the country has been delivered 8 submarine hulls”
f : “The country is testing existing torpedos in the bay area”
g : “Sources reported that the country has decided to buy new nuclear reactors”
We can see that amongst those pieces of evidence, only e and g are highly relevant
to the evaluation of message m. Evidence f is less relevant with respect to the
evaluation of m. Hence the states of contextual evidence on which the officer can
define his or her set of prior credibility ratings Cn
O
m are based on the set ε = {e, g}.
From set ε and message m, eight possible states can be distinguished:
s{e,g,m}, t{e,g,¬m}, u{e,¬g,¬m}, v{¬e,¬g,¬m}, w{¬e,g,m}, x{¬e,g,¬m}, y{¬e,¬g,m}, z{e,¬g,m}
In states where at least one piece of evidence amongst evidence e and g turns
out to be true, precondition exists for making an evaluation of message m: states
s, t, u, w, x and z. But in states where both pieces e and g turn out to be false,
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precondition fails for making such an evaluation of m. That is in states y and v.
I put states y and v at the bottom of the ordering to set them apart. Let us now
suppose that the officer gives the following prior distribution of degrees to message
m based on evidence from the set ε:
m
¬e,¬g
y
¬m
¬e,¬g
v
¬m
e, g
t
¬m
e,¬g
u
¬m
¬e, g
x
m
¬e, g
w
m
e,¬g
z
m
e, g
s
6 5 4 3 3 2 1
Remind that the numerals below each arrow (for instance, →4 u) indicate the (prior)
plausibility of the state that is located on the top of the arrow (state u in that case).
More precisely, these numerals indicate the credibility rating of the message that
is true or false at the state on top of the arrow. The model shows that message m
is rated 1 at state s whereas the negation of m, namely ¬m, is rated 5 at state t.
These ratings depend on the pieces of evidence ε that turn out to be true (or false)
when the message itself turns out to be true (or false).
As I said earlier, the set εplays the role of a Kratzerian ordering source [Kratzer 1981
1991]. Possible states are ordered along the relation 6O depending on whether
or not they satisfy evidence e,g ∈ ε. More precisely, evidence set ε induces a
plausibility ordering over the possible states since the more states satisfy pieces
of evidence from ε that are consistent with m, the more these state are judged
as plausible by the officer. On the contrary, the more the states satisfy pieces of
evidence from ε that are consistent with ¬m, the more these states are judged as
implausible by the officer.5
When determining a credibility distribution for message m, it seems reasonable
that if the officer gives the degree of credibility 1 to message m based on the
evidence set {e, g}, the same officer will give, by symmetry, a degree of credibility
that is very low to ¬m based on the same evidence set (degree 5 in that case). A
similar reasoning applies to all the degrees of credibility. The different ratings
and their evidence sets are presented in Table 4.7.
5 A difference with Kratzer’s framework is that in my own proposal, evidence from set ε do not
have the same weight. For instance, evidence e has more weight than evidence e since message
m gets a credibility degree of 2 based on the evidence set {e,¬g} but a lower, and even uncertain,
credibility degree of 3 based on the evidence set {¬e, g}.
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State(s) Evidence Set Prior Rating Cn
O
m
s {e,g} C1
O
m
z {e,¬g} C2
O
m
x,w {¬e, g} ¬C3
O
m ∧ ¬C3
O
¬m
u {e,¬g} C4
O
¬m
t {e,g} C5
O
¬m
y,v {¬e,¬g} ¬C6
O
m ∧ ¬C6
O
¬m
Table 4.7: Evidence-Based Prior Ratings.
Now that I have matched doctrinal credibility ratings with credibility operators in
L(intel), I turn to reliability ratings to propose similar clauses. But the correspon-
dence between reliability ratings and updates of degrees is not as straightforward
as before. Unlike for credibility, reliability ratings cannot be defined from literal
readings of their intended descriptions.
4.3.3 Rating Reliability Through Degrees Updates
4.3.3.1 Expressing Updates of Credibility Degrees
The general semantic clause for operation [R±
O
ϕ]ψ in model S is:
• S, s |= [R±
O
ϕ]ψ iff S
[R±o ϕ] , s |= ψ.
Updated models S
[R±o ϕ] are obtained from S in the following way:
S
[R±o ϕ] = 〈 S
[R±o ϕ] , 6
[R±o ϕ]
O
, ‖ . ‖
[R±o ϕ] 〉
In models S
[R±o ϕ] , the sets of states S
[R±o ϕ] and valuation maps ‖ . ‖
[R±o ϕ] are strictly
identical to the initial set of states S and valuation map ‖ . ‖ from S. The crucial
aspect of S
[R±o ϕ] are the plausibility preorders 6
[R±o ϕ]
O
. For all ± ∈ {A,B,C,D,E,F}, each
operation R±
O
with ϕ induces a specific change on the ranking of states depending
on whether these states satisfy formula ϕ or not.
To begin with, it is important to distinguish two kinds of situations. There are
situations in which formula ϕ is evaluable at the state s under consideration in
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the current plausibility ordering 6O : dg(s) < 6. But there are also situations in
which formula ϕ is not evaluable at the state s under consideration in the current
plausibility ordering 6O : dg(s) = 6. Making such a distinction is crucial since in
the first case (viz. dg(s) < 6), the credibility of ϕ in the new ordering 6
[R±o ϕ]
O
will
depend both on the prior credibility of the formula at state s and on the level of
reliability ± of its source at the same state. In the second case (viz. dg(s) = 6),
the credibility of formula ϕ in the updated ordering 6
[R±o ϕ]
O
will depend only on the
reliability of its source at state s.
In both situations, however, I write dg(s)R
±
o ϕ for the posterior degree of state s
obtained by exerting operation ± with formula ϕ on the prior degree dg(s) of state
s. To ensure that new degrees dgR
±
o ϕ remain within the bounds of set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
we introduce the function Cut(x) that will be applied in the definition of updates.6
Cut(x) =

















x if 1 6 x 6 5
1 if x < 1
5 if x > 5
Let us start out by defining the operations R±
O
when formula ϕ is evaluable at the
state s under consideration: dg(s) < 6. Operation RA
O
ϕ is defined as the update
in which all ϕ-states of the initial plausibility ordering 6O gain 3 ranks in the
new ordering 6
[RAo ϕ]
O
while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial plausibility ordering 6O loose
3 ranks in the new ordering 6
[RAo ϕ]
O
. In terms of credibility degrees, this means
that degrees of ϕ-states decrease by 3 while degrees of ¬ϕ-states increase by 3.
Accordingly, operation RA
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
A
o ϕ =









Cut(dg(s) − 3) if S, s |= ϕ.
Cut(dg(s) + 3) if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RB
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial plau-
sibility ordering gain 2 ranks in the new ordering 6
[RBo ϕ]
O
(their degrees decrease by
2) while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial plausibility ordering loose 2 ranks in the new
ordering 6
[RBo ϕ]
O
(their degrees increase by 2). Numerically, RB
O
ϕ is defined by:
6 This technical device is inspired by Aucher [2004].
149
dg(s)R
B
oϕ =









Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= ϕ.
Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RC
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial ordering
gain 1 rank in the new ordering 6
[RCo ϕ]
O
while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial ordering
loose 1 rank in the new ordering 6
[RCo ϕ]
O
. Numerically, operation RC
O
ϕ is given by:
dg(s)R
C
o ϕ =









Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= ϕ.
Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Contrary to the operations RA
O
ϕ and RC
O
ϕ that have a promoting effect on ϕ-states,
operation RD
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial ordering
loose 1 rank in the new ordering 6
[RDo ϕ]
O
(their degrees increase by 1) while all ¬ϕ-
states of the initial ordering gain 1 rank in the new ordering 6
[RDo ϕ]
O
(their degrees
decrease by 1). In terms of plausibility degrees, operation RD
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
D
o ϕ =









Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= ϕ.
Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RE
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial ordering
loose 2 ranks in the new ordering 6
[REo ϕ]
O
while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial ordering
gain 2 ranks in the new ordering 6
[REo ϕ]
O
. Numerically, operation RE
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
E
oϕ =









Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= ϕ.
Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Contrary to all the operations above, operation R F
O
ϕ leaves the initial plausibility
ordering 6O as it is, — no matter if formula ϕ is true or false at the state where the
operation is performed. Accordingly, operation R F
O
ϕ is defined by:
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dg(s)R
F
oϕ = dg(s) if S, s |= ϕ or if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
So far, I have defined the R±
O
-operations in case the degree of the evaluation state s
is less than 6. I have focused on cases in which true evidence already exists at state
s for making an evaluation of formula ϕ. But what if all the evidence turns out
to be false at the state s such that the credibility of formula ϕ cannot be judged?
In this case, the officer’s evaluation will be based only on the reliability of the
source. In other words, posterior credibility degrees dg(s)R
±
o ϕ will stricly reduce
to the (level of) reliability R±
O
of the source at state s [see Samet 1975, 200]. For
this reason, I associate a fixed degree to all the R±
O
-operations performed at states of
degree 6. These degrees will reflect the gain or loss of credibility implied by the
intended operation.
In case formula ϕ is not evaluable at the state s under consideration (dg(s) = 6),
operation RA
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial ordering
6O go to the first rank in the new ordering 6
[RAo ϕ]
O
while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial
ordering 6O go to the fifth rank in the new ordering 6
[RAo ϕ]
O
. Numerically, operation
R
A
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
A
o ϕ =









1 if S, s |= ϕ.
5 if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
When formula ϕ is not assessable at state s, operation RB
O
ϕmakes the states of the
initial ordering 6O go to the second rank in the new ordering 6
[RBo ϕ]
O
if these states
satisfy formula ϕ, and to the fourth rank in the new ordering 6
[RBo ϕ]
O
if these states
satisfy ¬ϕ. In terms of credibility degrees, operation RB
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
B
oϕ =









2 if S, s |= ϕ.
4 if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RC
O
ϕ is the update according to which all the states of the initial ordering
6O go to the third rank in the new ordering 6
[RCo ϕ]
O
no matter whether these states
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satisfy formula ϕ or satisfy formula ¬ϕ. Numerically, operation RC
O
ϕ is defined
by:
dg(s)R
C
o ϕ = 3 if S, s |= ϕ or if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RD
O
ϕ makes the states of the initial ordering 6O go to the fourth rank in
the new ordering 6
[RDo ϕ]
O
if these states satisfy formula ϕ, and to the second rank in
the new ordering 6
[RDo ϕ]
O
if these states satisfy ¬ϕ. In terms of credibility degrees,
operation RD
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
D
o ϕ =









4 if S, s |= ϕ.
2 if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Operation RE
O
ϕ is the update according to which all ϕ-states of the initial ordering
6O go to the fifth rank in the new ordering 6
[REo ϕ]
O
while all ¬ϕ-states of the initial
ordering 6O go to the first rank in the new ordering 6
[REo ϕ]
O
. In terms of degrees,
operation RE
O
ϕ is defined by:
dg(s)R
E
oϕ =









5 if S, s |= ϕ.
1 if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
Finally, operation R F
O
ϕ is the update according to which all the states of the initial
ordering 6O go to the sixth rank in the new ordering 6
[RFoϕ]
O
, — no matter if these
states satisfy formula ϕ or satisfy formula ¬ϕ. Numerically, operation R F
O
ϕ is
defined by:
dg(s)R
F
oϕ = 6 if S, s |= ϕ or if S, s |= ¬ϕ.
4.3.3.2 Matching Updates of Degrees with Reliability Ratings
Now I propose to match the various reliability operators with the doctrinal reli-
ability ratings ranging from A to F. Intuitively, the more reliable officers judge a
source of information to be, the more they will favor contextual evidence that is
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consistent with the message from this source. On the contrary, the less reliable
officers judge a source to be, the more they will favor contextual evidence that is
inconsistent with the message from this source. When officers are unable to assess
the reliability of a source, they keep credibility ratings as they are. My proposal to
match reliability operators R±
O
with doctrinal reliability ratings is based on those
intuitions. In model S, favoring or dismissing pieces of evidence that are consistent
or inconsistent with a message amounts to decreasing or increasing the rank of their
corresponding possible state.
The criteria for deciding whether sources are reliable, unreliable or unassessable,
depends on their informational pedigree. Levels of reliability officers may put into
sources are determined by the truth or falsity of all the information they have
provided in the past. That being determined, officers know how much they
should promote or dismiss pieces of evidence that back up or contradict the
message m they are evaluating.
Following doctrinal descriptions (see Table 4.2), sources are classified as “Com-
pletely Reliable” and rated A if they have a history of complete reliability such that
there is no doubt of authenticity and trustworthiness towards them. In such condi-
tions, the officer is strongly justified to promote the states s satisfying some evidence
ε that is consistent with message m being true and to dismiss the states s satisfy-
ing some evidence ε that are consistent with m being false. Accordingly, I offer to
match rating A with reliability operator RA
O
from L(intel). In case message m was
already evaluable at state s (because some distinct evidence ε exists for assessing m,
i.e. dg(s) < 6), the degree of state s decreases by 3 if s is consistent with m being
true: dg(s)R
A
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) − 3) if S, s |= m. On the contrary, the degree of state
s increases by 3 if s is consistent with m being false: dg(s)R
A
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) + 3)
if S, s |= ¬m. In case message m was not already evaluable at state s (because no
distinct piece of evidence ε exists for assessing m, i.e. dg(s) = 6), the degree of state
s becomes 1 if s satisfies m: dg(s)R
A
o ϕ = 1 if S, s |= m, and becomes 5 if s satisfies
¬m: dg(s)R
A
o ϕ = 5 if S, s |= ¬m.
This clause expresses the strongest trusting attitude the officer may have towards
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the intelligence source. But this strength can be relaxed to express weaker trusting
attitudes. We know that officers classify sources as “Usually Reliable” and rate
them B if they have a history of valid information most of the time such that there is
minor doubt about their authenticity and trustworthiness. Now officers are moderately
justified to promote m-consistent states on top of their plausibility ordering. This
level can be captured by operator RB
O
fromL(intel). In case message m was already
evaluable at state s (i.e. dg(s) < 6), the degree of state s decreases by 2 if s is
consistent with m being true: dg(s)R
B
oϕ = Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= m, and increases
by 2 if s is consistent with m being false: dg(s)R
B
oϕ = Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= ¬m.
But in case message m was not already evaluable at state s (i.e. dg(s) = 6), the
degree of state s becomes 2 if it satisfies m: dg(s)R
B
oϕ = 2 if S, s |= m, and becomes
4 if it satisfies ¬m: dg(s)R
B
oϕ = 4 if S, s |= ¬m.
By contrast, the description provided with rating “Fairly Reliable” is more mixed:
sources are rated C if they have provided valid information in the past but there is
some doubt concerning their authenticity and trustworthiness. Because of this, officers
should make a minor revision of the plausibility ordering. This corresponds to
reliability operator RC
O
in L(intel). In case message m was already evaluable at the
state s under consideration (i.e. dg(s) < 6), the degree of state s decreases by 1 if s is
consistent with m being true: dg(s)R
C
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= m, and increases
by 1 if s is consistent with m being false: dg(s)R
C
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= ¬m.
In case message m was not already evaluable at state s (i.e. dg(s) = 6), the degree
of state s becomes 3 no matter whether it satisfies m or satisfies ¬m: dg(s)R
C
o ϕ = 3
if S, s |= m or if S, s |= ¬m.
According to the doctrine, sources are classified as “Not Usually Reliable” and
rated D if there is significant doubt concerning their authenticity and trustworthiness
but they have provided valid information in the past. Expression “significant doubt”
clearly indicates that states which satisfy inconsistent evidence with m become
more plausible than states satisfying evidence consistent with m. But this pro-
motion is minimized by the fact that the sources delivered valid information in
the past. So the officer is barely justified in promoting m-inconsistent states on
top of his or her plausibility ordering. The corresponding operation is RD
O
in
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language L(intel). In case message m was already evaluable at state s, this op-
erator makes the degree of s decreases by 1 if s is consistent with m being false:
dg(s)R
D
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= ¬m, and increases by 1 if s is consistent with
m being true: dg(s)R
D
o ϕ = Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= m. In case message m was
not already evaluable at state s, the degree of state s becomes 1 if it satisfies ¬m:
dg(s)R
D
o ϕ = 1 if S, s |= ¬m, and becomes 5 if it satisfies m: dg(s)R
D
o ϕ = 5 if
S, s |= m.
Concerning the rating “Unreliable”, the doctrine states that sources are classified
E in case they are lacking in authenticity and trustworthiness and have an history
of invalid information. Now officers are highly justified to promote m-inconsistent
states on top of their plausibility ordering. But they are not as justified as they were
to promote m-consistent states in case of rating A. In the latter case, the doctrinal
description indicates sources have an history of complete reliability. In case of
rating E, the description is weaker: sources are not trustworthy and have provided
invalid information in the past but they are not described as completely unreliable.
For this reason, officers are not strongly justified to promote m-inconsistent states
on top of the plausibility ordering. This moderate attitude can be captured by
operator RE
O
in L(intel). In case message m was already evaluable at state s, this
operator makes the degree of s decreases by 2 if s is consistent with m being false:
dg(s)R
E
oϕ = Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= ¬m, and increases by 2 if s is consistent with
m being true: dg(s)R
E
oϕ = Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= m. In case message m was
not already evaluable at state s, the degree of state s becomes 2 if it satisfies ¬m:
dg(s)R
E
oϕ = 2 if S, s |= ¬m, and becomes 4 if it satisfies m: dg(s)R
E
oϕ = 4 if
S, s |= m.
Eventually, rating F is ascribed when the reliability of the source “Cannot Be
Judged”. That is: when no basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source. In
such a case, the evidence the officer has are all false and for this reason, they do not
provide a reasonable ground for adjudicating on the truth value of message m.
A corresponding operator in L(intel) is R FO . No matter if the message was already
evaluable at state s, this operator keeps the degree of s as it was if s satisfies m or
satisfies ¬m: dg(s)R
F
oϕ = dg(s) if S, s |= m or if S, s |= ¬m. If m was not evaluable
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at state s (i.e. dg(s) = 6), the degree of s remains equal to 6 after operation R F
O
is
performed in that case. Table 4.8 sums up all the semantic clauses I have given
for expressing reliability ratings when the message is evaluable.
4.3.3.3 General Case Study: a follow-up
Let us remind the model expressing a prior distribution of ratings for message m
based on the evidence set ε = {e, g} (see subsection 4.3.2):
m
¬e,¬g
y
¬m
¬e,¬g
v
¬m
e, g
t
¬m
e,¬g
u
¬m
¬e, g
x
m
¬e, g
w
m
e,¬g
z
m
e, g
s
6 5 4 3 3 2 1
Suppose now that the officer gives rating D to the source of the message. The
source is not usually reliable, there is significant doubt concerning his or her honesty
even though they have provided valid information about submarines in the past.
Based on rating D, the officer can mark a posterior credibility distribution for message
m. Once applied, the scoring rules that correspond to relability rating RD
O
return
the following updated model:
m
¬e,¬g
y
¬m
e, g
t
m
¬e, g
w
¬m
e,¬g
u
m
e,¬g
z
¬m
¬e,¬g
v
¬m
¬e, g
x
m
e, g
s
?
4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1
For instance, the (prior) credibility rating of message m was 2 at state z in the initial
model. Now, the posterior credibility score of m is 3 at state z in the updated model.
This suggests that in state z, m is not “Probably True” as it seemed initially but
more certainly “Possibly True”. Accordingly, the officer should be more careful
than he or she was concerning the truth of message m.
Table 4.9 sums up the update operation. However, two issues can be observed
after the computation. Although posterior scores are mutually consistent, the
rating 1 is now undefined. Besides that, some states, namely u{e,¬g,¬m} and z{e,¬g,m}, are
no longer distinguishable. They receive the same credibility score of 3 that make
them indistinguishable. In other words, some credibility information has been lost
during the process. But in fact some credibility information has also been gained
during the operation. States x{¬e,g,¬m} and w{¬e,g,m} that were indistinguishable
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Rating Label Operations on Degrees
R
A
O
ϕ Completely Reliable Cut(dg(s) − 3) if S, s |= ϕ
Cut(dg(s) + 3) if S, s |= ¬ϕ
R
B
O
ϕ Usually Reliable Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= ϕ
Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= ¬ϕ
R
C
O
ϕ Fairly Reliable Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= ϕ
Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= ¬ϕ
R
D
O
ϕ Not Usually Reliable Cut(dg(s) + 1) if S, s |= ϕ
Cut(dg(s) − 1) if S, s |= ¬ϕ
R
E
O
ϕ Unreliable Cut(dg(s) + 2) if S, s |= ϕ
Cut(dg(s) − 2) if S, s |= ¬ϕ
R
F
O
ϕ Cannot Be Judged dg(s) if S, s |= m or if S, s |= ¬m
Table 4.8: Semantic Conditions for Reliability Ratings.
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beforehand can now be differentiated. Furthermore, states v{¬e,¬g,¬m} and y{¬e,¬g,m}
are no longer evaluative blindspots for the officer.
States Evidence Set Posterior Rating Cn
O
m
x,s,v {¬e,g}, {e,g}, {¬e,¬g} ¬C2
O
m ∧ ¬C2
O
¬m
u,z {e,¬g} ¬C3
O
m ∧ ¬C3
O
¬m
t,w,y {e,g}, {¬e, g}, {¬e,¬g} ¬C4
O
m ∧ ¬C4
O
¬m
Table 4.9: Evidence-Based Posterior Ratings.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 The Scoring Operation: Before and After
The procedure I have defined in numerical belief revision is consistent with ex-
perimental results on intelligence evaluation. On the one hand, credibility is the
crucial dimension for evaluating messages. For a given message m as well as a set
of evidence ε for or against this message, plausibility orderings help determine
a prior credibility distribution for m. On the other hand, reliability ratings play a
balancing role on this distribution. They help mark posterior ratings, or resultant
scores, for message m. Let CO(m) and R O(m) stand for specific credibility and reli-
ability ratings for m, and ScO(m) stands for the resultant score that corresponds to
m.
Basically, two steps can be distinguished along the scoring operation. The first
step occurs before marking a score: the officer elicits a credibility rating CO(m) as
well as a reliability rating R O(m) for m. I have explained that determining the
credibility and reliability of message m is determining its degree of truth as well as
the degree of honesty of its source (see Chapter 3). Contextual evidence is used in
the first case while historical evidence serves in the second case. But a question
that we can naturally ask about the numerical procedure is as follows: what is
the correspondence between the evaluative dimensions of credibility and reliability and
158
the underlying descriptive dimensions of truth and honesty? How do these dimensions
combine with respect to informational types?
The second step of the scoring operation occurs once a score has been marked on
message m. Resultant scores mirror the different ways in which some officer may
change his or her confidence in m with respect to its posterior credibility score. In
fact, this score expresses a weaker or a stronger credibility rating for the message
based on the reliability of its source. Another question we can naturally ask is
therefore: what is the correspondence between resultant scores and informational types?
What kinds of information each provide and how do these pieces of information correlate?
The remaining part of this section addresses these questions. I first investigate
the correspondence between ratings and message types. I then discuss the corre-
spondence between resultant scores and types.
4.4.2 The Correspondence between Ratings and Types
The way they are defined, credibility ratings express decreasing degrees of con-
firmation for the intelligence message based on the evidence the officer has for
evaluating its degree of truth or falsity (see Table 4.1). Similarly, reliability ratings
express decreasing degrees of trustworthiness regarding the source based on growing
suspicion concerning her degree of honesty or dishonesty (see Table 4.2). Looking at
the descriptions given by the intelligence doctrine, credibility and reliability rat-
ings can be distinguished along a 3×3 matrix in the same way degrees of truth and
honesty were combined for giving a 3×3 matrix that described message types. Let
us start out by reminding the 3×3 matrix we proposed in Chapter 3 for classifying
message types:
Based on doctrinal descriptions, a similar matrix can be provided that partitions
the evaluative space into 3 categories of credibility ratings and 3 categories of
reliability ratings. Regarding credibility, a first category concerns messages that
are judged as true by officers: rating 1 (“Confirmed”), rating 2 (“Probably True”)
and rating 3 (“Possibly True”). In these cases, the evidence officers have is suf-
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Message type Truth of the Content
t True Indeterminate False
H
o
n
es
ty
o
f
th
e
S
o
u
rc
e
t1 t5 t2
Honest = = =
information error-avoidance misinformation
t7 t9 t8
Imprecise = = =
negative omission mixed positive omission
t3 t6 t4
Dishonest = = =
subjective lie half-truth objective lie
Table 4.10: Informational Labels for Message Types.
ficient for making them believe that message contents are more clearly true than
false, or even uncertain. By contrast, a second category can be teased apart in
which contents are judged as clearly false by officers: rating 5 (“Improbable”). In
rating 5, the message is contradicted by the evidence officers have on the subject
of interest. Finally, a third category can be isolated in which contents are judged
as being neither true nor false, but clearly uncertain. This is rating 4 (“Doubtfully
True”). I have insisted on the specificity of rating 4 by comparing the discrepancy
between the label “Doubtfully True” and its intended description by the intelli-
gence doctrine (see section 4.1 and subsection 4.3.2). Despite this description, the
label “Doubtfully True” clearly indicates that the message may be true but may
also be false, so that that its truth status is indeterminate in that case.
Regarding reliability ratings, three categories can also be distinguished depending
on the degree of honesty of the source. The first category concerns rating A (“Com-
160
pletely Reliable”), rating B (“Usually Reliable”) and rating C (“Fairly Reliable”).
Even though these ratings express increasing suspicion towards sources being
honest, this suspicion is very limited. Sources are considered as being clearly
honest for having provided valid information in the past. But as for credibility,
this category can be opposed to a second category in which sources are clearly
dishonest: this is rating E (“Unreliable”). In this situation, sources lack in trust-
worthiness and have a history of invalid information such that there is no doubt
of their dishonesty. Finally, an intermediary category can be isolated in which
sources are imprecise regarding the quality of the information they provide: rat-
ing D (“Not Usually Reliable”). When classified as D, sources are clearly less
cooperative than they should according to Gricean principles.
These three categories of credibility ratings CO(m) and three categories of reliability
ratings R O(m) partition the evaluative space into nine zones. But since eliciting
ratings for m is determining the degree of truth of m as well as the degree of honesty of
its source, these elicitations are elicitations of informational types. More precisely,
pairs of ratings, written 〈CO , RO〉, can be seen as subjective assessments of message
types based on contextual and historical evidence. Accordingly, the nine zones I
have identified in the evaluative space can be matched by the nine informational
types I have identified in the descriptive space. The correspondence between
rating pairs and informational types is given by Table 4.11. For simplicity’s sake,
I leave aside rating 6 and rating F in which contents and/or sources cannot be
judged. In these cases, types cannot be judged either.
4.4.3 The Correspondence between Types and Scores
Once credibility and reliability ratings have been elicited by the officer, the latter
marks a resultant score for message m. Table 4.12 indicates all the posterior scores
that can be derived by applying reliability updates RO on prior distributions of
ratings CO . Consider for instance update D. Once applied on prior credibility
rating 2, rating D returns a posterior credibility score of 3. But once applied on
rating 4, D returns a posterior credibility rating of 5, etc.
As constructs, resultant scores differ from types. Types are descriptive accounts
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Correspondence Content Credibility CO
Ratings & Types 1 | 2 | 3 4 5
S
o
u
rc
e
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
R
O
A
B information error-avoidance misinformation
C
D negative omission mixed positive omission
E subjective lie half-truth objective lie
Table 4.11: The Correspondence between Ratings and Types.
Correspondence Content Credibility CO
Scores & Types 1 | 2 | 3 4 5
S
o
u
rc
e
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
R
O
A 1 | 1 | 1 1 2
B 1 | 1 | 1 2 3
C 1 | 1 | 2 3 4
information error-avoidance misinformation
D 2 | 3 | 4 5 5
negative omission mixed positive omission
E 3 | 4 | 5 5 5
subjective lie half-truth objective lie
Table 4.12: The Correspondence between Scores and Types.
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of intelligence message based on dimensions of truth and honesty that are not
conflated with each other. Indeed, dimensions of truth and honesty are not reduced
to one another or confounded into a single dimension. On the contrary, resultant
scores are evaluative accounts of messages based on a credibility score that also
integrates the reliability of the source. In that case, reliability is an adjustment of
credibility.
Despite being different constructs, scores and types converge. They provide com-
plementary information concerning the quality of intelligence messages. I have
shown that pairs of credibility and reliability ratings for m, written 〈CO(m), RO(m)〉,
are assessments of messages types t(m). But on the other hand, pairs of ratings
for m also determine the resultant score of m: ScO(m). From these pairs, we can
finally associate resultant scores with types (see Table 4.12). To see more clearly
into the link between scores and types, I propose to calculate the average posterior
credibility scores of the 9 evaluative zones. For instance, the average score of the
type error-avoidance is 2: 1+2+33 = 2. The average score of the type subjective-lie is
4 ( 3+4+53 = 4) while the average score of the type positive omission is simply 5, etc.
All the different calculations are summed up in Table 4.13.
Looking at average scores, we observe that posterior credibility scores are con-
sistent with informational types. The more qualitative the type, the higher its
corresponding posterior score. On the contrary, the less qualitative the type, the
lower its posterior score. This correspondence can be easily explained: resultant
scores indicate the rational course of action to follow after having considered the
ratings of the messages. In that sense, the more beneficial the message is based
on its informational type, the better its resultant score. See for instance the types
information and error-avoidance: their corresponding scores are 1.1 and 2. By con-
trast, the more harmful or detrimental the message is based on its type, the worse
its resultant score. See for instance the types half-truth and objective lie: both have
corresponding scores of 5. Accordingly, scores can be seen as a rational basis for
action based on the message being classified as such or such.
However, Table 4.13 also shows that quantitative scores happen to be less sensitive
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Average Scores Content Credibility CO
Types 1 | 2 | 3 4 5
S
o
u
rc
e
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
R
O
A
B 1.1 2 3
C
information error-avoidance misinformation
D 3 5 5
negative omission mixed positive omission
E 4 5 5
subjective lie half-truth objective lie
Table 4.13: Average Scores for Informational Types.
than qualitative types when credibility ratings are higher than 4 and reliability
ratings higher than D. From a qualitative perspective, pairs of ratings 〈4,D〉,
〈5,D〉, 〈4,E〉 and 〈5,E〉 can be teased apart since they correspond to clear-cut
informational types: mixed, positive omission, half-truth and objective lie respec-
tively. But these pairs can no longer be teased apart from a quantitative perspec-
tive since the messages they correspond to all get a posterior score of 5. This
qualitative/quantitative discrepancy is illustrated by Figure 4.1 in which all the
informational types are ranked from best to worst based on their average scores.
Figure 4.1 shows that negative types can no longer be teased apart. This reflects
the loss of credibility information we observed in the practical case study: states
that were distinguishable before the scoring operation become indistinguishable
afterwards. This issue is caused by the recipes I have proposed for reliability
updates. The way I define them, they return less plausibility degrees than the
prior distributions they are applied to. Similar difficulties were identified by
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Figure 4.1: Qualitative Ranking Based on Average Scores.
Aucher [2008] and van Ditmarsch [2008] concerning quantitatively formulated
proposals for belief revision. Finer-grained recipes are needed to increase the
discriminative power of the scoring procedure.
4.5 Conclusion
We have seen that the doctrinal procedure for intelligence evaluation is not ade-
quately specified. Researchers have identified two fallacious assumptions in the
existing procedure. One of these assumptions is that “intelligence reports should
transmit facts and/or assessments” and that the “the distinction between fact and in-
terpretation [should] always be clearly indicated” [see STANAG-2511 2003, 2]. But
another incorrect assumption is that “reliability and credibility, the two aspects of
evaluation, must be considered independently of each other” [see STANAG-2511 2003,
A-2]. However, empirical results show that this independence is not effective.
Field officers perceive dimensions of credibility and reliability as being strongly
correlated. More specifically, credibility is seen as prevalent over reliability in the
resultant scores.
This chapter aimed to make the evaluative procedure compatible with this preva-
lence. I proposed to formalize information evaluation in a numerical setting in-
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spired by previous works in quantitative belief revision [e.g. Aucher 2004, van Dit-
marsch 2005, van Ditmarsch & Labuschagne 2007]. Most of the extant settings
for evaluating data mix qualitative features with quantitative ones. In particular,
symbolic procedures based on many-valued logics always have a quantitative
flavour [e.g. Akdag et al. 1992, Revault d’Allonnes et al. 2007, Revault d’Allonnes
& Lesot 2014]. By contrast, symbolic procedures based on modal logics do not
have a quantitative flavour [see Demolombe 2004, Cholvy 2013], even though
new steps have been made in this direction based on extensions of modal logics
[e.g. Legastelois et al. 2017ab].
The goal of this chapter was to bridge the gap between modal logic proposals
and quantitative approaches. In the proposed setting, dimensions of credibility and
reliability are captured syntactically through static and dynamic modal operators.
Credibility operators are indexed by numerical degrees ranging from 1 to 6, which
correspond to the distinct levels of the STANAG scale. These degrees are created
semantically by putting different constraints on the set of the most plausible states.
Reliability operators are numerical rules to update these degrees depending of
the reliability of the source. With respect to credibility operators, my setting
is essentially qualitative since numerical degrees are derived from a qualitative
ordering. But with respect to reliability, my setting is more quantitative than
qualitative since numerical features dominate in the updates. Let us now compare
my proposal with extant quantitative and qualitative proposals.
At the quantitative level, my setting is based on absolute degrees. Since experi-
ments revealed disagreement concerning probability degrees, I have continued to
use plain degrees, contrary to most of the quantitative proposals, especially those
based on Bayesian analysis and networks [e.g. Zlotnick 1972, Fisk 1972, Schweitzer
1978, Schum 1987, Barbieri 2013, Blasch et al. 2013], or on the Dempster-Shafer’
theory of evidence [e.g. Nimier & Appriou 1995, Nimier 2005, Cholvy 2004 2010,
Pichon et al. 2012]. The loss of expressivity I observed in my proposal may have
resulted from keeping plain degrees. Without moving to probability degrees,
adding new discrete values or moving to fuzzy degrees may solve the issue. I
also showed that the loss of information was limited since my setting eventually
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leads to recover informational types.
At the qualitative level, my proposal has the advantage of being of practical use
to intelligence personnel. Officers can better appreciate the quality of messages
by putting them into actionable categories (viz. information, misinformation, lies,
etc.). But let us draw a closer comparison between my proposal and the existing
qualitative ones.
As in multi-valued logic proposals [e.g. Seridi & Akdag 2001, Revault d’Allonnes
et al. 2007, Revault d’Allonnes & Lesot 2014 2015], I define credibility degrees on
a discrete scale to match the extant doctrine. Similarly, the credibility dimension
is assumed as the dominant dimension, but multi-valued proposals differ with
respect to the subdimensions they take into account (such as the reliability of the
source, his or her competence, sincerity, etc.), and with respect to the sequential
procedure which integrates those dimensions [e.g. Revault d’Allonnes & Lesot
2014]. In multi-valued proposals, semantic degrees encode the epistemic un-
certainty attached to message contents, sources, context or semantic formulations of
messages,7 whereas I use graded operators to express the uncertainty tied to the
credibility of messages. In both proposals, however, combination rules return a
unique posterior credibility degree. In both cases also, prior and posterior degrees
are defined in semantic structures but degrees of plain certainty/uncertainty, as
well as extra degrees of indifference and ignorance, are primitive in multi-valued
proposals whereas they are derived from the plausibility ordering in my own. To
end with, numerical rules are generalised from logical operations in multi-valued
proposals (such as conjunction, disjunction or implication) while numerical rules are
updates of the plausibility ordering in mine.
Compared to extant proposals in modal logics [e.g. Demolombe 2004, Cholvy
2013], my setting is directly intended to capture the credibility and reliability
dimensions of the STANAG doctrine. Existing proposals are more focused on
giving conjunctive definitions of these dimensions, as well as to subdimensions
used for charaterizing them, — such as the ability of sources to be truthful (or valid)
as well as maximally informative (or complete). By duality, sources are characterized
as misinformers or as disinformers when they fail to meet those requisits. Contrary
7 See Lesot & Revault d’Allonnes [2017] on these different aspects of uncertainty in many-valued
proposals.
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to these proposals, I have offered a logical syntax that includes static operators
for credibility and dynamic operators for reliability. The dynamic part of the
evaluation is mirrored directly in the syntax and not performed through syntactic
derivations in axiomatic systems provided with rules.
168
Conclusion
This thesis has been investigating various deceptive attitudes that range from the
standard case of lies to the non-standard cases of misleading defaults and strategic
omissions. I have combined conceptual, formal and experimental resources to see
more clearly into the definition as well as the evaluation of these deceptive attitudes.
1. Summary of the Chapters
Chapter 1 was entitled Two Definitions of Lying. Following common intuitions, a
statement is definitely, or typically, a lie when this statement is not only intended-
to-deceive and believed-to-be-false, but also objectively false. Then, a dishonest
statement must not be objectively false to be a lie. However, a typical lie is more
usually false than true because falsity makes it deceptive in that respect. For this
reason, some epistemologists have claimed that the correct definition of lying is
the “objective definition” whereby the speaker’s utterance is not only subjectively
false — as in the traditional, “subjective definition” — but also objectively false [e.g.
Grimaltos & Rosell 2013, Turri & Turri 2015]. The main lesson of Chapter 1 is that
falsity is not mandatory for lying. My experiments have shown that a dishonest
utterance is a lie even if it turns out to be objectively true. The French expression
“mentir vrai” can be used in that sense since in true lies, the speaker commits an
act of lying by trying to say something false (this is the meaning of “mentir”), but in
fact the outcome turns out to be true (this is the meaning of “vrai”).8 Accordingly,
8 This expression was made popular by the French poet and novelist Louis Aragon who used it
for describing a fictional method whereby writers transform exact facts to express higher-order
truths about the world and human matters [see Aragon 1980]. Here the expression “mentir
vrai” is used in a different sense for qualifying lies that are intended to be deceitful but happen
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dishonest speakers fail to deceive when they say something true. However, they
succeed at lying since their deceptive intentions are sufficient in that respect.
Chapter 2 was entitled The Surprise Deception Paradox. In Smullyan’s story, a
question we may ask is whether Emile actually lied to Raymond. In fact, Emile’s
announcement is a statement that intends to deceive Raymond. In addition to
that, this statement is objectively true (since Raymond is deceived at the end of
the day), even though it triggers a default conclusion that is false (Raymond is not
deceived by commission). Consistent with the definition of Chapter 1, Emile’s
announcement meets two of the critera required for the announcement to qualify
as a subjective lie. However, dishonesty (or untruthfulness) is not met by Emile
since he believes his utterance to be true. For this reason, his announcement does
not qualify as a subjective lie. The main lesson of Chapter 2 is that, like other
pragmatic phenomena such as false implicatures, misleading defaults are not lies
since the speaker’s utterance is not insincere although the default conclusion is
false or believed-as-false.
If Emile’s announcement is not a lie, what is the meaning of the deception by
omission involved in Smullyan’s story? Emile’s announcement does not fall into
the category of pragmatic imprecision since Emile does not hide information from
Raymond. But nor is Emile’s announcement semantically indeterminate since his
statement is not borderline between truth and falsity but clearly true. Then, an-
other lesson of Chapter 2 is that there may be an intermediary category between
pragmatic imprecision and semantic indeterminacy we may call “pragmatic in-
determinacy” and whereby it is pragmatically uncertain whether the speaker’s
assertion should be interpreted in one way or another. In this regard, it is uncer-
tain whether Emile’s announcement should be interpreted as “I will deceive you
by making some action you do not expect” or as “I will deceive you by no action
for the reason that you do not expect it”. Unfortunately for him, Raymond elicits
the first interpretation and is deceived.
Chapter 3 was entitled The Definition of Intelligence Messages and proposed a taxon-
omy of deceptive strategies that includes standard cases, in particular objective and
to be true.
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subjective lies, with non-standard cases, in particular omissions. As in Chapters 1 and
2, dimensions of truth/falsity and of honesty/dishonesty have been considered
for characterizing contents and sources. For simplicity’s sake, I did not represent
the source’s intention-to-deceive and the source’s utterance in this chapter. Hon-
esty was assumed as a reasonable proxy for representing the source’s intention
while utterances were taken for granted in the elicited contents. The main lesson
of Chapter 3 is that to be integrative of non-standard instances of deception, a
taxonomy must considers sources that are borderline between honesty and dis-
honesty, and contents that are borderline between truth and falsity. So contrary to
Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 considers speakers and contents along intermediary
dimensions of indeterminacy and imprecision. Imprecision is interpreted as either
hiding the truth (negative omissions) or as hiding falsity (positive omissions), while
indeterminacy is interpreted as either preventing false beliefs (error-avoidance) or
as preventing calibrated beliefs (half-truths). Most importantly, this comprehen-
sive account was intended for practical use. I wanted to help intelligence officers
give more fine-grained estimates of the messages they were evaluating by putting
them into actionable categories. The extant setting for information evaluation did
not authorize such epistemological distinctions that turns out to be useful from
an instrumental perspective.
Chapter 3 was closely related to Chapter 4. Entitled A Dynamic Procedure for Infor-
mation Evaluation, Chapter 4 proposed a new procedure for assessing intelligence
data. This proposal was motivated by empirical results showing the prevalence of
the credibility dimension in evaluative aspects. This chapter also offered to bridge
the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches on information evaluation
by proposing a new setting based on numerical plausibility degrees. The main
lesson of Chapter 4 is that quality and quantity are complementary and not sub-
stituable. Quantitative approaches need qualitative expertise on the epistemic,
semantic and pragmatic dimensions of messages. But qualitative approaches
also need numerical degrees for capturing the existing features of the intelligence
scale.
These four chapters dealt with complementary aspects that are the definition
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and evaluation of information, whether this information is deceptive or not. A
joint lesson is that these aspects are two sides of the same coin when we aim
to understand informational dynamics. Another lesson is that non-standard cases
are as important as standard cases in the study of deception, whether these cases
are borderline, like half-truths and omissions, or uncommon and peripheral, like
misleading defaults. That being said, many relevant aspects have necessarily been
left aside or simply touched upon in this integrative ambition. In addition to that,
some of the aspects that have been studied need further analysis. I would like to
end this thesis by drawing some perspectives for future work.
2. Future Perspectives
Chapter 1 presented new empirical data showing that falsity is not necessary for
lying. In contrast, the speaker’s intention to deceive, namely his or her intention
to say something false, is necessary for lying. One dimension this chapter did
not question is the statement condition. I have not investigated whether attempting
to say something false was also a necessary condition for lying. Is a dishonest
speaker who intends but does not attempt to say something false lying or not in that
sense? It seems intuitive that when the intended omission leads the addressee
to hold false beliefs, the speaker’s omission is indeed a lie. Recently, Wiegmann
& Willemsen [2017] and Wiegmann et al. [2017] have collected results that are
consistent with this intuition. They have observed that intended and dishonest
omissions were qualified as lies in case they lead addressees to false implicatures
they would have avoided otherwise. This implies that so-called “lies of omission”
are lies if the pragmatic imprecision of the speak leads the addressee to hold false
beliefs. One future perspective would be to conduct new experiments to confirm
whether utterances are necessary for lying.
Chapter 2 put emphasis on misleading default inferences and deception by omission
through the lenses of the surprise deception paradox. We have seen that omissions
of information have been related to false implicatures by empirical philosophers [see
Wiegmann & Willemsen 2017]. Whether the omission is total or partial, omitting
information makes the addressee conversationally implicate false information by
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hiding the most relevant part of the truth. In that respect, the addressee derives a
wrong conclusion because of incomplete beliefs. From a theoretical perspective,
further work would help make a closer comparison between false implicatures and
misleading defaults since false default conclusions are also triggered by incomplete
beliefs resulting from omissions. Following Caminada [2009] and Sakama et al.
[2010], the speaker needs to hide relevant information to make the hearer jumps
to false conclusions. If the hearer were better informed about the world, he or she
would not draw this mistaken conclusion by default reasoning. The link between
default inferences and false implicatures is debated in the literature, and so is the
difference between misleading defaults and false implicatures. More research is
needed to figure out the relations, and differences, between those two.
Chapter 3 proposed a descriptive matrix for defining intelligence messages.
Though this matrix is more sensitive than the existing one from a qualitative
perspective, there is room for discrimination concerning borderline categories of
indeterminacy and imprecision. We have seen that semantic indeterminacy splits
into subcategories of degree-vagueness vs. open-texture, whereas pragmatic impre-
cision splits into subcategories of generality vs. approximation. Further discrimina-
tion is then possible with respect to the indeterminacy of contents and imprecision
of sources. A 4×4 matrix could be proposed based on 4 levels for truth and 4 levels
for honesty, with two classical levels (True vs. False, Honest vs. Dishonest) as well
as two borderline levels in both cases (Degree-vagueness vs. Open-texture, Gener-
ality vs. Approximation). That way, officers would be provided with additional
categories to make even more specific appreciations of intelligence messages.
But a complementary direction could be to consider further dimensions than
truth and honesty for categorizing messages. Quite naturally, two dimensions
could be integrated to truth and honesty for giving finer characterizations of lies
[following Marsili 2014 2018] but also of non-standard cases of deception. First,
the untruthfulness of sources, namely the degree to which sources are sincere or
insincere, should be considered in pair with their degree of honesty and dishon-
esty. The more sources believe the messages they deliver to be false (true), the
more they are untruthful (truthful) and thus, dishonest (honest) when they deliver
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these messages.9 But considering the untruthfulness of sources implies to move
from plain beliefs to graded beliefs in order to express various degrees of certainty
for truth and falsity. Another dimension that should be considered for greater
expressivity is assertivity: how assertive are sources when they deliver the mes-
sages they deliver? What is the assertoric force of their utterances in that case?
Distinguishing various degrees of intensity in the sources’ assertions would also
lead to higher discrimination in qualitative aspects.
Chapter 4 presented a procedure for intelligence evaluation that complies with
empirical findings on the prevalence of the credibility dimension. However, I
observed that the quantitative aspects of the procedure were less sensitive than
its qualitative features. A discrepancy could be observed between qualitative
types and quantitative scores in posterior credibility ratings. In future work, I
plan to define finer-grained recipes to restore the equilibrium between these two
perspectives. Softer calculation rules shall be devised for numerical operations
such that prior credibility degrees of states that were distinguishable are not made
identical once updates are performed.
As a second step, I aim at implementing my proposal as a software that
intelligence officers could use to assess new messages. The program should be
written in a language rich enough to express the numerical plausibility features
of my procedure, and to give a unique credibility measure to messages based on
two modules, one linked to the credibility of message contents, the other linked
to the reliability of their sources. These modules should be supplied by evolving
knowledge bases: one containing contextual evidence for cross-checking contents
and the other containing information on sources to determine their informational
pedigree. However, one major challenge is that the credibility and reliability of
messages are interdependent, and so are the resultant scores. In order to succeed,
the software should keep constant track of the evolutions of the knowledge bases
in order to provide up-to-date ratings and scores.
That being done, It will remain to test the efficiency of the software. Experi-
mental protocols could be divided in relation to the following questions: (1) Does
the program give calibrated measures of the dimensions it aims to capture and
9 On the contrary, the less sources believe the messages they deliver to be false (true), the more
they are truthful (untruthful) and thus, honest (dishonest) when they deliver these messages.
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aggregate? (2) Is the software tractable for intelligence professionals to use it as
a common basis, or should it be simplified? (3) Does the procedure increase the
performance of officers making intelligence evaluation? In other words, does
recovering informational types help them better appreciate the messages they are
evaluating and make sounder decisions? To answer these questions, specific test
protocols will be needed. I leave the elaboration of these issues for further work.
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Appendix:
Lying and Vagueness§§
Paul Égré Benjamin Icard
Abstract
Vagueness is a double-edged sword in relation to lying and truthfulness. In
situations of in which a cooperative speaker is uncertain about the world,
vagueness offers a resource for truthfulness: it avoids committing oneself to
more precise utterances that would be either false or unjustifiably true, and
it is arguably an optimal solution to satisfy the Gricean maxims of Quality
and Quantity. In situations in which a non-cooperative speaker is well-
informed about the world, on the other hand, vagueness can be a deception
mechanism. We distinguish two cases of that sort: cases in which the speaker
is deliberately imprecise in order to hide information from the hearer; and
cases in which the speaker exploits the semantic indeterminacy of vague
predicates to produce utterances that are true in one sense, but false in another.
Should such utterances, which we call half-truths, be considered lies? The
answer, we argue, depends on the context: the lack of unequivocal truth is
not always sufficient to declare falsity.
Keywords: lying; deception; vagueness; imprecision; indeterminacy; generality; approximation;
open-texture; supervaluations; half-truth; informativeness; subjectivity; equivocation
§§Published in Oxford Handbook of Lying, J. Meibauer ed., Oxford University Press, 2018.
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Lying may be defined as the deliberate utterance of a false sentence (or thought
to be false), generally with the aim of misleading the hearer into thinking that
the sentence is true. Paradigmatic examples of lies involve sentences expressing
incontrovertibly false propositions. For example, when former French Minister of
Budget Jérôme Cahuzac solemnly declared on December 5, 2012: “I do not have,
Mr Deputee, I never had, any account in a foreign country, neither now nor before”,
he made an outright false assertion whose falsity he could no longer deny after
investigations found evidence that he had held bank accounts in Switzerland,
Singapore, and the Isle of Man. Those investigations quickly led to Cahuzac
admitting his lie and resignating.
The Cahuzac scandal is the example of a blatant lie: an utterance whose falsity
is clear and eventually beyond doubt, including to the speaker. For many of our
utterances, however, it is not so clear-cut whether they should be considered a
lie or not, even after all the evidence has been collected, and even to the speaker.
This happens when utterances are vague. The point is that vague sentences
have unclear truth-conditions, and cannot easily be nailed down as false for that
matter. Consider horoscopes, and the question of whether they are truthful or
not. Suppose my horoscope tells me (an example found on the internet):
(1) Overall, you will feel rather good, physically and morally. You won’t be
too inhibited this time and...
Is the sentence true or false? The answer is unclear. Characteristic of horoscopes is
the exploitation of vagueness. In an expression like overall, it is left underspecified
exactly what proportion of the time. Similarly, feel good is a qualitative predicate
for which there is no absolute criterion of application, and likewise for inhibited.
Further exploitation of vagueness can be found in the use of degree modifiers
like rather or too, whose interpretation is characteristically speaker- and listener-
dependent [see Lakoff 1973, Wright 1995]. Moreover, the indexical this time leaves
its temporal reference open, making simply unclear which context is targeted by
the sentence to be counted as true or false.
To philosophers of science, horoscopes are deceitful precisely because they
make exploitation of vagueness on such a large scale [Popper 1963]. To casual
readers, on the other hand, they are often pleasant to read, because it is easy to
182
find confirming instances of their truth (horoscopes can be thus argued to exploit
a well-documented psychological phenomenon by means of semantic vague-
ness, the phenomenon of confirmation bias, [see Wason 1966]. Such ambivalence
suggests that vagueness can be a convenient way of calibrating the truth of an as-
sertion. There is a tradeoff between informativeness and truth, or dually, between
vagueness and falsity. That is, the more vague an utterance, the more likely it is to
be true relative to some contexts of interpretation, and the less likely it is to be false
as a result. The more precise an utterance, on the other hand, the narrower the
range of contexts relative to which it can be true. By decreasing informativeness,
a vague sentence thus increases its chances of being true [Russell 1923].1
This inverse relationship between informativeness and truth is exploited not
just by horoscopes, it is a pervasive feature of everyday conversations and ex-
changes, and it concerns commercial, moral and legal transactions. Consider
sales and advertising: like horoscopes, ads generally use vague vocabulary to sell
their products. A famous case concerns the firm Ferrero, who used to advertise
for its star product as see healthy. The firm was sued by a Californian customer
on the grounds of making a false claim, considering the high rate of sugar in its
product, but the company retorted that “there are health benefits associated with
eating chocolate” (more on such moves below). In ordinary exchanges, however,
vagueness is not necessarily used to deceive, but simply to avoid making claims
that are too committal. Vagueness in that sense is not confined to horoscopes, but
concerns predictive utterances quite generally (as in medical communication, see
van Deemter 2009 and below). Vagueness is a feature of language that is used to
avoid flouting Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“Do not say what you believe to be
false / that for which you lack adequate evidence”) while exploiting Grice’s sec-
ond Maxim of Quantity (“Don’t make your contribution more informative than
is required” [see Grice 1975, 45-46].
The goal of this chapter is to clarify the ways in which the use of vague language
relates to both of those maxims. Vagueness is a multifaceted notion, however. In
the first part of this chapter, we start out by distinguish two main manifestations
of vagueness in language: pragmatic imprecision, and semantic indeterminacy, each
of which with more specific varieties. We then go on to explain in what sense
1 “A vague belief has a much better chance of being true than a precise one, because there are
more possible facts that would verify it” [Russell 1923, 91].
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vague language is a double-edged sword in relation to lying and truthfulness.
First, we show that in situations in which a cooperative speaker wishes to inform
about a state of affairs about which she is uncertain, vagueness offers a resource
for truthfulness: it avoids making more precise utterances which may be either
false or unjustifiably true (section 6.2). In situations in which a non-cooperative
speaker is perfectly informed about the world, on the other hand, vagueness can
be a deception mechanism. We distinguish two cases of that sort: cases in which
the speaker is deliberately imprecise in order to hide information from the hearer,
but remains literally truthful (section 6.3); and cases in which the speaker exploits
the semantic indeterminacy of vague predicates to make utterances that are true in
one sense, but false in another, what we call half-truths (section 6.4). The question
is whether such half-truths should be counted as lies. The answer, we suggest,
depends on the context: the lack of unequivocal truth is not always sufficient to
declare falsity (section 6.5).
6.1 Varieties of vagueness
Russell [1923] offered as a general definition that “a representation is vague when
the relation of the representing system to the represented system is not one-
one, but one-many”. In the linguistic case, an expression is vague according
to him if “there is not only one object that a word means, and not only one
possible fact that will verify a proposition”[89-90]. That is, the same utterance
is compatible with several distinct meanings. This one-many relationship can
be realized in several ways, and a merit of Russell’s definition is that it covers
a range of phenomena associated to linguistic vagueness. In what follows we
distinguish four main manifestations: generality, approximation, degree-vagueness,
and open-texture. Following several authors [see Pinkal 1995, Kennedy 2007, Solt
2015], we argue that generality and approximation are fundamentally cases of
pragmatic imprecision, whereas degree-vagueness and open-texture are semantic
phenomena, directly affecting the truth-conditions of expressions (see Figure 6.1).
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Vagueness
Imprecision
(pragmatic)
Generality
(underspecificity)
Approximation
(coarsening)
Indeterminacy
(semantic)
Degree-vagueness
(quantitative)
Open-texture
(qualitative)
Figure 6.1: Varieties of Linguistic Vagueness
6.1.1 Generality
A first instance of Russell’s definition concerns the phenomenon of generality in
language (being underspecific). Consider the following dialog between a father
and his son:
(2) Q. Who did you see at the party?
A. Some friends.
Let us assume that the son has ten friends, all known to the father. The son’s
answer is general in the sense that it is compatible with several more specific
answers being true. The father can’t infer from the answer which exact number
of friends was seen. An answer like two friends would be more informative in
that respect, but it would still be general, leaving the father uncertain as to which
two-membered subset of the relevant set includes the friends seen by his son.
Important to note is that in this context a sentence like I saw some friends has
completely clear truth-conditions, it simply means that the number of friends
seen by the speaker is greater than zero. Vagueness in that case does not mean
any indeterminacy in the statement of the truth-conditions of the sentence, but
simply refers to the fact that the response to the question fails to be maximally
informative.
Theorists of vagueness often dismiss generality as a central aspect for that
matter [see Fine 1975, Keefe 2000]. We find important to keep it into consideration
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here, for the underspecificity of answers, although relative to the question under
discussion, is a very common aspect of language use of particular relevance in
relation to lying.
6.1.2 Approximation
A second illustration of Russell’s definition of vagueness pertains to approxima-
tion. In cases of approximation an expression with precise truth conditions is used
to convey a meaning that differs from its literal meaning, but that is close enough.
As a result, the same expression is used with a coarser meaning (larger range of
interpretations than its literal meaning). Consider the following dialogues:
(3) Q. What do you make a month?
A. 3,000 euros.
(4) Q. What time did John arrive?
A. He arrived at 3 o’clock.
(5) Q. How old is she?
A. She is 40.
In (3), the answer may be asserted by someone who knows the precise answer
to actually be 3287,23 euros. This is a case in which the speaker rounds off the
actual number to a lower number, relying on the fact that it is more relevant to
set the standard of precision to multiples of 1000 euros than to a multiples of a
single euro, let alone cents [see Krifka 2007]. The same often happens with the
other two examples: 3 o-clock can be used when John in fact arrived at five past or
five to [van der Henst et al. 2002], and she is 40 could be used to refer to someone
whose age is within a few months or even a few years around 40, depending on
the context.
Approximation is not limited to numbering, but is also found in other domains,
as exemplified in Austin’s geometrical example [Austin 1962, Lewis 1979]:
(6) France is hexagonal.
The latter sentence would be false if taken to mean that France has precisely the
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shape of a hexagon, but we understand it to mean that it can be circumscribed to
a reasonable approximation by a hexagon.
Cases of approximation are cases in which a semantically precise expression
is used with slack [Lasersohn 1999]. Importantly, there may not be an absolutely
precise convention as to the range of meanings that are compatible with the use
of an expression. When is it no longer fine to say John is 40 years old? What if John
is 35 years old? Approximation is always relative to explicit or implicit standards
of precision and to rounding rules, and how close a value needs to be to the literal
meaning will often be at the speaker’s discretion.
6.1.3 Degree-vagueness
The third aspect of vagueness we isolate concerns the quantitative indeterminacy
attached to gradable expressions in particular (which we call degree-vagueness,
following Alston 1964; Burks 1946 talks of linear vagueness). Consider the fol-
lowing variation on the dialogue between a father and his son:
(7) Q. How many people were at the party?
A. Many people.
Here again, the answer is imprecise because compatible with a multiplicity of
states of affairs obtaining (maybe 25 people were at the party, 50, or 100). Unlike
for some, however, many is not an expression for which we can state determinate
truth conditions relative to a fixed countable domain. One way of viewing that
phenomenon is as a form of context-dependence [see Sapir 1944, Partee 1989,
Lappin 2000, Greer 2014, Egré & Cova 2015]: whereas some As are Bs is true
exactly if the number of As that are Bs is nonzero,many As are Bs would be true
if the number of As that are Bs exceeds a context-sensitive number n (cardinal
reading), or possibly if the number of As that are Bs exceeds a context-sensitive
proportion α of the As or of some other comparison class (proportional reading).
The setting of such parameters is problematic: assuming such threshold values,
did the son intend many to mean more than 5, more than a third, or some other
number? A remarkable fact about vague expressions such as many is that the
speaker himself or herself need not have a precise idea of the values of such
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thresholds in order to apply the expression and to convey meaning.
Beside many, paradigmatic examples of vague expressions in that sense in-
clude gradable adjectives like tall, long, expensive, healthy, etc., all of which accept
degree-modification (as in taller) or modification by intensifiers (very tall) [see
Kennedy 2007]. Gradable adjectives give rise to familiar symptoms, in particular
the admission of borderline cases of application and the susceptibility to sorites-
reasoning [see Keefe 2000, Egré & Klinedinst 2011, Burnett 2016] for a more specific
typology of gradable expressions). Borderline cases of application are cases for
which it is unclear to the speaker whether the expression should apply or not:
for example, it may be unclear whether a man of 178cm should be counted as
tall or not. An important fact about borderline cases is moreover that they give
rise to inconsistent verdicts both between- and within-subjects [see McCloskey &
Glucksberg 1978]. Cases of between-subject inconsistencies are often viewed as
manifestations of the subjectivity and evaluativity of vague expressions: many,
tall, healthy, beautiful, could mean different things without error depending on
the speaker [see Parikh 1994, Wright 1995, Kölbel 2004, Fara 2000, Raffman 2013,
Kennedy 2013, Egré 2016, Verheyen et al. 2017]. This subjectivity is important for
an assessment of the falsity of vague sentences: the same vague sentence could be
used truly relative to one speaker, but be viewed as false by another, depending
on their context, interests and evaluative standards (see in particular Kölbel 2004,
McNally & Stojanovic 2017 on predicates of personal taste).
6.1.4 Open-texture
The fourth illustration of Russell’s definition we single out concerns the open-
ness of the respects constitutive of the meaning of an expression, what we call
open-texture (following Waismann 1945; Burks 1946 talks of multidimensional
vagueness, and Alston 1964 of combinatorial vagueness). This openness is found
at different levels, and it has to do with polysemy and multidimensionality.
Already in the case of dimensional adjectives (like tall), the selection of a
comparison class is fundamental for the application of the adjective, but it can
vary without limit, and it will impact the setting of a boundary between tall and
not tall objects (tall for a building, for a basketball player, or for a fifth-grader, will
mean different things, [see Kamp 1975, Klein 1980].
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For a number of gradable adjectives, moreover, several dimensions of com-
parison interact, and their number and structure is generally indeterminate, even
when a comparison class has been fixed. Consider the adjective healthy. An
indication that healthy is multidimensional is the occurrence of adjuncts such as
healthy in some respect, healthy in all respects [Sassoon 2012]. For example, healthy as
applied to a meal could be predicated based on whether it provides vitamins, or
based on whether it has a particular effect on blood pressure, or based on some
way of integrating of those respects, and no definitive list of respects appears to
be forthcoming.
The phenomenon of open texture is not limited to gradable adjectives, but it
concerns the difficulty of providing necessary and sufficient conditions of appli-
cations for a vast number of expressions, including nominal expressions (Wittgen-
stein 1953 famously used the example of the word game to show the difficulty in
providing a consistent and exhaustive list of defining criteria for that notion).
6.1.5 Representing vagueness
Degree-vagueness and open-texture can be thought of as a forms of “referential
multiplicity” [Raffman 2013]. A convenient way of representing the meaning of a
vague expression, following the supervaluationist tradition, is thus in terms of a
set of admissible sharpenings or precisifications [Mehlberg 1958, Lewis 1979, Fine
1975, Kamp 1975]. For an expression like tall, for example, given a comparison
class, the meaning can be represented by a set of precise intervals above a vari-
able threshold; for an expression like healthy, given a comparison class again, it
may be thought of as a set of tuples consisting of variable respects and intervals
along a common dimension set by those respects. Similarly for approximation:
the meaning of hundred as used approximately can be represented by a set of
numbers around 100 [Lasersohn 1999]. Depending on the speaker, however, the
range of such admissible sharpenings may differ.2 Different speakers may also
assign different weights to different sharpenings depending on the context (see
2 This makes semantic vagueness close to lexical ambiguity, except that in the case of lexical
ambiguity the meanings are supposed to be mentally far apart or disjoint [Keefe 2000, Pinkal
1995]. Logically speaking, however, it is relevant to compare vagueness with ambiguity, since
precisifications play the same role as disambiguations [see Lewis 1982]. In the next section, we
will see that vagueness, like ambiguity, can give rise to pragmatic equivocation.
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Lassiter 2011, Lassiter & Goodman 2015 on probabilistic representations of vague
meaning).
In this regard, the main difference between expressions like hundred or some
students on the one hand, and tall or game on the other, is that the former have
determinate truth conditions. Because of that, generality and approximation are
cases of pragmatic vagueness: by being general rather than more specific a speaker
chooses to be less informative than she could be, and by being approximate
she gives less information than what the expression literally means. Degree-
vagueness and open-texture on the other hand are cases of semantic vagueness: the
meaning of expressions like many, healthy or game is “intrinsically uncertain” (in
the words of Peirce 1902, 748), that is those expressions do not have constant truth
conditions across contexts and speakers.
With these distinctions in mind, we are now in a position to examine the ways
in which vagueness interacts with the Gricean maxims. The Gricean maxims
assume that conversation fundamentally rests on cooperation. As we know from
game theory, however, speaker and hearer need not have their interests perfectly
aligned, and sometimes they can diverge dramatically. It may be costly to reveal
the truth, or to reveal the whole truth. Most of the time, however, making an
assertion that the listener would recognize as false can be even more costly: if a
false claim is exposed, the speaker incurs the risk of losing credibility, or greater
costs [see Asher & Lascarides 2013]. In the rest of this chapter, we distinguish two
main classes of situations that motivate the use of vague language. On the one
hand, there are situations where the speaker is imperfectly informed about the facts,
and may simply wish to avoid speaking falsely by speaking too precisely. On the
other hand, there are situations where the speaker is perfectly informed about the
facts, but has an interest to hide information from the hearer, and potentially to
take advantage of the indeterminacy of vague expressions to bias or mislead.
6.2 Avoiding error
Grice’s Maxim of Quality enjoins one not to speak falsely, but also not to say
things for which one lacks adequate evidence. One aspect in which the Maxim
of Quality justifies the use of vague language concerns cases where the speaker is
190
uncertain about which precise state of affairs obtains [see Channell 1994, Frazee
& Beaver 2010] or will obtain in the future [Channell 1985, van Deemter 2009].
Consider a situation in which you return from a party and are a fully coopera-
tive speaker trying to convey maximum information. The party was attended by
a group of people, but you do not know exactly how many there were, because
you could not count them. Upon returning from the party, you’re asked how
many people were there. In this case, there is no number n for which you can
truly and justifiably say: there were exactly n people. In order to respond truly and
justifiably, the next option would be to specify an exact interval. Suppose you are
sure that there were more than 20 people, and fewer than 200 hundreds, but are
uncertain in between. Then you may say:
(8) There were between 20 and 200 people.
The response is general in this case, but little informative. It would be more
informative to give your best estimate of a lower bound:
(9) At least 100 people.
But suppose there were in fact 93 persons attending. The answer would be literally
false, despite coming close to your assessment. On the other hand, you would
not be wrong if you said:
(10) a. About 100 people.
b. Many people.
Semantic expressions like about and many allow you to convey information truly
in this case, compatibly with an indeterminate range of states of affairs obtain-
ing. They allow you to avoid error, but also, somewhat surprisingly, to be more
informative than you would if you tried to specify exact intervals without error.
Importantly, the hearer may have a different understanding of what to count as
many than you. Suppose you understand many to denote a range of sharp intervals
(using the supervaluationist picture), with a probability distribution on them
(some precisifications are more likely to you than other; [see Lassiter 2011, Lassiter
& Goodman 2015]. The hearer may have a different probability distribution
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that rules out some of the intervals you consider possible, but you would still
communicate successfully if the hearer ends up with a posterior distribution that
includes the value you actually observed, and if it makes that value more likely
than before you answered [see Parikh 1994, Lassiter 2011, Lassiter & Goodman
2015].
The point of the previous example is that vague language, in situations of un-
certainty, may accomplish an optimal tradeoff between the need to be truthful and
the need to be informative frazee2010vagueness. Use of vague language in situ-
ations of uncertainty is also modulated by the cost of speaking falsely, compared
to the benefits of speaking accurately. An example discussed by van Deemter
[2009] concerns cases of medical communication. Van Deemter points out that
“a doctor who says “These symptoms will disappear fairly soon" is less likely to
get complaints, and to be sued, than one who says “These symptoms will have
disappeared by midnight"” [8].
Vague language, in summary, is a way of speaking truly and informatively
in situations of uncertainty. This does not mean that vagueness is immune to
falsity: suppose the symptoms disappear only after a month, then the patient
may charge the doctor of incompetence, or even of having lied. The patient
could complain that fairly soon was, in her perspective, incompatible with a time
interval of a month. The doctor could deny having spoken falsely, on the other
hand, by defending her own perspective. The relativity of vague interpretations
to speakers makes charges of lies, as we will see, a delicate matter (see section
6.5).
6.3 Hiding Information
Let us now turn to cases where the speaker has no uncertainty about the world,
but has an incentive to be noncooperative. Grice’s Maxim of Quantity is twofold:
it asks one to be as informative as required for the purpose of the conversation, but
also to not be more informative than required. What counts as “required for the
purpose of the conversation” is itself vague and heavily depends on the interests
that speaker and hearer have in sharing information [Asher & Lascarides 2013].
For a range of situations, a well-informed speaker can legitimately wish to retain
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information from the hearer, and so to be vague in order to limit cooperation.
Cases of what we called generality in the previous section are very common in that
regard. Consider the dialogue in (2), repeated here.
(11) Q. Who did you see at the party?
A. Some friends.
Let us assume that the father is actually interested in knowing whether his son
saw a particular person, say Ann, whom he suspects his son of dating. The son,
on the other hand, wishes to keep his privacy. Assume the son saw Ann indeed,
but also Don and Eli, two other friends known to the father. In this case, the son is
giving a perfectly true answer, but he is not allowing the father to identify whom
exactly he saw.
Compare with the example of the previous section. Assume you know this
time that exactly 63 people attended the party, but have an interest not to reveal
the exact number. You may choose to be underinformative by responding:
(12) Q. How many people were at the party?
A. Fewer than a hundred.
The answer is literally true, but partial in the sense of Groenendijk & Stokhof
[1982]: it leaves possibilities open and fails to completely settle the question.
Potentially, it is also misleading: for it triggers the implicature that it is compatible
with your knowledge that there could have been 90 people or more attending
[see Spector 2013]. Such cases, in which a speaker is literally truthful but uses
misleading implicatures are called cases of misdirection by Asher & Lascarides
[2013], who characterize them as instances of rhetorical as opposed to genuine
Gricean cooperativity.3
Neither of the previous examples relies on utterances that are vague semanti-
cally, but we can find similar cases where a semantically vague expression is used
to withhold information. Imagine nosey neighbours asking how much you paid
3 See in particular their discussion of Bronston vs. United States as an exploitation of literal truth
to refute perjury, as well as the presentation of the case in Tiersma [2004]. See Ransom et al.
[2017] for a recent study comparing cases in which a truthful speaker may have an incentive to
be completely uninformative to where they may choose to be partially informative depending
on the level of trust in the hearer.
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for your apartment. Assume you know the exact price you paid, but don’t want
to reveal it:
(13) Q. How much did you buy your apartment?
A. It was not too expensive.
An incentive to avoid being precise in this case is that you may want to avoid
appearing either lucky (in case you paid less than your neighbors for the same
size) or stupid (in case you paid more), or you may just want to give no indication
of your assets. Use of a qualitative expression like expensive is advantageous
here because it avoids specifying a definite number, and it remains compatible
with the preservation of truthfulness: we may assume that you are sincere in
thinking that the price you paid was not expensive, even ahead of the dialogue
(that assumption is not always warranted, see the next section).
Consider for comparison the following alternative answers, assuming the exact
price you paid for your apartment is 220,000 euros:
(14) a. I paid 200,000 euros.
b. I paid around 200,000 euros.
c. I paid between 50,000 euros and 300,000 euros.
Answer (14a) is approximate in this case, but it does not signal that it is approx-
imate. As pointed out by Meibauer [2014], it may be truthfully asserted if the
standard of precision in the context of the conversation is such that a difference of
20,000 euros would not be relevant. But the answer could be misleading, instead
of just imprecise, if uttered with the intention of making your neighbors believe
that you paid less than you actually did. For instance it would count as false in a
context in which the standard of precision needs to be maximal (say in the context
of declaring taxes).
Answer (14b) makes the approximation explicit, and it is also semantically
vague, due to the use of the vague modifier around. Despite that, the answer
remains more informative than the one in (13), for it lets your neighbors infer the
actual price with less uncertainty than based on hearing not too expensive.
Answer (14c), finally, is neither approximate nor semantically vague: it states
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an exact interval but to create uncertainty. Like (13), it signals either that you
do not know the price you paid, or that you don’t want to answer the question
precisely; however, the interval specified is so large here that the hearers would
be better-founded to think you do not want to answer the question. Also, the
answer in (13) may end up being more informative than the one in (14c) despite
relying on semantic vagueness, because upon hearing “not too expensive” the
hearer is likely to narrow down the range of prices you potentially paid to a
smaller interval than the one specified in (14c).4
6.4 Making half-truths
Beside cases in which a speaker is imprecise to hide information, there is a class
of cases where the speaker can exploit the semantic indeterminacy of vague
expressions to produce utterances whose truth status in unclear: they are true
under some way of resolving their vagueness, but that way can be tendentious or
biased.5
Consider the following example (from C. List and L. Valentini, p.c.) where
you receive an invitation for dinner. As a matter of fact, you would be free to go
to that dinner, but have no inclination for it. Imagine the following dialogue:
(15) Q. Are you free to come for supper tomorrow?
A. Sorry, I have an engagement.
(16) Q. Are you free to come for supper tomorrow?
A. Sorry, I am busy.
In (15), your response ought to qualify as a lie. In the case of (16), the answer does
not obviously count as a lie, but it does not clearly count as true either. One way of
explaining the contrast is in terms of supervaluations [Fine 1975, Kamp 1975]. On
all admissible ways of sharpening the meaning of I have an engagement, the sentence
4 This is because I paid between 50,000 and 300,000 euros scalarly implicates that it is possible you
paid 51,000. With not too expensive this inference is not mandated at all. On the mechanism of
such implicatures, see Fox [2014].
5 The term half-truth is used in a number of different senses in the literature. Our use is broadly
compatible with Carson [2010]’s, who defines a half-truth to be a true statement that “selectively
emphasize[s] facts that tend to support a particular interpretation or assessment of an issue”
[57-58]. We use half-true in the sense of borderline true.
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would come out false (i.e. super-false). On the other hand, there are admissible
ways of sharpening the meaning of busy for the sentence to count as true. I am
busy may even be deemed super-true, that is true literally on all admissible ways
of sharpening the meaning of busy, but this is moot: it depends on what to count
as an admissible precisification (see below). If you end up watching TV, you
would obviously be busy watching TV, but at the time of utterance busy appears
to convey that you have some obligation.
In our view the answer in (16) is a half-truth, precisely because it is not clearly
false, but not clearly true either. Concretely, I am busy offers a polite a way of
declining the invitation. A more informative alternative about the speaker’s mo-
tives would be to say: I am not very inclined, but it would be clearly offending. The
intent of I am busy is partly to mislead, therefore, but consistently with satisfying
a norm of politeness.6
A more extreme case of exploitation of semantic vagueness concerns Presi-
dent Bill Clinton’s declarations about the nature of his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky:
(17) I have never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.
This case, importantly, is one where all parties had been fully informed of the
relevant facts. To justify his claim without perjury, Bill Clinton took advantage
of the open texture of the expression sexual relations, that is of the lack of a clear
definition. However, he did it not by making up a definition, but by exploiting
an attempt made by his opponents to provide an explicit definition of the term
“[engaging in] sexual relations” [see Tiersma 2004, for details]. 7 Pressed to
explain himself, Clinton’s defense was:
(18) “I thought the definition [of sexual relations, as read by Judge Wright]
included any activity by the person being deposed, where the person was
the actor and came in contact with those parts of the bodies with the
purpose or intent of gratification, and excluded any other activity”.
6 Thanks to C. List and L. Valentini for discussion of that aspect.
7 The explicit definition in question is: “a person engages in “sexual relations" when the person
knowingly engages in or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks of any person with an intent to gratify or arouse the sexual desire of any per-
son‘Contact" means intentional touching, either directly or through clothing.”
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The way Bill Clinton defended himself can be put in supervaluationist terms again:
it is not the case that on all ways of further precisifying the explicit definition
proposed by his opponents, receiving oral sex counts as engaging in a sexual
relation. Interestingly, in an earlier statement Bill Clinton commented about
whether Monica Lewinsky had had “a sexual affair" with him as follows:
(19) Q. If she told someone that she had a sexual affair with you beginning in
November of 1995, would that be a lie?
A. It’s certainly not the truth. It would not be the truth.
In this occurrence, Clinton appeared to concede that the allegation would not
necessarily be false, but without counting as true. In supervaluationist terms
again, there are some admissible ways of precisifying sexual affair that would
make Lewinsky’s supposed statement true, yet not all ways of precisifying sexual
affair would make it true. Overall, Bill Clinton was able to exploit the semantic
indeterminacy of those expressions in order to avoid the charge of perjury. He
would have been convicted if, from the jury’s perspective, all admissible ways of
precisifying the meaning had led to the sentence being false, but the jury in that
case failed to rule out Clinton’s way from being admissible.
6.5 Are half-truths lies?
Let us take stock. In section 6.3 we saw that in response to a question, a speaker
can be underspecific without committing any lie. In section 6.4, however, we saw
that semantic indeterminacy can be used to produce sentences whose truth status
is unclear, what we called half-truths. Shouldn’t half-truths be considered lies,
however, given that those utterances fail to be clearly true?
First of all, utterances like (16) or (17) may typically be uttered insincerely. In
the case of (16), I may think to myself in petto “well, I am not really busy...” or
“well, I am busy watching TV”, and Clinton may have silently thought to himself
“well, except for an oral sexual relation”. Those utterances then may be viewed
as cases of amphiboly or mental reservation [Bok 1979, Mullaney 1980, Adler 1997],
whereby the actual meaning that the speaker has in mind is in fact different from
the meaning the hearer can reasonably infer.
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To avoid that complication, let us assume that each utterance is made sincerely
at the time it is uttered, and without mental reservation (without the speaker
making any silent addition). In supervaluationist terms, the question we are
asking is whether an utterance that fails to be super-true (true on all admissible
precisifications) ought to be considered false on normative grounds. We think
the answer to this question is nonobvious, for it depends on two parameters: the
definition of what to count as an admissible precisification, and the choice of a
standard for truth.
Regarding the first issue, most people would agree that Clinton’s utterance
is false simpliciter, despite being true under some very specific sharpening of the
meaning of sexual relation, for they would deem that particular precisification
to be inadmissible in an ordinary conversational context. In the legal context,
however, Clinton was successful in making that sharpening relevant, and since it
was incumbent on the jury to show that his statement was unequivocally false, it
allowed for his sentence not to qualify as a lie, despite the sentence not qualifying
as a clear truth either.
This brings us to the second issue. Theories of vagueness differ on the stan-
dards whereby a sentence can be truthfully uttered. Supervaluationism treats
sentences as true simpliciter if they are true on all admissible precisifications, but
there is a dual theory, subvaluationism, which treats sentences as true simpliciter
when true under some precisification [Hyde 1997]. Subvaluationism is very lib-
eral in that it predicts that a sentence and its negation can both be true then.8
In practice, the standards for truth and falsity appear to depend on the context.
In the Clinton lawsuit, it was sufficient for the sentence to be true under some
sharpening to not be considered a lie by the jury. In the class-action lawsuit
that opposed Athena Hohenberg to the Ferrero company, on the other hand,
the complaint was that healthy was used misleadingly for a product containing
too much fat and sugar. Ferrero’s defense was based on the fact that healthy is
multidimensional, and that their product was at least healthy in the respects of
bringing chocolate, containing low sodium, and so on.9. Despite that, the court
8 This implies that I am busy and I am not busy would both be true in a context in which either
is true under some admissible sharpening. But each of them would also be false, since false
under some sharpening. The upshot would be that the sentence both is a lie, and fails to be a
lie.
9 See http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/02/10/23912/a-mom-sues-nutella-maker-for-deceptive-advertising/
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eventually forbade Ferrero from advertising the product as healthy. The court
agreed that it is not enough for a sentence like this product is healthy to be true
on just some ways of precisifying healthy in order for the sentence to avoid being
misleading or to count as a lie, presumably in this case because the ways in which
the sentence is false outweigh those in which it is true (Ferrero’s use would in fact
violate the Gricean Maxim of Relevance).
In general, however, the Ferrero example may be more emblematic of the ways
in which vague language is interpreted. Grice’s Maxim of Manner recommends
avoiding ambiguity [see Grice 1975, 46]. There is evidence, however, that in
cases in which a vague predicate is used without qualification, and where two
interpretations are available for the predicate, a weak one and a strong one, the
stronger interpretation will be the default [see Dalrymple et al. 1998]. Upon
hearing this person is tall, the default is to get that the person is clearly tall, rather
than borderline tall [Alxatib & Pelletier 2011, Cobreros et al. 2012 2015]. Likewise,
when saying this product is healthy, the default is likely to hear this product is
healthy in most respects, or even in all respects [see Sassoon 2012], rather than just
some respects. As a result, to say of a product that it is healthy without qualification
would suggest that the product is more healthy than unhealthy: in the Ferrero
case, this pragmatic enrichment is deceptive, and can legitimately be considered
a lie.
We see, in summary, that often an utterance will be deemed a lie if it fails to
be unambiguously true. But sometimes, as the Clinton case shows us, it might
fail to be deemed a lie if it is not unambiguously false. Whichever of those two
will prevail appears to depend not just on the existence of ways for a sentence to
be true, but also on how relevant those ways are to the parties involved in the
conversation.
6.6 Conclusion
Let us recapitulate the main lessons of our discussion of the relation between
lying and vagueness. To begin with, we have seen that vagueness provides a
way for a cooperative speaker to remain truthful in situations in which she is
trying to communicate information about which she is uncertain. Vagueness may
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then be described as a way of avoiding error and therefore lies. This concerns
all cases in which the use of qualitative but vague vocabulary (as in many, long,
expensive) avoids committing oneself to precise quantitative expressions for which
one fails to have adequate evidence. As opposed to that, we have highlighted
two kinds of cases in which vagueness can be used deceptively. The first are cases
in which a well-informed speaker has motives to hide or retain information. In
such cases the speaker is deliberately imprecise and partial, but need not commit
lies in the strict sense of the term. She may however be misleading if the partial
information given triggers false implicatures. The second kind of cases concern
what we have called half-truths, utterances whose status is borderline between
true and false, depending on how vague expressions in them are interpreted.
Such cases are more problematic. An utterance will be misleading if it is true only
under some very peculiar precisification. On the other hand, the indeterminacy
of vague expressions can make it difficult to prove that a vague utterance is a lie,
as opposed to an expression whose intended meaning was misunderstood.
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Résumé
Cette thèse vise à mieux définir ainsi
qu’à mieux évaluer les stratégies
de tromperie et de manipulation
de l’information. Des ressources
conceptuelles, formelles et expéri-
mentales sont combinées en vue
d’analyser des cas standards de
tromperie, tels que le mensonge,
mais aussi non-standards, tels
que les inférences trompeuses et
l’omission stratégique.
Les aspects définitionnels sont
traités en premier. J’analyse la déf-
inition traditionnelle du mensonge en
présentant des résultats empiriques
en faveur de cette définition clas-
sique (dite ‘définition subjective’),
contre certains arguments visant à
défendre une ‘définition objective’
par l’ajout d’une condition de faus-
seté. J’examine ensuite une énigme
logique issue de R. Smullyan, et qui
porte sur un cas limite de tromperie
basé sur une règle d’inférence par
défaut pour tromper un agent par
omission.
Je traite ensuite des aspects éval-
uatifs. Je pars du cadre exis-
tant pour l’évaluation du renseigne-
ment et propose une typologie des
messages fondée sur les dimen-
sions descriptives de vérité (pour
leur contenu) et d’honnêteté (pour
leur source). Je présente en-
suite une procédure numérique pour
l’évaluation des messages basée sur
les dimensions évaluatives de crédi-
bilité (pour la vérité) et de fiabil-
ité (pour l’honnêteté). Des mod-
èles numériques de plausibilité ser-
vent à capturer la crédibilité a pri-
ori des messages puis des règles
numériques sont proposées pour ac-
tualiser ces degrés selon la fiabilité
de la source.
Mots-Clés
Mensonge, Tromperie, Omission,
Qualité de l’information, Désinfor-
mation, Mésinformation, Évaluation
de l’information, Vague, Logique
épistémique, Traitement du ren-
seignement.
Abstract
This thesis aims at improving the def-
inition and evaluation of deceptive
strategies that can manipulate infor-
mation. Using conceptual, formal
and experimental resources, I ana-
lyze three deceptive strategies, some
of which are standard cases of de-
ception, in particular lies, and others
non-standard cases of deception, in
particular misleading inferences and
strategic omissions.
Firstly, I consider definitional as-
pects. I deal with the definition of ly-
ing, and present new empirical data
supporting the traditional account of
the notion (called the ‘subjective defi-
nition’), contradicting recent claims in
favour of a falsity clause (leading to
an ‘objective definition’). Next, I an-
alyze non-standard cases of decep-
tion through the categories of mis-
leading defaults and omissions of in-
formation. I use qualitative belief re-
vision to examine a puzzle due to R.
Smullyan about the possibility of trig-
gering a default inference to deceive
an addressee by omission.
Secondly, I consider evaluative as-
pects. I take the perspective of
military intelligence data processing
to offer a typology of informational
messages based on the descriptive
dimensions of truth (for message
contents) and honesty (for message
sources). I also propose a nu-
merical procedure to evaluate these
messages based on the evaluative
dimensions of credibility (for truth)
and reliability (for honesty). Quan-
titative plausibility models are used
to capture degrees of prior credibil-
ity of messages, and dynamic rules
are defined to update these degrees
depending on the reliability of the
source.
Keywords
Lying, Deception, Omission, Infor-
mation Quality, Disinformation, Mis-
information, Information Evaluation,
Vagueness, Epistemic Logic, Intelli-
gence Data Processing.
